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This thesis explores the making of Thailand’s Civil and Commercial Code in 1925 
(‘Code of 1925’), especially the drafting method the draftsmen employed, and 
ascertains how the use of this method affected Thai lawyers’ understanding of rules 
and concepts of the Code.  
 The Code of 1925 emerged from a period in which Thailand was under threat 
from colonisation by Western powers. As a result of a number of unbalanced 
commercial treaties between the Thai and foreign governments, the jurisdictional 
sovereignty of the country had been eroded by consular jurisdiction and the 
principle of extraterritoriality. These ‘unfair treaties’ forced the Thai government to 
establish a modern legal system as part of its attempts to recover full judicial 
autonomy. The work of codification of civil and commercial law, which began in 
1908 under the direction of French draftsmen, produced the desired result in 1925 
only after Phraya Manavarajasevi (Plod na Songkhla) became involved. Plod was 
instrumental in replacing the French Code civil with the BGB of 1900 as the principal 
model and introducing the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 (‘Minpō’) and the ‘copying 
method’ which he referred to as the ‘Japanese method’ to the new Thai-dominated 
drafting committee. The Japanese Code and the ‘Japanese method’ were chosen 
owing to Plod’s belief that the Japanese had established their civil code by copying 
the BGB. 
 This thesis shows that Alan Watson’s theory of legal transplants is well suited 
for explaining this type of legal development: the draftsmen copied the wording of 
English translations of provisions of the BGB and the Minpō without much concern 
about their conceptual foundations. They finished their task within seven months.  
But Watson’s contention that successful legal borrowing does not require ‘a 
systematic knowledge of the law’ must be approached with great caution. Plod was 
misled by a secondary source he consulted into believing that the Minpō was 
practically a copy of the BGB. In reality, the Japanese Code was influenced by a 
variety of foreign laws, including German and French law. The drafting committee’s 
lack of knowledge about the rules and concepts they borrowed and the method they 
adopted led to difficulties in interpreting the rules and concepts in question. This is 
illustrated in this thesis by a case study of the legal rules in the Code of 1925 on 
specific performance.  
 Most of the Thai provisions concerning non-performance and remedies for 
non-performance were copied from the BGB, but two important rules concerning 
the rights to performance and damages (Articles 213 and 215) came from the Minpō. 
These provisions were mainly influenced by French law, but Plod and most likely 
other Thai draftsmen erroneously believed that they were of German origin. The 
text of these two articles clearly put specific performance and damages as remedies 
for non-performance on equal footing. The consequence of this is that Thai 
academics who maintain that specific performance is the primary remedy for non-
performance have struggled to justify this point of view. Whenever they expound 
on the principle of the primacy of specific performance in Thai law, Thai writers 
produce contradictory statements because the wording of Articles 213 and 215 
forces them to accept that the creditor in case of non-performance has the right to 
choose between specific performance and damages. 
 This thesis shows that legal borrowing without a proper use of comparative 
law and legal history and a systematic knowledge of the law borrowed can lead to 
undesirable results. Thai lawyers must employ comparative and historical methods 
when discovering the true character of the Thai rules and concepts. With the help of 
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1. THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF 1925 
On 11 November 1925, the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand (‘Code of 1925’), 
which contained Book I (on General Principles) and Book II (on Obligations) was 
promulgated to replace the Civil and Commercial Code of 1923 (‘Code of 1923’).1 
The promulgation of the Code of 1925 marked the end of the long, unsuccessful 
process of codification of private law in Thailand which began soon after the Penal 
Code came into effect in 1908. The modern codes emerged from a period in which 
the country was under threat from colonisation by Western powers. Thailand’s 
jurisdictional sovereignty had been eroded by consular jurisdiction and the 
principle of extraterritoriality2 as a result of a number of unbalanced commercial 
treaties modelled on the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1855 (commonly known as the 
Bowring Treaty) between the Thai and foreign governments.3 Increasing contacts 
with Western powers also provided Thai people with an opportunity to explore 
their own weaknesses by comparing their traditional values and systems with 
                                                      
1 Government Gazette (11 November 1925) Book 42, 1-2. Book III on Specific Contracts was 
promulgated in 1929, Book IV on Properties in 1931, and Book V on Family and Book VI on 
Succession in 1935. Before the Thai government adopted the Gregorian calendar for the 
arrangement of the months in 1941, the New Year in Thailand started on 1 April. However, 
the government retained the use of the Buddhist Era (BE) which is approximately five 
hundred and forty-three years before the Common Era. When dealing with Thai documents 
dated before 1941, this thesis fully adopts the Gregorian calendar. For example, according to 
the Government Gazette, Book III of the Code of 1925 was promulgated on 1 January 2471 
BE (1928 AD), which is 1 January 2472 BE (1929 AD) according to the Gregorian calendar. In 
this thesis, the promulgation date of Book III is written as 1 January 1929. 
2 According to John Bassett Moore, extraterritoriality is ‘an extensive exemption from the 
operation of the local law’. This is ‘owing to diversities in law, custom, and social habits, the 
citizens and subjects of nations possessing European civilization enjoy in countries of non-
European civilization, chiefly in the East. Extraterritoriality is ‘generally secured by treaties 
and in some instances is altogether based upon them, and its exercise is usually regulated by 
the legislation of the countries to whose citizens or subjects the privilege belongs’. John 
Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol 2 (Government Printing Office 1906) 593.   
3 See Francis Bowes Sayre, ‘The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam’ (1928) 22 AJIL 70, 71–
72. 
 2 
perceived western ‘modernity’.4 Both external pressure and internal motivation 
accounted for the modernisation of the country – a process which began in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  
 Relying heavily on the assistance of foreign advisers, King Chulalongkorn 
(Rama V) introduced a variety of reforms.5 Realising that negotiating the abolition 
of extraterritoriality required the establishment of a modern legal system, the king 
embarked upon a judicial reform beginning with modernising the court system and 
sending royals and nobles to study law in England from the 1890s. The travelling 
students became instrumental in setting up modern legal education based on the 
English system and ensuring the predominance of English law in the next forty 
years. Although both the modern Thai courts and the Law School of the Ministry of 
Justice established in 1897 were dominated by English common law, Chulalongkorn 
chose the civil law system as the model for modern Thai legislation.6 Codification of 
criminal law began in 1898 and was concluded successfully by a French-led drafting 
committee in 1907. The French influence increased when the work of codification of 
private law began in 1908 to the extent that the drafting of the civil and commercial 
code was from then on completely in the hands of French draftsmen.7 Their slow 
progress prompted King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) to add three English-educated Thai 
jurists to the drafting committee in 1916.8 However, it was not until 1923 that the 
work of codification underwent a transformation. The drafting committee’s 
composition changed so that the Thais outnumbered the French members, and the 
BGB replaced the French Code civil as the principal model for the Code of 1925. The 
Thai government tactfully rejected the French draft by promulgating it as the Code 
of 1923 but suspending it until it could be assessed by Thai legal professionals. As 
the government anticipated, the French-drafted Code was severely criticised for its 
incoherence and incomprehensibility, and this criticism paved the way for the 
drafting of a new civil and commercial code based on the BGB. All of these changes 
                                                      
4 Preedee Kasemsup, ‘Reception of Law in Thailand – A Buddhist Society’ in Masaji Chiba, 
Asian Indigenous Law: In Interaction with Received Law (KPI 1986) 291. 
5 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 68–69; MB 
Hooker, ‘The ‘Europeanization’ of Siam’s Law 1855-1908’ in MB Hooker (ed), Laws of South-
East Asia, vol 2 (Butterworth 1988) 552, 564. 
6 National Archive of Thailand, Ministry of Justice Doc No Yor 12 1/1, 
‘พระราชหัตถเลขากรมพระสวัสดิ์วัฒนวิศิษฐ ถวายพระบาทสมเด็จพระมงกุฎเกลาเจาอยูหัว 
เรื่องขอเสนอปาดูซเกี่ยวกับการจัดระบบการศึกษากฎหมาย (Letter from Prince Svastiwatvisit to King Vajiravudh 
on Georges Padoux’s Memorandum on the Question on Legal Education in Siam)’ (15 March 
1914). 
7 See René Guyon, The Work of Codification in Siam (Imprimerie Nationale 1919) 9-10; National 
Archive of Thailand, Office of the Council of State Doc No 9, ‘Letter No 162/14272 from 
Robert Greg to Prince Tridos’ (5 December 1923). 
8 Government Gazette (7 May 1916) Book 33, 40.   
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were masterminded by an English-educated Thai jurist, Phraya Manavarajasevi 
(Plod na Songkhla) (‘Plod’), who, while studying in England, had been inspired by 
the success that the Japanese had had in establishing a civil code which was, as he 
believed, modelled on the BGB.9  
 The drafting committee consisting of three Thais, including Plod, and two 
Frenchmen began drafting the new Code in March 192510 and spent only seven 
months finishing Books I and II, which were promulgated as the Code of 1925 in 
November.11 The Code was first drafted in English before being translated into Thai. 
Insights into the drafting methods and materials used by the draftsmen of the Code 
of 1925 were provided by Plod more than fifty years after the Code came into effect. 
When giving interviews to a group of academics from the Thammasat University 
Faculty of Law between 1981 and 1982, Plod clarified many important issues 
concerning the making of the Code of 1925. He revealed that the Code of 1925 was 
founded on two main models, the BGB and the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 (‘Minpō 
of 1898’), which was chosen because it was a simplified version of the former.12 Plod 
admitted that the provisions of the Code of 1925 were  ‘copied’ from rules mainly of 
the BGB and the Minpō of 1898, – the method that he had learnt from the Japanese 
draftsmen.13 Plod provided the names of the principal sources from which foreign 
provisions were copied and claimed to be the compiler of the list of statutes and 
materials which the draftsmen adopted as models for each provision of the Code of 
1925 (‘Plod’s List of References’).14 Plod’s List of References has usually been 
consulted by those who wish to trace the origin of Books I and II and has sometimes 
given an impression that the Code of 1925 is a proper product of comparative law. 
Relying on Plod’s List of References, Naoyuki Isogawa, Professor of Civil Law at 
Kyushu University, remarked that  
 
                                                      
9 See Phraya Manavarajasevi, บันทึกคําสัมภาษณพระยามานวราชเสว ี(Transcript of the Interviews with 
Phraya Manavarajasevi) (Thammasat University 1982). 
10 Government Gazette (28 October 1923) Book 40, 128-30. 
11 See National Archive of Thailand, Office of the Council of State Doc No 3, Book 
4(2),‘รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมายตั้งแตวันที่ 1 กันยายน ถึง 27 มีนาคม พ.ศ. 2467 (Minutes of the Meetings of 
the Committee of Legislation)’ (1 September 1924 - 27 March 1925); ibid Doc No 3, Book 
5(1),‘รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมายตั้งแตวันที ่1 สิงหาคม ถึง 27 ตุลาคม พ.ศ. 2468 (Minutes of the Meetings of 
the Committee of Legislation)’ (1 August - 27 October 1925). 
12 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 4, 13, 23, 42. 
13 ibid 4. 
14 See Phraya Manavarajasevi, อุทาหรณสําหรับประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยบรรพ 1-2 ฉบับกรมรางกฎหมาย 
และที่มาของกฎหมายในประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 1-5 (Department of Legislative Drafting’s 
Instances of Books I and II of the Civil and Commercial Code and Sources of the Provisions 
of Books I, II, II, IV, and V of the Civil and Commercial Code) (Bangkok University 1990). 
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TCCC [Thai Civil and Commercial Code of 1925] can more accurately than 
JCC [Japanese Civil Code of 1898] be characterized as the genuine fruits of 
comparative jurisprudence.15 [My emphasis] 
2. ALAN WATSON’S THEORY OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 
Taking account of Plod’s interviews, one can reasonably link legal change in 
Thailand in 1925 to Alan Watson’s theory of legal transplants.16 Watson, a renowned 
comparatist and Romanist, developed a theory within the contexts of comparative 
law and legal history that law changed mainly by borrowing. This theory is 
commonly known as the theory of ‘legal transplants’.17 In Watson’s view legal 
borrowing was driven by lawyers and lawmakers and was not decisively 
determined by external social, economic and political factors.18 The transplanting of 
legal rules was therefore ‘socially easy’.19 Interestingly, Watson simplified legal 
development to the extent that he maintained that a successful legal transplant does 
not require ‘a systematic knowledge of the law’.20 His theory of legal transplants did 
not call attention to issues of the ‘success’ of a transplant or how the law borrowed 
developed.21 His notion of ‘success’ depends on the survival of the law,22 and his 
typical example of a successful transplant is the Minpō of 1898.23 The simplicity of 
Watson’s theory of legal transplants has attracted strong criticism from academics in 
different fields, mainly scholars of the sociology of law. Pierre Legrand argued that 
a legal transplant was ‘impossible’ because law has different meanings in different 
contexts.24 Gunther Teubner offered a new explanation for legal change: he 
submitted that the borrowed rule will become a legal irritant in the new 
                                                      
15 Naoyuki Isogawa, ‘The Japanese Civil Code in the World Legal Systems: Toward a 
Comparative Study of the Asian Civil Law’ in Prachoom Chomchai (ed), Development of Legal 
Systems in Asia: Experiences of Japan and Thailand (Thammasat University 1998) 165. 
16 See Andrew Harding, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Transplatation in South East Asia: 
Making Sense of the ‘Nodic Din’’ in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds), Adapting Legal 
Cultures (Hart Publishing 2001) 213. 
17 See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, UGA Press 
1993). 
18 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 CLJ 313, 315; Alan Watson, 
Legal Origins and Legal Change (Hambledon Press 1991) 102. 
19 Watson, Legal Transplants 95. 
20 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 LQR 79, 79. 
21 Jan Smits, ‘On Successful Legal Transplants in a Future Ius Commune Europaeum’ in 
Andrew Harding and Esin Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer 2002) 
140. 
22 Watson, Legal Transplants 20. 
23 Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ 82–83. 
24 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 MJECL 111, 114. 
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environment because ‘the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and the 
internal context will undergo fundamental change’.25 Disputing the relationship 
between law and society with Watson, leading legal sociologists, such as Lawrence 
Friedman,26 Roger Cotterrell,27 and David Nelken,28 insisted on the significance of 
external factors. Their common thesis is that social and legal change are correlated.  
 This lively debate demonstrates that the issue of legal transplants could be 
approached from different angles. For this reason, a careful exploration of Watson’s 
theory of legal transplants and its opposing theories may offer a better 
understanding of legal change and provide a proper approach for understanding 
how and why Thai private law changed in 1925.29  
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CODE OF 1925 
The debate concerning legal transplants should, however, not be confined to the 
questions of how and why law is borrowed. Attention should also be given to 
another important question as to how the law borrowed has developed, or in other 
words, whether the transplantation has been successful.30 If the factors of success of 
a transplant are as simple as Watson’s suggested, based on the fact that the Code of 
1925 has survived for nearly a century, and most of its main features, especially 
concerning the law of obligations, have been left untouched,31 one may easily 
                                                      
25 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Differences’ (1998) 61 MLR 11, 12. 
26 Lawrence M Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage 
Foundation 1975) 269. Friedman sees American law as ‘a mirror of society’. Lawrence M 
Friedman, A History of American Law (Simon & Schuster 1985) 12. 
27 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Is There a Logic of Legal Transplants?’ in David Nelken and Johannes 
Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing 2001) 90. 
28 David Nelken, ‘The Meaning of Success in Transnational Legal Transfers’ (2001) 19 
Windsor YB Access Just 349, 354; David Nelken, ‘Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation’ 
in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing 2001) 21-
22. 
29 Michele Graziadei believes that ‘the study of legal transplants may be helpful to 
developing more interesting models of how the law changes than those currently available 
from a mainstream point of view’. Michele Graziadei, ‘Legal Transplants and the Frontiers 
of Legal Knowledge’ (2009) 10 Theoretical Inq L 693, 694. 
30 See Nelken, ‘Meaning of Success’ 349-64; Smits, ‘On Successful Legal Transplants’ 137-54. 
Similarly, Graziadei holds that ‘[i]t is one thing to notice that legal transplants happen. But 
to have an inkling of what goes on when they happen is quite another. It is virtually 
impossible to make sense of legal transplants without inquiring what legal change implies in 
empirical terms…’ Graziadei, ‘Legal Transplants’ 704.  
31 Book I underwent a number of changes most of which were trivial. A major reform took 
place in 1992 where the provisions concerning juristic persons and prescription, were 
amended. See Government Gazette (8 April 1992) Book 109, 1. 
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conclude that the reception of foreign law in 1925 was successful. However, 
considering the state of academic debates about this topic in Thailand, it is unclear 
whether certain underlying problems resulted from conflicting approaches to 
interpreting the law or the law itself. For example, giving a presentation on the topic 
‘The Right to Terminate a Contract under Thai Law in Case of Non-performance of 
Obligations’,32 Daraporn Thirawat, an expert on the Thai law of obligations and a 
doctor of law from France, said that in case of non-performance the Code of 1925 
gave the creditor the right to choose between performance and rescission and if he 
decided to rescind the contract he no longer had the right to specific performance.33 
Daraporn34 pointed out that the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 based Articles 387 
and 388 of the Code of 1925 concerning the right to rescind a contract on Articles 
514 and 542 of the Minpō of 1898, which were modelled on the BGB.35 Kittasak 
Prokati,36 a doctor of law from Germany and respondent of Daraporn’s presentation, 
argued that according to the German law of obligations, it was a general principle 
that the creditor had to claim performance first before resorting to other remedies, 
namely damages and rescission.37 Kittisak observed that Thai academics and judges 
seemed to have accepted the notion of choices of remedies for non-performance.38 It 
is clear that Daraporn’s and Kittisak’s views on the character of the Thai concept of 
non-performance were not based on conflicting theories; Daraporn did not attempt 
to explain the Thai concept of remedies for non-performance based on the legal 
system most familiar to her, namely French law, but she and Kittisak were, in fact, 
discussing the same concept, the German concept of non-performance.  
 Daraporn’s perception of German law’s influence on remedies is most likely 
shaped by a mainstream conception among Thai lawyers and scholars that because 
the Code of 1925 ‘was drafted on the lines of the Japanese Civil Code, which was 
modelled after the German Civil Code’, the Thai Code is a reflection of the German 
Code.39 But is this broad conception correct? If so, why did Kittisak disagree with 
                                                      
32 A topic presented at the International Symposium in Bangkok Thailand between 6-7 
November 1997. This event was organised by Thammasat University Faculty of law and 
Kyushu University Faculty of Law. 
33 Daraporn Thirawat, ‘The Right to Terminate a Contract under Thai law in Case of Non-
performance of Obligations’ in Prachoom Chomchai (ed), Development of Legal Systems in 
Asia: Experiences of Japan and Thailand (Thammasat University 1998) 171. 
34 For Thai readers’ convenience, in this thesis, Thais are mentioned by their first name. 
Calling each other only by their family name is unusual in Thailand.   
35 Thirawat, ‘Right to Terminate a Contract’ 176. 
36 Professor of Law at Thammasat University and associate member of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law. 
37 Thirawat, ‘Right to Terminate a Contract’ 203. 
38 ibid. 
39 Kasemsup, ‘Reception of Law in Thailand’ 293. 
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Daraporn’s understanding of the Thai remedies for non-performance which she 
believed was based on German law? Did this result from a misunderstanding? If so, 
whose, the interpreter’s or the draftsmen’s? If this misunderstanding was a direct 
result of the drafting of the Code of 1925, can one still claim that the making of this 
Code was fully successful?  
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND THE CASE STUDY 
This thesis examines the making of the Code of 1925 with the central focus on the 
method that the draftsmen employed in the drafting and ascertains whether such 
drafting method has affected Thai lawyers’ understanding of its provisions and 
concepts. Accordingly, it sets up two main questions: first, in which manner Thai 
private law changed in 1925 and, second, whether the reception of foreign private 
law through a particular drafting method caused any problems for Thai lawyers’ 
understanding of the Code of 1925. To understand legal change in Thailand in 1925, 
various theories on the reception were studied. Since Watson’s theory of legal 
transplants seems to explain the modernisation of Thai private law appropriately, 
the first question was approached with his theory. However, several important 
arguments, such as that of Legrand, Teubner and some sociologists, such as 
Cotterrell and Nelken, which revolve around Watson’s theory of legal transplants, 
are also taken into account to establish the most plausible explanation for the 
reception of foreign private law in Thailand. This provides a chance to discover 
whether the Thai reception occurred in the manner which Watson propounded.
 The second question of this thesis concerns the issue of success of receptions. 
The importance of this question was emphasised by John Merryman, who holds 
that ‘[m]ost fundamental is the completely unresolved question whether successful 
transplants are beneficial or detrimental in their impact’.40 If one inclines towards 
Watson’s notion of successful borrowing, one perhaps does not find any significant 
problem arising from a legal transplant as long as the law survives. This thesis, 
however, rests on the assumption that some theoretical problems, such as the one 
discussed above, have resulted from the Code of 1925 itself. This means that there 
may have been some defects in the drafting of the Code. A possible defect is 
incompatibility between rules arising from the draftsmen’s lack of knowledge of the 
                                                      
40 John Henry Merryman, ‘On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the 
Common Law’ in Mauro Cappelletti, New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe (Badia 
Fiesolana 1978) 209. 
 8 
rules that they ‘copied’. Disputing the relevance of draftsmen’s systematic 
knowledge of the law borrowed with Watson, this author suspects that this defect 
led to some difficulties in understanding and interpreting a rule or a concept. Thus 
to investigate the second question this thesis will establish a link between the cause, 
incompatibility between rules arising from the draftsmen’s lack of legal knowledge 
about the rules adopted, and the resulting problems with the interpretation of the 
rules. It is reasonable to hold that, if lack of ‘a systematic knowledge of the law’ 
borrowed proves to have led to difficulties in understanding it, one cannot fully 
agree with Watson that ‘a systematic knowledge of the law’ is not necessary for 
successful borrowing and that success of a reception depends on the survival of the 
law. To research the second question, the drafting method, the draftsmen’s 
knowledge of the legal rules borrowed at the time of the reception, and lawyers’ 
understanding of the rules established, must be taken into account. Based on this 
requirement, research on the entire Code of 1925 is not feasible for a PhD thesis. A 
case study is therefore needed. 
 Specific performance has been selected as the case study to investigate the 
second question. The case study also offers an opportunity for analysis of the 
method that the draftsmen of 1925 employed. This will more specifically confirm 
the findings of the research on the first question. The reason for choosing specific 
performance is twofold. First, specific performance is a core principle of the law of 
obligations in the civil law system.41 In Germany, specific performance is, in Ernst 
Rabel’s terms, the ‘backbone’ of the German law of obligations.42 Although this 
concept is not expressed in so many words, and its existence has to be assumed 
from a number of BGB provisions,43 mainly s 241,44 the primacy of specific 
performance has long firmly been established in German law.45 As a contractual 
                                                      
41 See Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations  : Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition (OUP 1996) 1-10. 
42 Jens Kleinschmidt, ‘Specific Performance’, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private 
Law, vol 2 (2012) 1581. 
43 GH Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon 1988) 51. 
44 Werner Lorenz, ‘Reform of the German Law of Breach of Contract’ (1997) 1 Edin LR 317, 
331; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations 776; Florian Faust and Volker Wiese, ‘Specific 
Performance: A German Perspective’ in JM Smits and others (eds), Specific Performance in 
Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (Intersentia 2008) 50. 
45 See K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, 
Clarendon Press 1998) 472; Ernst J Cohn, Manual of German Law (2nd edn, BIICL 1968) 94; 
Reinhard Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives (OUP 2005) 43; Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, ‘The New Approach to Breach of 
Contract in German Law’ in Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies 
for Breach of Contract (Hart Publishing 2005) 138. 
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remedy,46 specific performance is not an isolated concept, but it is related to other 
rules and concepts within the realm of non-performance. When considering 
whether specific performance is the primary remedy for non-performance, other 
remedies especially damages must also be taken into account. This thesis therefore 
focuses on the principle of the primacy of specific performance and explores the 
relationship between specific performance and other remedies for non-performance, 
mainly damages. Second, specific performance is a dividing line between common 
law and civil law even among members of the civil law family, including French 
and German law.47 Lawyers from different legal systems understand the concept of 
specific performance differently, and the definition of the term ‘specific 
performance’ has not yet been universally established.48 Henrik Lando and Caspar 
Rose claim that  
 
The standard definition of specific performance is that when a party to 
contract does not perform his or her obligations, e.g. due to late delivery or 
the delivery of defective goods, the other party can claim performance by 
the breaching party in accordance with the contract.49 
 
But according to Guenter Treitel, in civil law systems specific performance may 
include: 
 
any process by which the creditor receives the substance of what he 
bargains for…They include, for example, the process whereby the creditor 
can have the contract executed or a defect cured at the expense of the 
debtor, and the process whereby a substitute may be bought at the expense 
of the debtor.50 
 
German lawyers, in particular, do not understand the concept of specific 
performance as narrowly as a ‘remedy’ of breach of contract51 or a means of 
                                                      
46 The term ‘remedy’ does not perfectly represent the true nature of specific performance in 
German law. But for comparative purposes, German scholars generally accept its use when 
expounding on the concept of specific performance in the context of non-performance in 
English. This is also the case in French law where until recently the term ‘remedy’ has not 
been used ‘to describe the nature of the possible responses of the law to contractual non-
performance’. John Bell, Sophie Boyron, and Simon Whittaker, Principles of French Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2008) 349. See also Denis Tellon, ‘French Report’ in Donald Harris and Denis 
Tallon (eds), Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (Clarendon Press 1989) 263-64. 
47 John P Dawson, ‘Specific Performance in France and Germany’ (1959) 57 Mich L Rev 495, 
525. See also Cohn, Manual of German Law 94.  
48 See Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract 43-46. 
49 Hendrik Lando and Caspar Rose, ‘On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil 
Law Countries’ (2004) 24 IRLE 437, 474. 
50 Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract 46. 
51 In this thesis, the terms ‘breach of contract’ and ‘non-performance’ are interchangeable. 
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‘enforcing’ performance. Their understanding of the concept of specific performance 
is closely associated with the concept of ‘claim’ (Anspruch) which is defined in s 194 
BGB as ‘the right to require another person to do or to refrain from doing an act’.52 
When considering claims arising from a contract, German lawyers usually draw a 
distinction between: 
 
(1.) an Anspruch that  arises from the formation of the contract itself and is 
directed at the fulfilment of the contractual promise and (2.) an Anspruch 
that arises due to a breach of contract. The former type of Anspruch is called 
Erfüllungsanspruch or Primäranspruch (primary claim), the latter type 
Sekundäranspruch (secondary claim) because it compliments or replaces the 
Primäranspruch if a breach has occurred. The most important 
Sekundäranspruch consists in a claim for damages (Schadensersatzanspruch).53 
 
Florian Faust and Volker Wiese therefore conclude that 
 
German lawyers would not raise the question whether specific 
performance should be granted in cases of breach of contract, because in 
their understanding a claim for specific performance has been in existence 
since the contract was concluded, long before the breach. They would 
rather ask whether the breach led to the loss of the claim for specific 
performance (for instance because performance became impossible) and, 
perhaps, to its replacement by a claim for ‘damages in lieu of performance’ 
(Schadensersatz statt der Leistung).54 
 
In other words, in German law, specific performance is the primary contractual 
claim. In a broader sense, it is also the primary remedy in case of non-performance 
on the grounds that the creditor retains his right to claim performance until he has 
and chooses secondary claims, for example the right to claim damages instead of 
performance and the right to rescind the contract. Thus when referring specific 
performance as the primary remedy in German law, one must keep the broad 
meaning of specific performance in mind. This meaning is appropriately conveyed 
by Treitel: 
 
                                                      
52 Faust and Wiese, ‘Specific Performance’ 50. The quotation is an English translation of s 194 
by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard Dannemann, ‘German Law Archive’                                     
< http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/> accessed 10 April 2013; See also Basil Markesinis, 
Werner Lorenz, and Gerhard Dannemann, The German Law of Obligations (Clarendon Press 
1997) 19-20. 
53 Faust and Wiese, ibid. See also Basil Markesinis, Hannes Unberath, and Angus Johnston, 
The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006) 398. 
54 Faust and Wiese, ibid. See also Ernst A Kramer, ‘§241’ in Helmut Heinrichs, Kurt 
Rebmann and Franz Jürgen Säcker (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
vol 2 (Beck Verlag 1979) 60. 
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By [specific performance]55 is meant, in its broadest sense, a process 
whereby the creditor obtains as nearly as possible the actual subject-matter 
of his bargain, as opposed to compensation in money for failing to obtain it. 
Such compensation is also ‘enforcement’ of the contract in the sense of 
putting the creditor into the same financial position as that in which he 
would have been, if the contract had been performed: from this point of 
view, it may be contrasted with the remedies of refusal to perform and of 
putting an end to the contract. But such compensation in money is not 
‘enforced performance’ in the sense here under discussion in that its object 
is not to give the creditor the very thing for which he bargained.56 
 
 The distinct positions on specific performance among three major legal 
systems, namely English, French and German law, facilitate the identification of 
effects of the reception in this thesis. Comparatists who possess sufficient 
knowledge of private law, more specifically the law of obligations, of different legal 
systems should recognise the differences between French, German and English law. 
For example, if one employs a French jurist who has no knowledge of and 
information on this distinction to draft some provisions of specific performance 
reflecting the German legal tradition, he might end up writing specific performance 
rules based on the Code civil in the belief that all civil law jurisdictions share the 
same concept of specific performance. This may lead to confusion over the 
interpretation of the rules especially if the interpreter thinks of them as German-
influenced rules. 
 The reception of law and its effects on the understanding of the law means 
that the focus of this thesis is on doctrinal effects of the reception. Although the 
effects of the reception can be measured differently, for example from social and 
economic perspectives, a thorough analysis of a particular aspect of success of the 
reception is the only option for a PhD thesis. More importantly, special care is taken 
to ascertain whether Watson’s claim that a successful legal transplant does not 
reguire ‘a systematic knowledge of the law’ is plausible.57 This question of Thai 
lawyers’ understanding and knowledge of the law received needs to be explored 
doctrinally. If success of the transplant is measured merely by its occurrence it is 
undeniable that this claim is true. Because the occurrence of a transplant is 
                                                      
55 Treitel uses the term ‘enforced performance’ to avoid the confusion which potentially 
arises from the use of the term ‘specific performance’, which originates from common law. 
See Markesinis and others, German Law of Contract 398. However, in this thesis the latter is 
preferred to reflect a general trend that the use of ‘specific performance’ is no longer peculiar 
to the common law system.  
56 Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract 43. 
57 Eric Stein encourages a verification of this claim saying that ‘[i]t would be interesting 
indeed to investigate, for example, how much the Japanese and Turkish experts knew about 
the Western systems which they recommended for reception to their law makers’. Eric Stein, 
‘Uses, Misuses – and Nonuses of Comparative Law’ (1977-78) 72 Nw U L Rev 198, 209. 
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determined by those who hold legislative power, to ask whether a transplant occurs 
or not may not be a worthwhile question. Thus comparatists should ask instead 
what happens after the reception, ie whether the law is incorporated into the society 
and whether it has been understood as the draftsmen expected it to be.58 
 Both legal history and comparative law are employed to answer two main 
questions of this thesis. A number of historical documents, including the minutes of 
the meetings of the draftsmen, relevant drafting documents, and foreign statutes 
and materials that they consulted, are considered. A comparative method is used to 
explore the concept of specific performance mainly in the German, Japanese and 
Thai legal systems. The examination of the making of the Code of 1925 also provides 
an opportunity to determine the draftsmen’s employment of comparative law and 
legal history. 
5. ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Andrew Harding identified a shortage of comparative research on Southeast Asian 
law saying: 
 
In the main streams and occasional eddies of comparative law, as well as in 
the related fields of comparative sociology of law, legal theory in general, 
and law and development, virtually no account has been taken of the South 
East Asian legal experience, even though some excellent and highly 
relevant work on the region has been done. Scholars in the field of law in 
South East Asia have therefore trodden a somewhat lonely path.59  
 
Harding’s concern is well illustrated by the absence of an assessment of the 
modernisation of Thai private law and its effects given that the Code of 1925 has 
been at work for nearly a century.60 Unfortunately, there have been only a handful 
of publications in Thailand on the making of the Thai code, for example 
‘การปฏิรูปกฎหมายของประเทศไทยต้ังแต พ.ศ. 2411 จนถึง พ.ศ. 2478’ (The Law Reform in Thailand from 
                                                      
58 See JWF Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective on English Public law (Clarendon Press 1996) 15; Cotterrell, ‘Is There a Logic of 
Legal Transplants?’ 79. 
59 Harding, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Transplatation in South East Asia’ 199.  
60 However, traditional Thai law has been studied extensively by many scholars, notably 
Tokichi Masao (1869-1921), a draftsman of the Thai Penal Code, who wrote a doctoral thesis 
on Ancient Thai law at Yale University, Robert Lingat (1892-1972), an eminent French 
scholar and prolific writer on ancient Indian, Thai and Burmese law, Yoneo Ishii (1929-2010), 
an eminent Japanese scholar of Southeast Asian Studies, and Andrew Huxley, Professor of 
Southeast Asian Law at SOAS, a prominent expert on Traditional Thai and Burmese law and 
Buddhist Law.  
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1868 to 1935 AD)61 and ‘การจัดรางประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย: พ.ศ. 2451-2478’ (The Drafting of 
Siamese Civil and Commercial Code: from 1908 to 1935 AD),62 both of which are 
masters dissertations in history. These focus on general facts about codification and 
the drafting organisations. A study of the methods that the draftsmen employed in 
drafting the Code and the effects of their drafting methods has not been undertaken. 
When tracing the origin of a provision of the Code of 1925, Thai researchers and the 
interpreter of a rule usually rely on Plod’s List of References. However, no one has 
ever validated this source of information. If there is a mistake in it, the 
interpretation of the rule in question may be affected.  
 The original contribution of this thesis therefore lies in the fact that the making 
of the Code of 1925, especially the method the draftsmen employed in making its 
provisions, and the effects of the use of such method have never been thoroughly 
investigated before. The thesis also contributes to the development of comparative 
law, legal history and private law in Thailand, especially the law of obligations, by 
calling attention to legal change in 1925. It will also raise academic awareness of the 
roles of comparative law and legal history in the reception of law among Thai 
lawyers by promoting their proper use for understanding of rules and concepts of 
the Code of 1925.  
6. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter 1, ‘Legal Transplants: A History’, explores Watson’s theory of legal 
transplants and arguments against it to establish a method for studying the 
modernisation of Thai private law in 1925. The chapter begins by considering the 
notion of legal transplants prior to Watson’s theory of legal transplants and 
examines core ideas of the theory of legal transplants and theories and arguments 
revolving around it. Since the success of the reception is a main question of thesis, 
the chapter addresses this issue specifically.  
 Chapter 2, ‘The Modernisation of Thai Law: Background’, provides a broad 
overview of the modernisation of Thai law, including the reforms of the 
administration of justice and legal education, and codification of civil and 
commercial law. This paves the way for a thorough examination of the making of 
                                                      
61 See Patcharin Piamsomboon, ‘การปฏิรปูกฎหมายของประเทศไทยตั้งแต พ.ศ. 2411 จนถึง พ.ศ. 2478 (The Law 
Reform in Thailand from 1868 to 1935 AD)’ (MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University 1974). 
62 Pakdi Phagagrong, ‘การจัดรางประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย: พ.ศ. 2451-2478 (The Drafting of Siamese 
Civil and Commercial Code: from 1908 to 1935 AD)’ (MA Thesis, Silpakorn University 1994). 
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the Code of 1925 in Chapter 3. Legal change does not occur independently of society, 
and therefore this chapter pays attention to conditions of traditional Thai society 
and law and factors which influenced changes. 
 Chapter 3, ‘The Making of the Civil and Commercial Code of 1925’, surveys 
the methods that the Thai draftsmen employed and materials that they consulted in 
drafting the Code of 1925. This chapter reveals the manner in which Thai private 
law changed and ascertains whether the reception of foreign private law in Thailand 
is an example of a Watsonian legal transplant. This chapter is divided into two parts, 
first, the role of the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 with a focus on Plod’s role in the 
shift of policy to adopt the BGB and the Minpō as the principal models and the new 
drafting method, and second, methods and materials used for drafting the Code of 
1925. 
 Chapter 4, ‘The German Concept of Specific Performance’, is the first chapter 
to deal with the case study. The focus of this chapter is on the principle of the 
primacy of specific performance in German law, and it is also divided into two 
parts: its historical development prior to the BGB and specific performance under 
the BGB. The latter includes an examination of Ernest Schuster’s The Principles of 
German Civil Law, the draftsmen’s main source for their knowledge of the BGB, to 
discover whether information on the German concept of specific performance was 
accessible to the draftsmen. Based on Plod’s conception that the Minpō was 
practically a copy of the BGB, this chapter paves the way for the examining of the 
Japanese concept of specific performance in Chapter 5.  
 Chapter 5, ‘The Reception of German Law in Japan and the Japanese Concept 
of Specific Performance’, contains two parts. Plod’s conception of the close 
relationship between the BGB and the Minpō of 1898 is confirmed through an 
investigation of the reception of German law in Japan. JE de Becker’s Annotated Civil 
Code of Japan, on which the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 relied heavily, is then 
examined to ascertain whether its information is reliable. This research is crucial to 
this thesis because the copying of the provisions of the Minpō was derived from the  
annotations found in this book. The second part of the chapter deals with the 
Japanese concept of specific performance to explore its character and determine 
whether it was based on the German concept of specific performance. 
 Chapter 6, ‘The Drafting of the Rules of Specific Performance in the Civil and 
Commercial Code of 1925 and Conceptions of Specific Performance in Thai Law’, 
looks at the making of the rules concerning specific performance in the Code of 1925 
as a specific example of the employment of the drafting method discussed in 
Chapter 3 and Thai lawyers’ conceptions of specific performance. It then ascertains 
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whether problems with the understanding and interpretation of the rules are caused 
by the method that the draftsmen employed in the drafting of the Code of 1925. 
 The Conclusion answers the two main questions of this thesis: how did Thai 
private law change in 1925 and did the reception of foreign private law through a 
particular drafting method cause any problems for Thai lawyers’ understanding of 
the Code of 1925? The lessons from the case study will also be used to assess 
whether Watson’s theory of legal transplants explains the reception of law in 
Thailand appropriately and whether his contention that successful legal borrowing 



































LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: A HISTORY 
INTRODUCTION 
The laws which would be the best for England, the country from which the 
laws are to be transferred, being given, the next object of consideration is, 
By what principles are the variations necessary to be made in these laws, in 
order to accommodate them to the circumstances of Bengal, the country 
into which they are to be transferred, to be determined.1  
 
This quotation is taken from a paper of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), entitled ‘Of the 
Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’, and it confirms that the idea 
of ‘legal transplants’ was discussed in Great Britain as early as 1782.2 But it was not 
until 1974, when Alan Watson developed the theory of legal transplants, the main 
thesis of which is that law develops mostly by borrowing,3 that legal transplants 
became a focus of the study of legal change and a central paradigm in comparative 
legal studies.4 Despite the emergence of comparative law as a new branch of legal 
science in Great Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century, in the early 
stages of comparative law, British comparatists saw their method as a tool for 
serving practical interests, especially of the British Empire.5 Legal borrowing was 
discussed, not as a source of legal change but rather as a result of comparison. 
                                                      
1 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’ in 
John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol 1 (Russell & Russell 1962) 172. 
2 The year in which the paper was first drafted. 
3 Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (2nd edn, TU Press 2001) 95. 
4 Michele Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ in 
Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(OUP 2006) 442–43; Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Enhancing Judicial Reputation through Legal 
Transplants: Estoppel Travels to France‘ (2012) 60 AJCL 383, 383; John W Cairns, ‘Watson, 
Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants’, (2013) Ga J Int’l & Comp L (forthcoming) 34, 
34-35, 41. See also Andrew Huxley, ‘Jeremy Bentham on Legal Transplants’ (2007) 2 JCL 177, 
177. 
5 John W Cairns, ‘Development of Comparative Law in Great Britain’ in Mathias Reimann 
and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 133. 
 17 
Thanks to Watson, legal transplantation has not only been seen as a result but also 
an approach to comparative law. 
 This historical chapter informs the theoretical basis of the two main questions 
of this thesis which concern the making of Thailand's Civil and Commercial Code in 
1925 ('Code of 1925') and the effects of the drafting method used to create it. Since 
Thai law during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries developed mainly through 
borrowing foreign law,6 Watson’s theory of legal transplants and its rival theories 
must form the core of this discussion. This chapter seeks to understand how Watson 
and others explain the reception of law and how they perceive success of the 
reception so as to discover a suitable approach for studying legal change in Thai 
private law in 1925. Watson’s theory of legal transplants is not an isolated idea but a 
part of the development of legal scholarship in Great Britain, especially regarding 
the study of legal change and comparative law. A broad overview of how the study 
of legal change in Great Britain has developed, especially within the context of 
comparative law, is needed for a full picture of the issues involved. This chapter is 
therefore divided into three parts, historical reflections of the notion of legal 
transplants prior to Watson, Watson's theory of legal transplants and success of 
receptions. 
1. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS PRIOR TO ALAN WATSON: HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS 
The aim of this section is not to provide a detailed history of legal transplants7 but 
merely to survey the contributions of some of the more important historical figures 
and their impact on the history of legal transplants. 
1.1 Bentham and legal transplants  
Bentham wrote a treatise entitled ‘Of the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of 
Legislation’ (‘Time and Place’) in 1782.8 It was published twenty years later. 
Although Bentham used the phrase ‘transplanting laws’ instead of ‘legal 
                                                      
6 Andrew Harding, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Transplatation in South East Asia: Making 
Sense of the “Nodic Din”’ in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures 
(Hart Publishing 2001) 213. 
7 For a detailed historical account of legal transplants see Cairns, ‘Watson’ 1-41. 
8 Bentham’s essay had five chapters: ‘ Principles to be Followed in Transplanting Laws’, 
‘Regard to be Paid to Subsisting Institutions’, ‘Rules Respecting the Method of Transplanting 
Laws’, ‘Laws Appear the Worse for Being Transplanted’, and ‘Influence of Time’. 
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transplants’, this essay deals with the subject of legal borrowing9 which Alan 
Watson later popularised as ‘legal transplants’. Andrew Huxley believes that 
Bentham is the first scholar in Great Britain, who used the term ‘transplant’ with the 
notion of legal change10 but observes that, ‘though Watson read ‘Time and Place’, he 
did not allow it to influence his own approach to legal change and legal 
transplant’.11 Through this paper, Bentham offered the East India Company 
practical advice on the establishment of Anglo-Bengali law.12 Unlike Watson, whose 
theory of legal transplants concerns the recipient country and serves an academic 
purpose, Bentham was more concerned with the interests of the donor country, 
imperialism and pragmatism.13 Comparing the contexts of British society in the late 
eighteenth century with the second half of the twentieth century, the difference 
between the focuses of Bentham’s and Watson’s legal transplants is understandable. 
It will be shown in the next sections of this chapter that the early studies of legal 
change and the early development of comparative law in Great Britain during the 
nineteenth century were closely associated with pragmatism and imperialism.  
 Huxley identified Bentham’s three main arguments concerning legal 
positivism, imperialism and the reform of English law.14 Bentham argued against 
Montesquieu’s notion of the peculiarity of law.15 Based on utilitarian principles, 
Bentham holds that the best law for one country can also be the best law for 
another.16 He claims that  
 
The whole of history proves, that there is no circumstance connected with 
climate or texture of the earth incompatible with the happiness of man; and 
that, whatever men can live, there they may possess a government, a 
religion, and manners, that will render them happy.17  
 
                                                      
9 See Bentham, ‘Time and Place’ 169-94. 
10 Huxley, ‘Jeremy Bentham’ 182. 
11 ibid 177. In his Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974), Watson quoted a 
short passage from Bentham’s ‘Time and Place’. Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach 
to Comparative Law (2nd edn, UGA Press 1993) 35. 
12 Bentham, ‘Time and Place’ 171-72. 
13 See comparison between Bentham’s and Watson’s notions of legal transplants in Huxley, 
‘Jeremy Bentham’ 186-87. 
14 Huxley, ‘Jeremy Bentham’ 178. 
15 In his famous book De l'esprit des lois (The Sprit of Laws), Montesquieu submits that ‘the 
political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human 
reason is applied. They should be adapted in such manner to the people for whom they are 
framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit another...They should be in 
relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to 
the principal occupation of the natives’. Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 
vol 1 (Thomas Nugent tr, Colonial Press 1899) 6–7. 
16 Bentham, ‘Time and Place’ 172-80. See also Huxley, ‘Jeremy Bentham’ 179. 
17 Bentham, ibid 177. 
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Driven by his strong imperialistic view,18 Bentham was more concerned with how 
the donor country implanted legal rules in the recipient country than with how the 
recipient country received legal rules from the donor country.19 He, for example, 
urged English lawgivers to learn ‘how to accommodate his laws to the 
circumstances of Bengal’.20 In the last two chapters, Bentham discussed the 
inadequacy and the need to reform English law. He suggested that an improvement 
of Anglo-Bengali law ‘would also be better even for England’.21  
1.2 Savigny, Maine and Jhering on ‘legal evolution’   
More than half a century after the first publication of Bentham’s ‘Time and Place’, 
Henry Maine (1822-88) published Ancient Law, a work on legal evolution, which had 
a profound impact on British legal scholarship, especially historical jurisprudence 
and legal sociology.22 Clearly, Maine’s work was not influenced by Bentham’s 
notion of legal transplants; conversely, it portrays his criticism of utilitarian 
principles.23 It has been suggested that Maine’s approach to legal change was 
influenced by Savigny’s historical jurisprudence.24 Maine admired Savigny,25 but it 
is not clear to what extent his work was based on Savigny’s ideas because Maine 
never expressed an acknowledgement of Savigny’s influence on his work.26 Peter 
Stein observes that an obvious connection between the two scholars was that Maine 
                                                      
18 Huxley, ‘Jeremy Bentham’ 177. 
19 Bentham dedicated Chapter 3 for a list of principles for good transplatation. See Bentham, 
‘Time and Place’ 180-84. 
20 ibid 172. 
21 ibid 185. 
22 HC Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study & 
Research (CUP 1946) 16–17; Robert Redfield, ‘Maine’s Ancient Law in the Light of Primitive 
Societies’ (1950) 3 WPQ 574, 574–575; E Donald Elliott, ‘The Evolutionary Tradition in 
Jurisprudence’ (1985) 85 Col LR 38, 46; RCJ Cocks, Sir Henry Maine: A Study in Victorian 
Jurisprudence (CUP 2004) 141–95; Roger Cotterrell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory in 
Sociological Perspective (OUP 1995) 79; George Feaver, From Status to Contract: A Biography of 
Sir Henry Maine 1822-1888 (Longmans 1969) 58. 
23 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its 
Relation to Modern Ideas (8th edn, J Murray 1880) 7-8. See also Cocks, ibid 2-3; Peter Stein, 
Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (CUP 1980) 89. 
24 Paul Vinogradoff, ‘The Teaching of Sir Henry Maine’ (1904) 20 LQR 119, 119; Peter Stein, 
Roman Law in European History (CUP 1999) 126; Frederick Pollock, Oxford Lectures and Other 
Discourses (Macmillan 1890) 153. 
25 In his Ancient Law, Maine refers to Savigny as ‘the Great German Jurist’. Maine, Ancient 
Law 254. 
26 Cocks, Sir Henry Maine 26.  
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‘was also concerned with the history of legal institutions in the manner of 
Savigny’.27  
To understand Savigny’s historical approach to legal evolution, one needs to 
take account of social and political context of the Germany of his time. In 1804, 
France successfully enacted a civil code, known as the Code Napoléon, which unified 
largely classical Roman law, some French customary law28 and some libertarian 
ideas which were products of the French Revolution.29 The French Civil Code was 
widely adopted in many western German states following Napoleon’s victory over 
Prussia and Austria at the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, the defeat 
of the French allowed German nationalism to grow, even among scholars. Anton 
Friedrich Justus Thibaut (1772-1840) began to discuss the necessity of having a 
unified civil code for the sake of a unified Germany in 1814.30 Responding to 
Thibaut’s proposal for codification, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), a 
leading figure of the German Historical School published a pamphlet entitled Vom 
Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Of the Vocation of Our 
Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence).31 Inspired by Montesquieu’s notion that 
good law must be founded on the spirit of the society,32 Savigny argued that law 
and culture were closely connected and developed together. He especially noted the 
relationship between law and society:  
 
…this organic connection of the law with the essence and character of a 
people manifests itself also over time, and here also it is to be compared to 
language. As with language, so too the law does not stand absolutely still 
for even an instant, but undergoes the same movement and evolution is 
subject to the same law of internal necessity as every earlier development, 
therefore, the law grows forward with a people, constitutes itself out of 
them, and finally becomes extinct as a people lose their individuality.33  
 
                                                      
27 Stein, Legal Evolution 89. 
28 Stein, Roman Law 114–15. 
29 FH Lawson, AE Anton, and L Neville Brown, Amos and Walton’s Introduction to French Law 
(3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1967) 31. For instance, John Dawson suggests that the French Civil 
Code does not allow the debtor to be forced to do or not to something because of 'the 
reaction of the Revolution against arbitrary power'. John P Dawson, ‘Specific Performance in 
France and Germany’ (1959) 57 Mich L Rev 495, 510.  
30 Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe: With Particular Reference to Germany 
(Tony Weir tr, Clarendon Press 1996) 310; Arthur von Mehren and James Russell Gordley, 
The Civil Law System: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (2nd edn, Little, Brown 
1977) 60–61; Mathias Reimann, ‘The Historical School against Codification: Savigny, Carter, 
and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code’ (1989) 37 AJCL 95, 97. 
31 Wieacker, ibid 309–10. 
32 Stein, Legal Evolution 57. See Montesquieu's statement in n 15. 
33 Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fu ̈r Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 
(Keip 1997) 8–9 translated by Elliott in ‘Evolutionary Tradition’ 42. 
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According to Savigny, legal development is driven by two forces, custom and 
jurisprudence: ‘all law…is first developed by custom and, next by jurisprudence, – 
everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary 
will of a law-giver.’34 He sees codification as radical change effected by the will of 
government, of which he disapproves.35  
Maine most likely adopted Savigny’s historical jurisprudence when studying 
the law of ancient societies.36 As Great Britain’s trend towards the scientific analysis 
of law grew in the mid-nineteenth century,37 Maine became concerned with using 
scientific methods for his work on legal evolution.38 He studied legal development 
from Roman to his own times and explained the relationship between societal and 
legal developments from a broad historical perspective. Maine perceived that law 
changed in a definite pattern or sequence39 and it evolved in a way predetermined 
by the development of society.40 His most famous proposition is the remark that ‘the 
movement of the progressive societies has … been a movement from Status to 
Contract.’41  
Savigny’s theory on legal development enjoyed great popularity, not only 
domestically but also overseas, even in New York,42 by those who, for various 
reasons, were sceptical of legislative reform and codification.43 Despite this, there 
were some German jurists, notably Rudolf von Jhering (1818-92), who were not 
convinced by Savigny’s proposition that law develops organically from within 
outward. Jhering, whose ideas were sometimes ‘described by contemporary 
Germans as German Benthamism’,44 found that this theory was only applicable to 
                                                      
34 Savigny, Of the Vocation 30. 
35 ibid 22–23; See also Elliott, ‘Evolutionary Tradition’ 42. 
36 Stein, Roman Law 126; Vinogradoff, ‘Teaching of Sir Henry Maine’ 119. 
37 Raymond Cocks gives a good account of scientific trend in Victorian legal science:  
‘Many Victorian lawyers thought that scientific analysis could be used to resolve major legal 
problems. In the period of 1840 to 1870 writers on law were almost obsessed with scientific 
analysis although, unfortunately, they defined it in the vaguest terms…Above all, it implied 
a regard for those who looked beyond the letter of the law and discovered principles which 
enable the law properly to be categorised and criticised…The law books of the mid-
nineteenth century reflected this concern’. Cocks, Sir Henry Maine 14-17.   
38 ibid 17-19; Feaver, From Status to Contract 45; Gutteridge, Comparative Law 17; Stein, Legal 
Evolution 89.  
39  Lawrence M Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage 
Foundation 1975)  281. 
40 Maine, Ancient Law 113–70. See also Raymond Westbrook, ‘The Early History of Law: A 
Theoretical Essay’ (2010) 127 ZRG 1, 3.   
41 Maine, ibid 170. 
42 See Reimann, ‘Historical School’ 108. 
43 Stein, Roman Law 117–118. See also Mathias Reimann, ‘Nineteenth Century German Legal 
Science’ (1990) 31 Boston Coll LR 837, 858–75. 
44 Stein, Legal Evolution 68. 
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the legal development in prehistoric societies45 and therefore rejected the Historical 
School’s idea of Volksgeist as the sole determinant of legal development. The 
presence of Roman law in the German legal system was clear evidence; Jhering 
contended that law does not only develop unconsciously out of the national spirit 
but that its growth is also determined by other factors, namely lawyers’ conscious 
efforts to solve practical problems and by legislation.46 For Jhering, legal 
development also depended on the ability of the people to grasp legal ideas from 
others.47  
 
The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but 
of usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he 
has one as good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just 
because it didn’t grow in his back garden.48 
1.3 The study of legal change in the context of comparative law  
The growing trend towards scientific analysis of law during the Victorian era 
provided fertile ground for the development of comparative law in Great Britain.49 
Frederick Pollock claimed that the establishment of the Society of Comparative 
Legislation in Paris and Maine’s appointment to the first Professor of Historical and 
Comparative Jurisprudence at Oxford in 1869 marked the complete recognition of 
comparative law as a new branch of legal science.50 Maine had in fact begun to 
employ comparative methods even before he took up the Oxford professorship, 
notably in his Ancient Law, where he compared different ancient societies to observe 
how law developed.51 Some British scholars of later generations continued using 
comparative law as an approach to the study of legal change. James Bryce, for 
example, conducted research on legal development of Roman and English societies 
                                                      
45 Rudolf von Jhering, The Struggle for Law (John Lalor tr, 2nd edn, Legal Classics Library 
1991) 16–17. 
46 ibid 120–21. 
47 Rudolf von Jhering, Geist des ro ̈mischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner 
Entwicklung, vol 1 (Breitkopf und Ha ̈rtel 1874) 7. 
48 ibid 8 cited in Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law 17. 
49 For more information about Victorian legal science see Cocks, Sir Henry Maine 14-17. 
50  Frederick Pollock, ‘The History of Comparative Jurisprudence’ (1903) 5 JSCL 74, 86. See 
also Gutteridge, Comparative Law 17. However, Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson claims that the 
First Congress of Comparative Law at Paris in 1900 is symbolically the birth of comparative 
law as new branch of legal science in its own right. See Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, 
‘Development of Comparative Law in France’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 36. 
51 L Neville Brown, ‘A Century of Comparative Law in England: 1869-1969’ (1971) 19 AJCL 
232, 232–33; Cairns, ‘Development of Comparative Law 135. 
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through a comparative method in the early twentieth century.52 Bryce strengthened 
the position of comparative law as a common legal method by claiming that it was 
one of the four methods commonly employed in legal science, along with ‘the 
metaphysical method’, ‘the analytical method’ and ‘the historical method’.53 He was 
one of the earliest British legal comparatists who emphasised the close relationship 
between the historical and comparative methods; he postulated that ‘for the study 
of the differences between two systems becomes much more profitable when it is 
seen how the differences arose, and this can be explained only by social and political 
history’.54 Similarly, Pollock, who was instrumental in the early development of 
comparative law,55 affirmed the interplay between comparative and historical 
jurisprudence.56 He suggests that a comparatist must look into the historical 
development of the rules compared. ‘What does matter is understanding that 
comparison of institutions is profitable only when we take account of the stage of 
civilisation and of special development to which the termed to be compared 
belong’.57 
The main purpose of comparative law in early-twentieth-century Great Britain, 
however, was not to trace the origins and evolution of legal ideas and institutions 
for advancements in legal science but to serve the practical interests of the nation58 
as John W Cairns points out that ‘most strands in the early development of British 
comparative law were closely linked to the experiences and needs of the British 
Empire’.59 Even Maine, who had found fame as a pioneer of the doctrine of legal 
evolution, admitted that, ‘the chief function of Comparative Jurisprudence is to 
facilitate legislation and the practical improvement of the law’.60 Early British 
comparatists investigated foreign laws especially in the British colonies so as to 
discover how they solved similar legal problems and use their findings to improve 
                                                      
52 James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (OUP 1901) 745–81. See also Cairns, 
‘Development of Comparative Law’ 135–36. 
53 Bryce, ibid. 609. He suggests that the historical and comparative methods are of most 
general practical use. ibid 636. 
54 ibid 620. 
55 Brown, ‘Century of Comparative Law’ 234. 
56 Pollock, ‘History of Comparative Jurisprudence’ 75. 
57 ibid 76. 
58 FP Walton, ‘Study of Foreign Laws’ (1934) 46 Jur Rev, 1–2. 
59 Cairns, ‘Development of Comparative Law’ 133. Similarly, Huxley, who studied legal 
transplants in Burma in the late nineteenth century, submits that ‘the legal transplant 
scholarship served as propaganda to support the annexation of Upper Burma’. Andrew 
Huxley, ‘Legal Transplants as Historical Data: Exemplum Birmanicum’ (2009) 37 JICH 167, 
167. 
60 Henry Sumner Maine, ‘The Effects of the Observation of India on Modern European 
Thought’ in Village-Communities in the East and West: Six Lectures Delivered at Oxford with 
Additional Addresses (7th edn, Murray 1907) 4. See also Gutteridge, Comparative Law 27. 
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their own legislation in certain areas.61 This was confirmed by a number of leading 
scholars, such as Edward Jenks, who viewed comparative law as a means to achieve 
practical ends.62 A similar assertion was made by Pollock, who said 
 
Probably the earliest form of the comparative study of institutions was the 
observation that those of another commonwealth were in some way better 
than one’s own, followed by deliberate imitation [my emphasis] of them.63  
 
The main purpose of the Society of Comparative Legislation established in 1895,64 
which was aimed at ‘promoting knowledge of the course of legislation in different 
countries, more particularly in the several parts of her Majesty’s Dominions, and in 
the United States’,65 is another reflection of the general trend towards the use of 
comparative law during that period. 
1.4 Walton’s ‘legal transplantation’ 
Although Bentham’s phrase ‘transplanting law’ seems not to have generated much 
discussion, the idea of ‘legal borrowing’ remained of academic interest in 
comparative law and foreign law in Great Britain between the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. However, British comparatists did not discuss it as a main 
process of legal change, but rather as a principal aim of comparative law. This is 
illustrated by the above-mentioned remark of Pollock of 1903. There we find the 
word, ‘imitation’.66 According to Pollock, early comparative law in Great Britain was 
aimed at improving legislation, and comparison would lead to ‘imitation’.67  
The most extensive discussion of the notion of borrowing as a process of legal 
change since Bentham’s ‘Time and Place’ was found in a writing of Frederick 
Walton (1858-1948), a leading British comparatist. In 1927, Walton published a 
journal article entitled ‘The Historical School of Jurisprudence and Transplantations 
of Law’ (‘Transplantations of Law’), which aimed to refute Savigny’s theory of 
Volksgeist. He argued that ‘a very large and important part of the German law did 
not grow out of the German people, and does not bear the marks of their national 
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genius, but…grew out of the consciousness of the Roman people, and bears the 
stamp of the Roman mind’.68 Using Egyptian, Japanese and Turkish law codes as 
case studies, Walton postulated that a legal system of a people does not always 
grow out of their legal consciousness but can develop out of legal borrowing and 
sometimes even an entire foreign system can be transplanted.69 For Walton 
 
This [was] a new phenomenon in the legal world, It is not the case of a 
conqueror imposing his laws on a conquered people. Nor it is the case of 
one country copying a particular rule or a particular piece of legislation 
which has been found to work well in another place. This kind of 
legislative borrowing is much commoner than it used to be, but there is 
nothing shocking about it.70  
 
It is interesting to note that Walton used the terms, ‘transplantation’, ‘borrowing’ 
and ‘copying’ interchangeably to denote legal development by adopting foreign 
legislation.71  
2. ALAN WATSON’S THEORY OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS  
In 1974, Alan Watson, then Professor of Civil Law at the University of Edinburgh, 
published a book entitled Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, which 
concerned approaches to comparative law, the nature of law and the nature of legal 
development.72 As the title suggests, Watson approached comparative law and the 
study of legal change through a theory he calls ‘legal transplants’. It is not clear 
whether this book was inspired by Bentham’s ‘Time and Place’ and Walton’s 
‘Transplantations of Law’ since Watson never acknowledged any debt to them. 
Although their ideas on legal borrowing are remarkably similar, Watson deals with 
the topic more extensively and prolifically. Over the past three decades, in addition 
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to his 1974 book, he has authored numerous publications in relation to his theory of 
legal transplants.73 His works, especially on legal change, have sparked fierce 
controversy among academics in various fields of law. The discussion of legal 
borrowing which Watson provoked has, however, advanced the study of legal 
change and comparative legal studies.74 Legal transplantation is not only a 
consequence of comparison as it used to be during Pollock’s lifetime, but it is now 
also regarded as a method of comparative law.75  
2.1 Aspects of the theory of legal transplants 
Watson remarked that ‘Comparative Law is about the nature of law, and especially 
about the nature of legal development.’76 This statement summarises what his 
theory of legal transplants concerns. This author proposes that there are three main 
aspects to Watson’s theory of legal transplants: namely the nature of legal change, 
the nature of law and the nature of comparative law. These are interrelated. 
Watson’s views on the nature of law and on the nature of legal change are dealt 
with together here since in his writing he does not clearly separate them. However, 
since his critics have tried to guess what he thinks law is, his view on the nature of 
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law will be discussed below (2.2 ‘Responses to Watson’s theory of legal 
transplants’).77 
2.1.1 The nature of legal change 
Watson observes legal change in both ancient and modern societies from a historical 
perspective before concluding that ‘[m]ost changes in most systems are the result of 
borrowing’.78 The terms ‘borrowing’ and ‘legal transplants’ in his publications are 
interchangeable.79 The definition and characters of ‘legal transplants’ are illustrated 
by the following quotations from Watson: 
 
[L]egal transplants – the moving of a rule or a system of law from one 
country to another, or from one people to another – have been common 
since the earliest recorded history.80 
 
[T]he transplanting of individual rules or of a large part of a legal system is 
extremely common. This is true both of early times – witness the ancient 
Near East – and the present day.81 
 
[T]ransplanting is, in fact, the most fertile source of legal development. 
Most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing…This is so both 
for individual rules and for systematics as can be seen in the overwhelming 
importance for the Western world’s private law of Roman Civil Law and 
English Common Law.82 
 
[T]he transplanting of legal rules is socially easy.83 
 
[L]egal rules, in addition to being part of the social structure, also operate 
on the level of ideas. On this basis law develops by transplanting, not 
because some such rule was the inevitable consequence of the social 
structure and would have emerged even without a model to copy, but 
because the foreign rule was known to those with control over law making 
and they observed the (apparent) benefits which could be derived from it. 
What is borrowed, that is to say, is very often the idea. [My emphasis] If 
this conclusion is accurate then it also follows that the accessibility – for 
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whatever reason – of the foreign rule will play a considerable role in its 
influence, and that legal development by transplanting derives from the 
expertise of the lawyers who know the foreign rule rather than from the 
common consciousness of society.84 
 
 Watson’s characterisation of transplanting as a change which is socially easy 
became the centre of a controversy over his theory and provoked the strongest 
responses from legal scholars, mostly legal sociologists. Watson described the 
smoothness of the process saying    
 
Whatever opposition there might be from the bar or legislature, it remains 
true that legal rules move easily and are accepted into the system without 
too great difficulty. This is so even when the rules come from a very 
different kind of system.85  
 
In 1976, Watson published a journal article entitled ‘Legal Transplants and Law 
Reform’ in response to Kahn-Freund’s publication, ‘On Uses and Misuses of 
Comparative Law’, which was released a few months before Watson’s 1974 legal 
transplants book was published.86 Kahn-Freund emphasised the importance of the 
context of society, especially the political factor, as determinants of successful 
transplants87 saying ‘any attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of 
its origin continues to entail the risk of rejection’.88 He therefore urges that the use of 
comparative law for practical purposes must take account of the original context of 
the law received.89 Watson’s reaction to Kahn-Freund caused further controversy 
when he emphasised the insignificant role of external factors for legal transplants. 
Watson argued that borrowing can be successful even when the legal and political 
systems and the levels of development of the donor and recipient are very 
different.90 
 From Watson’s quotations mentioned above, we can identify at least four 
main features of his notion of legal change. First, law changes mostly by borrowing. 
Second, what is borrowed is a legal idea. Third, legal borrowing is driven by 
lawyers rather the common consciousness of society. And, fourth, contextual 
knowledge of the law received, including a systematic knowledge of it, is not 
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needed for successful borrowing. While the three other features seem to be 
understandable, Watson’s view on the object of borrowing is apparently ambiguous. 
Watson submits that what is borrowed is often ‘the idea’. Unfortunately, he does 
not clearly explain what ‘the idea’ is. Despite this, based on his numerous writings 
on the subject, we have sufficient information to deduce his meaning. Watson 
emphasises that to search for a legal idea the law reformer does not need a 
systematic knowledge of the rules borrowed.91 He later clarifies that his theory of 
legal transplants focuses on ‘positive rules of law’.92 If a systematic knowledge of the 
law is not required to borrow a legal idea, then we can only borrow Friedman’s 
words to conclude that Watson sees ‘a legal idea’ as ‘words sprung out on paper’.93 
In other words, Watson seems to suggest that what is borrowed is the wording of 
the legal rule. This is why for him to frame a single basic code of private law is a 
relatively easy task.94 
 Because of its simplicity and pragmatism, Watson’s theory of legal change 
appeals to those who seek to explain legal change in developing countries, for 
example Thailand, between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the 
surface, Watson’s theory of legal transplants seems to explain the modernisation of 
Thai private law accurately.95 We will test this hypothesis and will also have a 
chance to assess critically whether a successful transplant is possible without a 
systematic knowledge of the foreign law models as he claims. 
2.1.2 The nature of comparative law 
In accordance with his view on the nature of legal change, namely that law changes 
mostly by borrowing, Watson contends that the focus of comparative law should be 
on the historical relationship between the donor and recipient legal systems.96 
 
I would suggest that [comparative law] is the study of the relationship of 
one legal system and its rules with another. The nature of any such 
relationship, the reasons for the similarities and the differences, is 
discoverable only by a study of the history of the systems or of the rules; 
hence in the first place, Comparative Law is Legal History concerned with 
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the relationship between systems…If this approach is right and 
Comparative Law is best regarded as a study of the relationship between 
systems of law, then it follows that where there is no relationship there can 
be no Comparative Law, and any comparison drawn between rules will be 
arbitrary and without systematic worth.97 
 
If law develops mostly through borrowing, one needs to look into the development 
of the recipient legal system in relation to the donor legal system, i.e. how the law 
was borrowed. Watson has strengthened the close bond between comparative law 
and legal history,98 which has been upheld by leading comparatists99 since it 
emerged as a new legal discipline. Watson’s approach to comparative law is, in my 
view, convincing, but if to borrow foreign law lawmakers are not required to have 
contextual knowledge or even a systematic knowledge of it, one may cast doubt on 
the usefulness of comparative law. On the one hand, Watson insisted that what 
lawmakers needed to borrow foreign law was ‘the idea’ of it. On the other hand, he 
emphasised that legal comparatists needed to study the relationship between the 
donor system and the recipient system. If legal borrowing occurs simply by copying 
of legal ideas, comparative law may be of no use to the borrower and if the 
approach to comparative law is to investigate the relationship of the legal systems 
historically as Watson suggests, one can expect that to be able to make comparisons 
comparatists need a systematic knowledge about what they wish to compare and 
that they will discover something more than how two sets of legal ideas are related. 
2.2 Responses to Alan Watson’s theory of legal transplants 
Watson’s theory of legal transplants has both opponents and adherents. Even 
among the latter, however, it has been criticised for its lack of detail.100 Since what 
critics think of his theory sheds light on new aspects of Watson’s study of legal 
change, we will consider their criticism. Responses to Watson’s theory of legal 
transplants are considered in three different aspects: the nature of legal change; the 
nature of comparative law; and the nature of law. 
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2.2.1 The nature of legal change 
Most of the criticisms of Watson’s theory on legal transplants have been raised by 
legal sociologists and more generally by those who see law as a reflection of 
society.101 Critics have focused on his explicit and implicit suggestions that since law 
changes mainly by borrowing, external factors, for example social, political and 
economic factors, do not have a significant impact on legal development102 and are 
largely directed by legal professional elites, namely lawyers and lawmakers.103 
Friedman finds the idea of legal transplants, especially as presented in the book, 
Society and Legal Change, unconvincing.104 He argues that the process of making law 
which is largely controlled by lawmakers, as suggested by Watson, is political in 
nature, and therefore successful legislative process depended on political factors.105 
He also argues that law does not survive autonomously but because it remains 
useful to society.106  
 Pierre Legrand, a staunch critic of Watson’s theory, finds the metaphor, ‘legal 
transplants’, misleading because, in his view, it is not possible for a law to be 
transplanted.107 From a sociological standpoint, he argues that ‘the meaning of the 
rule…is not entirely supplied by the rule itself; a rule is never completely self-
explanatory’.108 In fact, it is mostly given by the interpreter in accordance with the 
way he understands ‘the context within which the rule arises and by the manner in 
which she frames her question’.109 This process is determined by who and where the 
interpreter is.110 Of course, ‘the context’ Legrand mentions is the bundle of external 
factors which vary from place to place and which influence how the interpreter 
understands the rule. Hence a legal rule is understood differently in different 
places.111 Watson has defended his position against this criticism in his more recent 
publications. He announced that he has long held that ‘a transplanted rule is not the 
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same thing as it was in its previous home.’112 One may consider this as a change of 
position. If this is not the case, then there must be some ambiguity in his early 
works. For example, he wrote that ‘[o]ne of the most striking features of legal rules 
is their power of survival’ and ‘[m]any, many rules endure for centuries with only 
minor modifications, both in their own land and abroad’.113 These statements imply 
that the rules Watson refers to whether in their own land or abroad are the same 
rules.  
 Legrand is not the only one who finds the metaphor of legal transplants 
misleading. Gunther Teubner proposed another term and conception, ‘legal 
irritants’, which he claimed explained legal change by borrowing more accurately 
and which is more plausible than suggesting that legal transplants are always 
impossible.114 For Teubner, ‘legal transplants’ gives the wrong impression that what 
is borrowed remains identical with the rule used as its model and has the same 
function. In fact, ‘[i]t is not transplanted into another organism, rather it works as a 
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected 
events’,115 furthermore 
 
‘Legal irritants’ cannot be domesticated; they are not transformed from 
something alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new cultural 
context, rather they will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the 
external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will 
undergo fundamental change.116 
 
Teubner’s theory does not focus on the question of legal borrowing as to whether 
the law borrowed is rejected or integrated in society but on the question as to ‘what 
kind of transformations of meaning will the term undergo, how its role [will] differ, 
once it is reconstructed anew under [the new environment]?’117 He studied the 
reception of the German concept of good faith in English law118 and discovered that 
it does not perform the same function as it does in German law because of 
differences between Germany’s and Great Britain’s economic cultures.119 
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 Teubner analyses three aspects of Watson’s theory and offers new 
explanations for them. First, legal borrowing is socially easy because of globalisation 
which ‘created one world-wide network of legal communications which 
downgrades the law of the nation state to mere regional parts of this network’.120 A 
legal transfer is therefore no longer a matter of an interrelation of national societies 
but ‘a direct contact between legal orders within one global legal discourse’.121 
Despite this, it does not necessarily mean that the cultural ties of the national laws 
can simply be overlooked. Second, lawyers and lawmakers are regarded as 
‘secondary’ actors since ‘the inner logics of the legal discourse itself…builds on 
normative self-reference and recursivity and thus creates a preference for internal 
transfer within the global legal system as opposed to the difficult new invention of 
legal rules out of social issues’.122 Third, legal borrowing is only one of the main 
forms of legal change and others may result from complex multi-layered 
interrelations between law and society.123 
 Some other concerns of legal sociologists revolve around the same issues, 
including Watson’s emphasis on lawyers’ roles in legal development and his 
trivialising of external factors. Even though they do not completely reject this idea, 
most of them find that Watson’s explanation is incomplete and does not represent 
the whole picture of legal change. Bruce Frier opines that Watson’s theory focuses 
on private law and neglects other areas of law, for example, criminal law and 
constitutional law, which have more interrelations with social needs. He also 
criticises Watson for limiting his examples to particular places and times while 
ignoring others, for example the era of legislation.124 William Ewald, although 
supportive of much of the idea of legal transplants,125 asks Watson to supply 
evidence for his claim that the interests of other sections of society have no 
significant impact on legal development.126 Roger Cotterrell acknowledges that the 
view on lawyers and lawmakers’ crucial role in legal change is plausible but only 
when the complexity of the relationship between law and society has been 
understood sociologically.127  
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2.2.2 The nature of law 
Through his statement ‘[c]omparative Law is about the nature of law, and especially 
about the nature of legal development’,128 we can assume that Watson sees the 
nature of legal change as part of the nature of law. It is reasonable to believe that his 
critics also agree with this assumption since they usually interpret his view on the 
nature of legal change as his view on the nature of law simultaneously even though 
in dealing with his theory of legal transplants he never reveals what he thinks law is. 
Criticism may to a degree result from Watson’s view on what is borrowed in which 
he seems to suggest that the object of borrowing is the wording of the legal rule.129 
Friedman considers Watson’s theory of legal transplants as weak because it is 
founded on a narrow concept of the nature of law since ‘[f]or Watson, a rule means 
words sprung out on paper, not a living process. Words on paper may indeed have 
little connection with society; the important question is how they operate’.130  
Similarly, Legrand interprets Watson’s object of borrowing as ‘statutory rules’ 
mainly because of his proposition that legal borrowing is socially easy.131 Legrand 
sees the legal transplants theory as promoting legal positivism.132 Examining 
Watson’s legal transplant examples of the imposition of foreign law in former 
colonial states in Africa,133 Richard Abel goes further to accuse him of having a 
hidden political agenda. ‘Watson consistently conceals the political element in his 
statements of and explanations for such phenomena as the English conveyancing 
rules and the imposition and preservation of metropolitan law in the colonies’.134 
 Watson later clarifies the subject of his studies of legal transplants that they 
are ‘primarily concerned with positive rules of law’.135 The fact that he concentrated 
his studies of legal change on positive law does not necessarily mean that for him 
law is only a set of positive rules and that he is a legal positivist. The question is 
only whether the scope of a study of legal change should be limited to positive rules 
of law or not.     
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2.2.3 The nature of comparative law 
Watson has great faith in a unified method of comparative law and legal history for 
understanding legal development.136 But since his theory of legal transplants 
underplays the role of society, legal sociologists suspect that he is also attempting to 
make sociology of law an irrelevant method for the study of legal change.137 There is 
no doubt that they find legal sociology an indispensible approach in conjunction 
with comparative law and legal history to the study of legal change. Cotterrell sees 
comparative law and sociology of law as a single enterprise committed to 
understanding law as a social phenomenon.138 Abel contends that comparative law 
and legal history should not be limited to doctrinal analysis of positive law since 
‘[s]tudies using historical and comparative materials to construct a social theory of 
when and why legal rules are preserved under changed social conditions, and 
assessing that persistence in terms of explicitly stated values, would be a major 
contribution’.139 Frier suggests that legal history is fully exploited when the 
researcher takes account of ‘the dynamic tension between the jurisprudential 
tradition and the social purposiveness of law, between internal and external factors 
affecting legal change’.140 
 Rudolfo Sacco, a renowned comparatist, published two instalments of a 
journal article entitled ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ 
in 1991.141 Sacco developed a new theory on comparative law methods which also 
provides an interesting perspective on the study of legal change. It is not clear 
whether Sacco’s publication is aimed at challenging Watson’s approach to 
comparative law, but it has often been used in contrast to his theory of legal 
transplants.142 Watson wrote a paper to acknowledge ‘legal formants’ implicitly but 
mainly to defend his argument that legal development can be distant from social 
reality.143 Sacco offers a new approach to understanding the nature of law. He 
contends that a legal rule of a country should not be thought of merely as a 
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statutory rule but can be any of its three aspects, the rules of legislatures, the rules of 
courts or the rules of the scholars who formulate legal doctrine.144 Thus when 
borrowing a legal rule, the borrower must take account of these three different 
elements which have the same root but which may offer different meaning or 
understanding of it as a result of the process of interpretation.145 Comparative law 
should not be used to reject this difference but to admit that it exists because of the 
multiplicity of the legal formants. Hence when comparing legal systems, we must 
look for their differences and similarities in all three dimensions.146 Sacco postulates 
that recognising legal formants acknowledges that ‘the comparative perspective is 
historical per excellence’ that comparison looks to history to find, for example, why 
a law is understood differently by a judge and by a scholar.147 
3. SUCCESS OF RECEPTIONS 
Even though Watson places more emphasis on how law changes than how success 
of legal change is perceived, this does not necessarily mean that the latter is not an 
important aspect of the study of legal change. It may be true that law develops 
mostly by borrowing as Watson speculates, but questions about legal change should 
not be confined to how law is borrowed. It is also equally important to ask how the 
law borrowed has developed subsequently. In other words, it is essential to enquire 
whether legal borrowing is successful.148 This is because effectiveness of the law 
borrowed usually matters to the borrower even though the law was borrowed on 
certain purposes and they were fulfilled. In Thailand, for instance, the Civil and 
Commercial Code of 1923 compiled mainly by French draftsmen was soon rejected 
because the Thai government and lawyers were not satisfied with its quality, even 
though the main purpose of having a code which was to end extraterritoriality 
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could have been fulfilled by the French draft.149 Since the discussion of legal 
reception of this thesis revolves around his theory of legal transplants, Watson’s 
perception of successful receptions is first examined before factors of success of 
receptions are generally discussed. 
3.1 Alan Watson’s notion of successful legal transplants 
Watson does not clearly explain when and how a legal transplant can be treated as 
‘successful’.150 His legal transplant theory mainly concerns how legal borrowing 
occurs151 and how its developments can be said to be independent of social factors. 
Watson admits that what happens after borrowing, i.e. how it has developed or 
interpreted by scholars and judges, is not the main concern for his theory of legal 
transplants.152 His unclear position on success of receptions and disregard for the 
effects of receptions is criticised by JWF Allison, who contends that ‘[w]ithout a 
study of effect or interpretation…one cannot draw inferences concerning the success 
of transplantation’.153 Similarly, Cotterrell argues that the study of a legal transplant 
is of no significance unless one can show how it has affected society.154  
 Despite the absence of clear definition of the term ‘success’, Watson’s works 
on the theory of legal transplants provide sufficient clues about how he conceives of 
‘success’. Watson explains that the focus of his ‘legal transplants’ is on ‘the existence 
of the rule’.155 His proof for the weak relation between law and society is the ‘power 
of survival’ of legal rules that ‘many rules endure for centuries with only minor 
modifications, both in their own land and abroad’.156 The clearest illustration of 
Watson’s notion of ‘success’ is his example of the reception of foreign civil law in 
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What counted for the speedy success [my emphasis] of this transplant in 
general was the Japanese desire for it, not their knowledge of the French 
and German political context of the legal rules, or any similarity of that 
political context with what existed in Japan.157 
 
From his propositions, we can construct Watson’s conception of a successful legal 
transplant and the determinant of this success. It is most likely that for Watson legal 
borrowing is successful if the law borrowed survives for a period of time. The 
determinant of success is therefore the ‘survival’ or ‘existence’ of the law 
transplanted. However, this notion of survival is disapproved of by Friedman, who 
questions as to how we can determine when a legal rule survives or dies out. He is 
not convinced that a legal rule can survive by itself. Taking the mortgage and the 
trust as examples, Friedman concludes that while other medieval legal rules became 
extinct the two concepts have survived because they have remained useful to 
society.158 Friedman’s argument has some merit at least in that there should be a 
more objective assessment of the success of a legal transplant than a focus on 
whether the adopted rules exist or not. The survival of a law ultimately depends on 
government bodies which hold the power to abolish it. A more meaningful question 
is about what determines that the law should no longer exist. Friedman has a point, 
but the retention or abolition of a law may also involve wider and more complex 
reasons than its usefulness to society. 
 A weakness of Watson’s theory of legal transplants, if not the absence of a 
clear definition of success as discussed above, is that it places too much emphasis on 
the occurrence of a reception of law but too little on the success of it. It may be more 
worthwhile for those who hold Watson’s view that legal borrowing is the main 
source for legal change to change the question from ‘whether’ to ‘how the law was 
borrowed’.159 Moreover, it is a more meaningful question to ask how the legal rules 
have developed after they were transplanted into society, i.e. whether they have 
been fully incorporated into the new environment. To answer this question, a 
unified approach of comparative law and legal history must be adopted. However, 
to have a full picture, one also needs to see legal development from sociological 
perspective.     
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3.2 Factors of success of receptions 
Defining the success of receptions is often controversial, and this is why academics 
usually avoid giving a precise definition for the term ‘success’.160 They attempt 
instead to establish the criteria for success of a reception. But this still does not 
escape controversy.161 The criteria of success may depend on the aims of the 
reception, which possibly results in various subjective assessments. However, if 
everyone agrees that the main aim of receptions of foreign law is to successfully 
establish a law based on the texts of the rules adopted, then the only criterion is to 
examine whether the law is promulgated by a legitimate legislative body. This is a 
less controversial meaning of success, but one may argue that it is too simplistic. 
Similarly, if we measure the success of a reception by looking at the survival of the 
rules adopted,162 most receptions of law may be considered to be successful 
transplants at least for a certain period of time. Watson’s survival consideration, 
though simplistic, offers certainty. We may adopt it but find a more sophisticated 
explanation for it, which may not necessarily lessen the degree of controversy. If we 
generally agree that we borrow foreign legal rules mainly because we appreciate 
their underlying principles and wish to establish our own rules based on the 
reasoning of the rule in question,163 we may consider our aim achieved when they 
are understood and applied by our lawyers, including judges and scholars, in a way 
similar as their models are in their home for a certain period of time. It is equally 
important that the rules must be incorporated into the new environment.164 If the 
rule survives for a significant period of time one may assume that it has been 
incorporated into society. However, this is not always true as there may be some 
adopted rules which are struggling to survive but are still in use. Thus one needs to 
consider both internal and external factors of success.165 Internal factors concern 
lawmakers and lawyers who must possess knowledge of the rules, transplant them 
properly and apply them in accordance with jurisprudence of the original system. 
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Regarding external factors, the rules must be incorporated into society, which 
depends mainly on what caused the reception of law, what was received and the 
context of the new environment.  
3.2.1 Internal factors 
In the discussion of Watson’s theory of legal transplants, the internal factors usually 
referred to are a class of lawmakers and lawyers, including judges and scholars, 
who dominate the making, application and interpretation of law.166 Watson has 
illustrated how significant this professional group is for legal development.167 
Cairns, who undertook extensive PhD research into codifications in the Territory of 
Orleans and Province of Lower Canada under Watson’s supervision, confirms his 
supervisor’s proposition that external pressure must be exerted on lawyers and 
lawmakers. 
 
A change in economic organisation or ideology (in itself a human 
construction) does not in itself cause a change in the law: a lawmaker has to 
see the change and then act to change the law because of the change in the 
economy. (Law is not a self-perpetuating living body: it only exists through 
human actions.)168 
 
Cairns concludes that lawmakers act as ‘mediators’ between ‘society’ and ‘law’.169 
 
The relationship of causality between all the factors potentially influencing 
law and the law itself is dependent on those who make the law: it is they 
who make these various factors effective on the law in their construction of 
the law.170 
 
 The central role of lawyers and lawmakers in legal development is not 
contentious. The true question is about what kind of knowledge these people 
needed to have to make legal borrowing successful. Watson’s position on this 
question generates controversy. He insists that: 
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What … the law reformer should be after in looking at foreign systems was 
an idea which could be transformed into part of the law of his country. For 
this a systematic knowledge of the law or political structure of the donor 
system was not necessary, [my emphasis] though a law reformer with such 
knowledge would be more efficient. Successful borrowing could be 
achieved even when nothing was known of the political, social or economic 
context of the foreign law.171 
 
It is understandable that Watson downplays the importance of social, political and 
economic knowledge of the donor system because of his view that legal 
development is mostly distinct from social reality, but without ‘a systematic 
knowledge of the law’ one has considerable doubts as to how a legal transplant can 
be successful. Of course, if one adheres to his disputed notion of success, one may 
be convinced that as long as the lawmakers can borrow legal ideas and they survive 
in the new environment, any kind of knowledge is not necessary. 
 If we look at the German situation, we find ‘learned men’, those who studied 
Roman law as the driving force behind the reception of Roman law. However, legal 
borrowing in Germany was not merely a process of borrowing positive Roman rules 
but what Franz Wieacker calls the ‘intellectualization of German law and lawyers’. 
 
If one is to see the Reception in its full historical significance it is better to 
concentrate less on the adoption of the actual rules of the ius commune and 
more on the main process of development, namely on the intellectualization 
of German law and lawyers. By this we mean the rationalization of the 
whole of public life, the resolution of political and private disputes, not by 
force, emotion, or unthinking deference to tradition but by canvassing the 
solution reached by independent juristic analysis of similar problems and 
deciding on the basis of a rational rule thus arrived at.172 
 
It was those learned men who spread Roman legal ideas in German society and 
helped foster the intellectual climate and thereby made it ready for the subsequent 
receptions of substantive Roman rules in Germany. One may doubt whether the 
reception of Roman law in German law would have still been successful if those 
German men had not possessed ‘a systematic knowledge’ of Roman law. 
 It is convincing that, if they want the legal ideas to be understood in similar 
ways as they were in their home jurisdiction, lawmakers need to make the new 
environment intellectually suitable for them to grow, and they therefore need to pay 
close attention to legal education. Kurt Lipstein analysed the reception of the Swiss 
Civil Code in Turkey in 1926 and found that, despite conflicting cultural traditions 
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of Switzerland and Turkey, owing to education and organisation, Swiss civil law 
was transplanted in Turkey more smoothly than many envisaged for   
  
If a small but leading intelligentsia, which is united in its purpose, 
introduces a new system of values and behavior among a population 
which is little educated, the cleavage between law on the one side and 
custom, traditions, and morality on the other side can be overcome and the 
law emerges victorious. The problem is reduced to one of organization and 
education.173 
 
 From these illustrations, we may conclude that if legal borrowing is to be 
successful lawyers need adequate legal education174 which enables them to 
transplant, understand and apply the rules borrowed properly. It follows that 
lawyers without a systematic knowledge of the rules transplanted tend to apply 
them in a way they are familiar with but not in a way they are understood at their 
home jurisdiction. 
3.2.2 External factors 
Lawyers with sufficient knowledge of law are not the only determinant for 
successful receptions. They may know how to apply it, but this does not necessarily 
guarantee that the transplanted law can successfully be incorporated into their 
society. If it fails to be absorbed into society, the transplant may cease to exist or 
cause problems. Thus we need to examine the external forces which affect the 
incorporation of the law transplanted into society.175 Regarding the external factors 
of a successful transplant, David Nelken points out that 
 
We must be prepared to find that the conditions of success will depend on 
what is being transferred, by which source, to which receiving society, the 
way the transfer is introduced, and a potentially unlimited number of 
wider background factors and previous historical experiences.176 
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To identify all the external determinants of success is, as Cairns puts it, 
‘impossible’.177 One rather focuses on some important factors which have often been 
discussed among legal scholars in relation to Watson’s theory of legal transplants.  
Causes of receptions 
There are many factors which lead to or trigger receptions of law. These factors can 
also be called ‘causes of receptions’ or ‘motivations of receptions’ and used to 
establish ‘types of receptions’. What causes or motivates a successful reception may 
also determine how smoothly the law has been incorporated into society.178 
Generally, there are two main types of reception, reception by imposition and 
reception because of prestige. The first type is exemplified by the imposition of law 
in colonies by colonial powers while the receptions in the second type take place 
because the recipient state appreciates foreign law.179 In terms of the recipient state’s 
willingness to receive foreign law, we can also call the first and the second types of 
receptions, involuntary and voluntary receptions. There can be another type of 
receptions where legal borrowing occurs because a state has made a commitment to 
an adoption of foreign law. It is indeterminate whether the recipient country is 
willing to borrow foreign law. This can be illustrated by law reform programmes in 
developing countries which are undertaken to fulfil a condition set by the IMF or 
the World Bank in exchange for financial support.180 The reception of foreign private 
law in Thailand’s Civil and Commercial Code of 1925 may also be included in this 
category given that the country had to establish modern codes of law in order to be 
freed from consular jurisdictions. It is clear that none of the colonial powers forced 
Thailand to do so, but one cannot entirely be sure that the modernisation of Thai 
law took place because of the Thai attribution to prestige of foreign law.181 
 An implication of the causes of receptions for their success is that ‘in contrast 
to prestige, dominance does not produce spontaneous adherence to cultural 
models’.182 Since it naturally relies on the use of force, dominance usually 
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disappears when the occupation ends.183 It follows that the reception of foreign law 
will fail except when the law has already been incorporated into the new 
environment due to ‘the rational authority of the legal system or local lobbies’.184 
Max Rheinstein observes that ‘[i]n the case of [voluntary] reception we find two 
legal climates, that of the model and that of the recipient, and certain legal 
phenomena of the model are voluntarily and consciously taken over into the legal 
climate of the recipient’.185  
What is received 
The success of a legal transplant may also depend on the degree of transferability of 
the rules. These give a clue ‘what chance there are that the new law will be adjusted 
to the home environment and what are the risks that it will be rejected’.186 The 
transferability of legal rules can be identified only when one views the nature of law 
as ‘a multilayered cultural interfusion of great complexity and variability, an 
amalgam of group processes, historical and social, intellectual and psychological’.187 
Kahn-Freund postulates that legal rules are ranged from the mechanical which can 
be transplanted with relative ease to the organic which can be transplanted with 
difficulty.188 Based on Kahn-Freund’s notion of transferability of legal rules, Teubner 
developed his own theory called ‘law’s binding arrangements’.189 He submits that 
legal rules and social processes are coupled either loosely or tightly and then 
concludes that the loosely coupled areas of law have a relatively high chance of 
successful transfer while a transfer of legal rules with tight coupling in binding 
arrangements have a relatively high chance of failure.190 Similarly, Cotterrell 
contends that we should ‘see law as always rooted in communities of various 
kinds’.191 Law can broadly be separated into two main types, ‘instrumental law’ and 
‘culturally-based law’, each of which has different transferability. Instrumental laws, 
especially contract and commercial law, are relatively easy to be transplanted 
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because of their ‘tie to economic interests rather than national customs or 
sentiments’192 while culturally-based law is relatively easy to resist in the new 
environment.193 This can be illustrated by property law which ‘is deeply rooted in 
locally developed legal traditions’.194 
 Watson believes that legal transplants are socially easy since he concentrates 
his attention exclusively on private law where transfer has a relatively high chance 
of success. It is therefore doubtful whether he would change his position if he 
extends his case studies to criminal law or constitutional law which is tightly 
coupled with social needs.195 
The context of the recipient society 
This external factor is closely related to what is received as discussed above. While 
the success of transplants may be determined by how strong the link between the 
law and its home society was, in this section we will examine how suitable the new 
environment is for the growth of the law received. Thus the compatibility between 
the law and the new home depends on both the degree of transferability of the law 
and the suitability of the new home.196 The context of society here is mainly 
concerned with social, political and economic conditions of recipient society.197 The 
significance of these aspects has consistently been stressed by legal sociologists 
when it comes to an issue of legal transplants. 
 Cotterrell, who for the purpose of determining success of receptions divides 
community198 into four types, ‘instrumental community’, ‘traditional community’, 
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‘community of belief’ and ‘affective community’,199 shows that each type of society 
provides different conditions for the development of the law received and therefore 
will respond to each type of law differently.  
 
This abstract framework of types of community does not allow any neat 
classification of laws as hard or easy to transplant. But it provides 
possibilities for linking law to different kinds of need and problems 
associated with different kinds of social relationships. Certainly, when laws 
are transplanted, the transplant is likely to be linked in the perceptions of 
the transplants with patterns of social relations they associate with the 
law.200 
 
The formation of an instrumental community is mainly based on people’s common 
interest, especially economic interest.201 Foreign law does not encounter strong 
resistance in this type of community as long as it serves its purposes.202  Similarly, a 
traditional community where people find themselves often by chance coexisting in a 
shared an environment,203 provides a suitable environment for foreign law to grow 
due to its relatively weak social ties.204 However, an affective community where 
people unite by their mutual affection and community of belief where people share 
common beliefs or values205 resists any law which contrasts with its common social 
values or beliefs.206 
 Teubner’s case study of the reception of the German concept of good faith in 
Great Britain shows that it did not grow in the same way it did in Germany. This is 
because the concept of good faith has been used to facilitate and support the 
German economic system, which is based on business-coordinated economies and 
therefore does not perform the same function in the British economic environment, 
which is based on liberal market economies.207 In Cotterrell’s terms, the legal 
concept does not satisfy the needs of instrumental community, British business 
community,208 and, in Teubner’s terms, the concept of good faith therefore becomes 
a legal irritant to the British legal system, which changes its binding arrangement 
fundamentally. ‘Good faith would become a quasi-constitutional constraint on two 
central elements of the production regime: a constraint on strong hierarchies of 
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private government and a constraint on certain expansionist tendencies of 
competitive processes’.209 Ugo Mattei, who claims that, despite a diversity of 
institutional backgrounds, modern legal systems tend to move towards economic 
efficiency,210 similarly admits that despite economic efficiency the legal systems may 
sometimes develop ‘strong barriers’ to transplantation for various reasons.211 
 The political condition of the new environment is another important factor 
which determines whether the new law has successfully been absorbed into the new 
environment. Kocourek defines the political factor as ‘the objective complex of 
governmental arrangements in a State, and more particularly, the nature of the 
sources of law, organization of courts, and the activity of legislative power’.212 Kahn-
Freund suggests that political structure and the influence of social groups in society 
‘play a decisive role in the law making and the decision making process’.213 Watson 
was criticised because he failed to take account of the complexity of the modern 
legislative process.214 This criticism has some merit in the sense that the making of a 
law is no longer a matter for ruling elites or a small group of lawmakers and 
lawyers as it was some hundred years ago. In the modern democratic world, more 
political actors play crucial roles in legal development. Friedman illustrates how the 
legislature works as a rulemaking body in the United States, which reflects complex 
political structure and relationship between political actors. American legislators 
therefore need to ensure that a statute keeps balance between public interest and 
groups’ interest.215  
 The significance of the political factor in the reception of law and its success 
can also be illustrated by codification in Thailand where under intense external 
political pressure the Thai government had to end consular jurisdictions speedily. 
Of course, as Cairns points out,216 this external factor may not directly affect the 
success of the reception of law in Thailand, but making a law under such political 
condition, the Thai lawmakers may have been forced to adopt a method which may 
have greatly affected the way the law has developed. How the political factor 
caused the reception of foreign private law in Thailand and how it indirectly 
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affected the subsequent development of the law in Thailand will be discussed in the 
next chapters. 
CONCLUSION 
Watson’s approach has merit because it offers sensible explanations for legal change. 
His view that legal borrowing is the main source of legal change is convincing, but 
his excessive emphasis on lawmakers’ and lawyers’ role and his underestimation of 
external factors, especially with regard to success of receptions, need to be 
reassessed. This thesis considers both the advantages of his theory and criticism of it 
to delineate a method for the study of the reception of foreign private law in 
Thailand in 1925. It proposes to approach the matter via three main questions, what 
causes legal borrowing, how law is borrowed and whether legal borrowing is 
successful. These questions will be investigated mainly with the methodologies of 
comparative law and legal history. The next chapter will deal with the first question 







THE MODERNISATION OF THAI LAW: BACKGROUND 
INTRODUCTION 
Alan Watson observed that:  
 
For law to be changed there must be a sufficiently strong impulse directed 
through a Pressure Force operating on a Source of Law. This impulse must 
overcome the Inertia, the general absence of a sustained interest on the part 
of society and its ruling élite to struggle for the most ‘satisfactory’ rule.1 
 
This statement seems to explain adequately how legal change in Thailand was 
triggered in the nineteenth century when commercial and military expansionism 
forced the Thai government to sign a treaty with Great Britain known as the 
Bowring Treaty of 1855. This treaty marked the beginning of the system of 
extraterritoriality in Thailand2 and became the model for a series of treaties with 
other Western countries. Consular jurisdiction eventually proved to be disastrous to 
the Thai government as it came to be seriously abused by some Western powers. As 
a result, the Thai king and his government felt a strong impulse to modernise their 
traditional law in order to regain full judicial autonomy.3 The external challenge 
alone, however, is not sufficient to account for these changes. Contact with 
Westerners also helped the ruling elite to identify defects and the inadequacy of the 
Thai legal system which was founded on Indian moral ideologies. External pressure 
and internal motivation effected a major change in Thai society in general and the 
modernisation of Thai law in particular. The reforms of the legal system began with 
the reorganisation and westernisation of the judicial system and later the first law 
                                                      
1 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 CLJ 313, 331.  
2 Francis Bowes Sayre, ‘The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam’ (1928) 22 AJIL 70, 70. 
3 Preedee Kasemsup, ‘Reception of Law in Thailand – A Buddhist Society’ in Masaji Chiba, 
Asian Indigenous Law: In Interaction with Received Law (KPI 1986) 291; David M Engel, Code 
and Custom in a Thai Provincial Court: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Systems of Justice 
(UA Press 1978) 1. 
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school was established. Codification was the last stage of the modernisation of Thai 
law.  
 This chapter examines whether Watson’s observation is really apposite to 
Thailand’s experience of legal change. Although the main focus of this thesis is on 
how foreign private law was borrowed in the Thai legal system, the reception of 
foreign private law is not an isolated event in Thai history but part of social and 
political change: codification was part of the modernisation of the Thai legal system. 
To fully understand it, one must look at the reception of foreign private law in 
Thailand in context. This chapter therefore looks at the social and political 
background of traditional Thai society, the causes of legal change and the general 
process of modernisation to throw light on the question of why legal change in 
Thailand occurred in a particular manner. 
1. AN OVERVIEW OF PRE-CODIFICATION THAI SOCIETY AND LAW 
1.1 A brief history of Thailand  
The origin of Thailand, known before 1939 as Siam,4 is a matter of controversy due 
to lack of reliable written records. Simon de la Loubère, Louis XIV’s extraordinary 
envoy to Siam in 1687, noted that ‘Siamese History is full of Fables’.5 It is commonly 
believed that the ancestors of the modern Siamese were Tai people who began to 
immigrate south from southern China from 100 BC. The Tai settled in present day 
Southeast Asia between the sixth and seventh centuries AD,6 where other ethnic 
groups were already present, notably the Mon and the Khmer (Angkor).7 Their 
settlements were in the Chao Phraya River basin8 and scattered over the region. 
These gradually developed into city-states, the primary political unit, known in Thai 
as mueang.9 The Tai notably had a distinct language, the foundation of the modern 
                                                      
4 In this thesis, ‘Siam’ and ‘Thailand’ are used interchangeably. So are ‘Siamese’ and ‘Thai’. 
5 Simon de la Loube ̀re, The Kingdom of Siam (OUP 1969) 8. 
6 WAR Wood, A History of Siam: From the Earliest Times to the Year A.D. 1781 (Chalermnit 
Bookshop 1959) 31–32; HG Quaritch Wales, Siamese State Ceremonies: Their History and 
Function (Quaritch 1931) 13–14; Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand 
(2nd edn, CUP 2009) 3. 
7 David K Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (2nd edn, YUP 2004) 1; Wales, ibid 12; Baker and 
Phongpaichit, ibid 3. 
8 Wyatt, ibid 2; Baker and Phongpaichit, ibid 4.  
9 Baker and Phongpaichit, ibid. See also Wyatt, ibid 6. 
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Thai language, which identified them as a separate people.10 Tai culture, which was 
intensively connected to religious ideologies, proved to be the driving force behind 
the cultural development of Thailand over several centuries.11 Archaeological and 
historical remains show that Theravada Buddhism was received in Southeast Asia 
mainly through the contacts with Buddhist missionaries from India as early as the 
beginning of the Buddhist Era,12 which may be earlier than the reception of 
Brahmanism (ancient Hinduism).13 It is, however, the Mon people who firmly 
established a Theravada Buddhist civilisation in central Southeast Asia between the 
sixth and ninth centuries. This Buddhist culture was gradually absorbed into the life 
of the Tai people who lived on the fringes of the Mon kingdom.14  
 In the early ninth century the Angkorean kingdom replaced the Mon kingdom 
to become the single most powerful kingdom in central Southeast Asia.15 Although 
the Khmer practiced Mahayana Buddhism as early as the first century,16 from the 
seventh century Brahmanism became the personal religion of most of the Khmer 
kings.17 Their preferred religion spread over their land as evident by the remains of 
the Angkorean-Brahmanical temples across central and northeastern Thailand and 
Cambodia, but the well-established Theravada Buddhism from the time of the Mon 
kingdom largely immunised Tai’s culture and religious beliefs against Hinduism.18 
The Brahmanical influence prevailed only in respect of governance and 
administration; Hindu concepts were borrowed to justify the supremacy of the 
monarch and the organisation of the government.19 A result of this borrowing was 
that Brahman priests (purohit), experts on Hindu law, had an important role to play 
in the administration of Tai states.20 
From the first half of the thirteenth century the Khmer Empire as well as the 
Burmese kingdom suffered a sharp decline paving the way for the rapid growth of 
some city-states of Tai people, especially in the Chao Phraya River valley and the 
upper peninsula, which, mainly by warfare, developed into more powerful political 
                                                      
10 Wyatt, ibid.  
11 ibid 20. 
12 The Buddhist era starts from the death of Gautama Buddha. In Thailand, this is equal to 
the Christian era plus five hundred and forty three years. 
13 Wood, History of Siam 42–44; Wales, Siamese State Ceremonies 12–13. 
14 Wyatt, Thailand 19–20. 
15 ibid 21. 
16 Wales, Siamese State Ceremonies 19. 
17 Wood, History of Siam 46. 
18 Wales, Siamese State Ceremonies 19; Wyatt, Thailand 24; Baker and Phongpaichit, History of 
Thailand 19.  
19 HG Quaritch Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration (Paragon Book 1965) 8. 
20 ibid; Wales, Siamese State Ceremonies 19. 
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units.21 These groups of Tai people were significantly socially and culturally 
different from the northern Tai. They employed Brahmanical beliefs and practices to 
establish a ‘relatively more complex, hierarchical social and political organization’.22 
Towards the end of the thirteenth century these people were, according to Chinese 
sources, known as Siamese.23 Sukhothai, one of the early Siamese states, which 
emerged in the mid-thirteenth century, became the dominant power in the large 
part of present-day Thailand at least for half a century. Although it lasted almost 
two hundred years, from the early fourteenth century Kingdom of Sukhothai was in 
decline.24  
 In about 1351, another Siamese state, the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, was 
established in the valley of Chao Phraya River region to the south of the Kingdom of 
Sukhothai.25 Throughout its 400-year history, Ayutthaya was dominant among the 
Tai states and was one of the most powerful kingdoms in Southeast Asia.26 By 1550, 
most of the neighbouring states, namely the Malay Kingdom, the Kingdom of Laos, 
Sukhothai, Chiang Mai, the Khmer Kingdom and the Shan States fell under the 
control of Ayutthaya.27 It was during the era of Ayutthaya that contacts between the 
Siamese and European traders and missionaries were first recorded. The Portuguese, 
Spanish, Dutch and French were permitted to set up their own settlements outside 
the city walls. During the reign of Louis XIV, the relationship between France and 
Siam reached a peak; the two kingdoms exchanged diplomatic missions and the 
French won favour with the Siamese king.28 Some western visitors to Ayutthaya, 
particularly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, produced written 
records of their journeys and experiences. These were vital to later Siamese 
generations in search of their origins. The history of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya is 
revealed through a number of records of foreigners who visited Ayutthaya from the 
                                                      
21 Wyatt, Thailand 30; Baker and Phongpaichit, History of Thailand 7. 
22 Wyatt, ibid 40. 
23 ibid 41. 
24 ibid 41–49.  
25 Richard D Cushman, The Royal Chronicles of Ayutthaya: A Synoptic Translation (Siam Society 
2000) 10. 
26 Keith W Taylor, ‘The Early Kingdoms’ in Nicholas Tarling (ed), The Cambridge History of 
Southeast Asia, vol 1 (CUP 1992) 172; Wyatt, Thailand 57. 
27 Virginia Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia: Linking East and West (Allen & Unwin 2003) 72. 
28 David Wyatt ‘Introduction’ in Simon de la Loubère The Kingdom of Siam (OUP 1969) v-vi; 
Dirk van der Cruysse, ‘Aspects of Siamese-French Relations during the Seventeenth 
Century’ (1992) 80 JSS 63, 64; Prince Damrong, ‘The Introduction of Western Culture in 
Siam’ (1926-1927) 20 JSS 89, 91–92; G Coedès, ‘Siamese Documents of the Seventeenth 
Century’ (1921) 14 JSS 7, 7. 
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seventeenth century29 visitors, notably Fernão Mendes Pinto (c 1650s),30 Jeremias 
van Vliet (1633-1642),31 De la Loubère (1687-1688)32 and Nicolas Gervaise (1688).33 
These foreign accounts are more reliable than the highly controversial local fables 
and chronicles of the local tradition. 
 Although they were Buddhist rulers, the kings of Ayutthaya wisely extracted 
political benefits from the Hindu concepts of law and administration to strengthen 
their power.34 Following the sack of Angkor Thom, the capital of the Khmer 
Kingdom by the Siamese in 1431, Khmer officials and priests were brought to 
Ayutthaya. These people were instrumental in effecting a change in Siam’s social 
and political systems: the king gained semi-divine status35 and the government was 
centralised. This allowed the ruler to exercise his direct authority over the feudal 
system which was previously administered by regional lords.36 The Hindu-Khmer 
style of administration remained influential in Siam until the mid-nineteenth 
century.  
 The city of Ayutthaya was besieged and sacked by the Burmese in 1767 and 
this ended the four-hundred-year reign of the great Siamese kingdom. The 
Kingdom of Thonburi, as the successor of Ayutthaya, was established in the area on 
the west bank of the Chao Phraya River: this later merged into Bangkok. The new 
                                                      
29 Ian Hodges, ‘Time in Transition: King Narai and the Luang Prasoet Chronicle of 
Ayutthaya’ (1999) 87 JSS 33. 
30 A Portuguese explorer and writer who travelled to several countries in Asia and wrote an 
account of his adventures. His memoir, Pilgrimage (Peregrinaçãm in Portuguese), published in 
1614, includes his experience in Siam in the mid-sixteenth century and is one of the earliest 
foreign accounts of Siamese society. See William Wood, ‘Fernão Mendez Pinto’s Account of 
Events in Siam’ (1926-1927) 20 JSS 25. See also Joaquim de Campos, ‘Early Portuguese 
Accounts of Thailand’ (1940) 32 JSS 1.  
31 The director of the Dutch East India Company in Ayutthaya between 1633 and 1642. He 
wrote three books about seventeenth century Siam, namely Description of the Kingdom of Siam, 
The Short History of the Kingdom of Siam and The Historical Account of the War of Succession 
Following the Death of King Pra Interajatsia, 22nd King of Ayuthian Dynasty. See Jeremie van 
Vliet, ‘Jeremie van Vliet’s Historical Account of Siam’ (1938) 30 JSS 95. See also Alfons van 
der Kraan, ‘The Dutch in Siam: Jeremias van Vliet and the 1636 Incident at Ayutthaya’ [2000] 
2 UNEAC Asia Papers  
< http://www.une.edu.au/asiacentre/PDF/Kraan_1.pdf> accessed 5 December 2012.    
32 David Wyatt, an eminent expert on Thai history, regards De la Loubère’s book, The 
Kingdom of Siam, as the finest work on seventeenth century Siam, see Wyatt, ‘Introduction’ 
viii. See also Ronald Love, ‘Simon de la Loubère: French Views of Siam in the 1680s’ (1994) 
82 JSS 155; George Sioris, ‘Some 16th and 17th Century Interpretations of Japan and Siam 
Fróis-Álvarez-La Loubère-Gervaise: A Layman’s Comparative Reading’ (1994) 82 JSS 179, 
182–83. 
33 A French missionary who produced a well-known historical account of Siam in 1688 called 
The Natural and Political History of the Kingdom of Siam. See Nicolas Gervaise, The Natural and 
Political History of the Kingdom of Siam (John Villiers tr, White Lotus 1989). See also Sioris, 
‘Some 16th and 17th Century Interpretations’ 183–84. 
34 Baker and Phongpaichit, History of Thailand 14. 
35 Gervaise, Natural and Political History 125. 
36 Wales, Ancient Siamese Government 70. 
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kingdom lasted only fifteen years. In 1782, the king was executed and one of his 
generals succeeded him as the new Siamese king, known as King Rama I. The new 
monarch built a new capital in the original area of Bangkok, which is on the other 
bank of the Chao Phraya River and opposite Thonburi, as well as establishing a new 
dynasty called the House of Chakri. He named his new kingdom ‘Rattanakosin’.37 
Ayutthayan traditions and political systems were considerably maintained in these 
two successive Siamese kingdoms. The early kings of the House of Chakri spent a 
great deal of time restoring old laws and practices of Ayutthaya.38 The old social 
and political traditions were followed and underwent little change until the 
modernisation of the kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century. 
1.2 Some social and political characteristics of pre-codification Thailand 
Traditional Thai society was considerably shaped by Theravada Buddhism39 but 
also integrated with other religious beliefs and traditions. Chris Baker and Pasuk 
Phongpaichit observe that  
 
[i]n practice, this pure form of Theravada was blended with other religious 
practices, including roles for Hindu gods, notions of supernatural power 
often borrowed from tantric types of Buddhism, and folk beliefs in spirits – 
especially in their power to foretell and influence the future.40 
 
Buddhism involves everyday life from birth to death and forms the basis of Thai 
culture and identity. A formal educational system did not exist in traditional Thai 
society. Until the nineteenth century when modern schools were established,41 Thai 
men were educated by Buddhist monks at Buddhist temples.42 Although Hinduism 
seemed to be favoured by the rulers as a main source of their divine power and 
justification for absolutism, apolitical Buddhism never lost its influence over the 
                                                      
37 Wyatt, Thailand 128–29. 
38 ibid 129–30; Wales, Siamese State Ceremonies 15. 
39 Gervaise, Natural and Political History 125–29. 
40 Baker and Phongpaichit, History of Thailand 19. 
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42 De la Loube ̀re, Kingdom of Siam 58; David K Wyatt, Studies in Thai History: Collected Articles 
(Silkworm Books 1994) 223; Jane Bunnag, ‘Loose Structure: Fact or Fancy? Thai Society Re-
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ruling class who used its philosophy to mitigate the rigidity of the Hindu system of 
administration.43 The Thai social order was shaped by the Buddhist ideology that:  
 
[a]s good Buddhists, the Thai perceive that all living beings stand in a 
hierarchy of varying ability to make actions effective and of varying degree 
of freedom from suffering…This hierarchy depends on a composite quality 
called ‘merit’ (bun) or ‘virtue’ (khaamdii), or one may also speak of a graded 
series of penalties (baap).44   
 
Unlike the term ‘merit’ in English which gives an impression of a fixed characteristic, 
Thai merit is changeable depending on a person’s actions.45 This is the reason why 
‘the Thai social order roots individuals in no permanent rank’46 and why the Hindu 
caste system was never adopted.47  
 There was great social mobility in Siam. There were two roles, superior and 
subordinate, in every type of relationship. The superior was expected to be 
‘benevolent calmly self-assured, authoritative (rather than authoritarian) while the 
subordinate is respectful, attentive, helpful but not necessarily obedient (although 
face to face disobedience would be unthinkable)’.48 
 
Each individual has, in fact, very similar kinds of relationships with his 
patron, his teacher, a senior kinsmen and a Buddhist monk, all of whom 
occupy a position of superiority with respect to him. Each of these 
relationships is of a very generalized patron/client type, and each tends to 
have a material component, which is to say that the inferior party receives 
not only advice and sponsorship, but also more tangible benefits in the 
form of financial support, either regular or only occasional.49 
 
 Paternalism gave Thai society its political character from the foundation of 
Sukhothai in the thirteenth century.50 From the time of their early states, Thai people 
fought with Southeast Asian states which already existed in the region. They 
needed the protection provided by their rulers and this may explain why 
                                                      
43 Michael Wright, ‘Ayudhya and Its Place in Pre-Modern Southeast Asia’ (1992) 80 JSS 81, 
83; Baker and Phongpaichit, History of Thailand 19–20. 
44 LM Hanks, ‘Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order’ (1962) 64 American Anthropologist 
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46 ibid 1248. 
47 Richard A O’Connor, ‘Law as Indigenous Social Theory: A Siamese Thai Case’ (1981) 8 
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49 Bunnag, ibid. See Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok 
Period 1782-1873 (Amarin Printing 1996) 157. 
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paternalistic monarchy never lost its prominence in Sukhothai where its relatively 
small size of territory and population meant the relationship between the rulers and 
their people was close and in Ayutthaya where paternalism was strengthened by 
the Hindu-Angorean system of administration which was imposed over its 
expansive kingdom.51 Because of constant military threats from neighbour states, 
Ayutthayan kings set up their kingdom ‘as a proto-military state whereby the 
people were organized in specific groups, controlled, at the informal level, by a 
paternal scheme, and, on a more formal level, by the centralized Indian hierarchy’.52 
The social and political structure of traditional Thai society had a pyramid shape 
‘with the monarch on the top and the hierarchic order of Sakdina under him’.53 
Sakdina (literally, ‘dignity mark’)54 is the system of remuneration where land and 
titles were dispensed proportionally to those who served the ruler and the country. 
Sakdina varied from person to person, but the monarch always set a maximum level 
of privilege for each position.55 The Sakdina system reflected the loose, informal 
social and political classes of traditional Thai society. Below the king, there were 
members of the royal family and government officials in various Sakdina ranks. The 
commoners, known in Thai as Prai, who always belonged to a band of a prince or an 
official, also had certain amount of privilege.56 Slaves (tars) who attained no Sakdina 
were the lowest class of people.57 The people of each Sakdina rank enjoyed their 
privilege proportionally and could be advanced in the hierarchy as long as the 
monarch was satisfied with their service.58 Sakdina rank determined civil and 
criminal liability; fines and punishments were proportional to status.59  
 The social and political structure which remained intact until the 
modernisation of the country in the nineteenth century formed an important 
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58 ibid 85-86; Wyatt, Thailand 62. 
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Political rather than moral-ethical considerations formed the primary basis 
of social organization in Siam. Due to constant threats of warfare in the 
Ayudhaya period as well as in the early part of the Chakkri, the main focus 
was on the individual’s relationship to the state and, hence, it may be said 
that the state played a more direct role in personal life in Siam as compared 
to China where the primary relationship was rather in the familial sphere.60 
 
In other words, Thai people were accustomed to top-down rule and receiving 
orders from the ruler. This paternalism together with the superior-subordinate-
relationship type exhibits important characteristics of traditional Thai society and 
formed part of modern Thailand’s identity. These social and political features help 
us understand why Thai law has developed in a certain way. Similarly, 
acknowledging the role of Buddhism in shaping Thai society may help solve some 
puzzles, ie why some law has never been successfully adopted in Thai society. In 
Cotterrell’s terms,61 traditional Thai society can in a general sense be considered as a 
‘community of belief’, where the people were bound by a common religious faith. A 
borrowing of any law whose aims are contrary to Buddhist beliefs risks failure.62 
1.3 An overview of the pre-codification Thai legal system 
This research focuses on two main aspects of the traditional Thai legal system: 
sources of pre-codification Thai law and the administration of justice: that is the 
court system and the nature of legal proceedings in traditional Thai society. Since 
the central theme of this research is the reception of foreign private law, it is also 
worth having an overview of traditional Thai private law which may provide a clue 
as to whether foreign law can be incorporated into Thai society successfully.  
                                                      
60 Viraphol, ‘Law in Traditional Siam and China’ 88. 
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1.3.1 Sources of pre-codification Thai law 
The best written evidence for constructing a clear picture of pre-codification Thai 
law is Kojmai Tra Sam Duang (กฎหมายตราสามดวง) or the Three-Seal Code,63 the first 
comprehensive law of Thailand and the compilation of traditional Thai law existing 
before 1805.64 This law was in use until the modern codes of Thailand were 
established a hundred years later. Pre-codification Thai law can be divided into 
written law and unwritten law. Traditional Thai law was mainly written law and 
can relatively easily be documented by written evidence. A study of unwritten law 
would be a work of anthropology and is not discussed here. 
 De la Loubère recorded that written law and written records of court 
proceedings were the normal practice of the Siamese since the time of the Ayutthaya 
Kingdom.65 It has generally been accepted that, like several other Southeast Asian 
states,66 traditional Thai law was considerably shaped by Indian moral ideologies.67 
There were two main sources of written law.68 A stone inscription believed to have 
been erected during the Sukhothai Kingdom (1238-1438) refers to Thammasat and 
ratchasatra as the law of the land.69 The role of Thammasat can be compared to that of 
a modern-day constitution. Its scope transcends the boundary of public law70 and it 
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 59 
extends even to the matters which now fall within the area of private law.71 
Thammasat had universally been used by Siamese kings for the administration of 
justice in Siam. It was regarded as the supreme expression of truth and equity, 
demonstrating how justice should be rightly administered.72 
 Thammasat (Dhammasattha in Pali)73 originated from the Hindu Laws of Manu. 
Nevertheless, the Siamese did not adopt it directly from the original but from the 
Mon Buddhist version (dhammasattham) to suit their social and religious 
conditions.74 Some original Hindu principles, for example the Manu legend,75 which 
helped to justify royal power76 and several provisions concerning debt, property, 
marriage and remarriage were adjusted77 while some Hindu institutions, especially 
the caste system, were rejected.78 As the spirit of Thammasat was grounded in 
Theravada Buddhism, the Brahmanical concept of the Law of Manu which makes 
spiritual and secular matters inseparable was also rejected79 since the ‘law of a new 
Manu, greatly different from Brahmanical laws of Manu, by its being merely a civil 
or lay law, i.e. law, still of a transcending nature, but concerning social organisation 
only’.80 By virtue of Buddhism, ‘Thammasat describes its ideal of a monarch as a 
King of Righteousness, elected by the people (the Mahasammata)’.81 According to 
Thammasat, an ideal monarch  
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abides steadfast in the ten kingly virtues, constantly upholding the five 
common precepts and on holy days the set of eight precepts, living in 
kindness and goodwill to all beings. He takes pains to study the 
Thammasat and to keep the four principles of justice, namely: to assess 
the right or wrong of all service or disservice rendered to him, to uphold 
the righteous and truthful, to acquire riches through none but just means 
and to maintain the prosperity of his state through none but just means.82 
 
 Ratchasatra or royal ordinances, a supplement to Thammasat, put the principles 
of the latter into practice.83 Kings enjoyed absolute power and could act as they 
pleased, but their decisions were merely orders. These could not contradict 
Thammasat and remained effective as long as the ruler who issued them lived, 
unless they were sanctioned by the new ruler.84 The system of ratchasatra formed a 
system of positive law (or ‘legislation’ in Huxley’s terms)85 that was not completely 
separate from the eternal law of Thammasat. In the early period of Siam, its kings 
collected the decisions and ordinances of their predecessors and put them in books 
separate from Thammasat in order to make use of them. The value and authority of 
such records were due to the king’s reputation of being a good ruler, for example a 
ruler who governed in accordance with the rules of Thammasat. Later rulers checked 
whether the old royal decisions and ordinances accorded with Thammasat and if 
they did they were then written in the form of sections and placed under the 
corresponding heading of Thammasat. This made them permanent rules, not because 
of them being the king’s legislation but because they reflected the eternal law.86 
 Following the sack of the Ayutthaya Kingdom in 1767 which mostly 
destroyed Siamese legal literature kept in the capital, King Rama I embarked on a 
project to restore the old law of Ayutthaya. This resulted in the compilation of the 
Three-Seal Code, the integration of Thammasat and ratchasatra in 1805.87 The Three-
Seal Code was not a mere reproduction of the old laws.88 The king corrected the old 
sources by checking whether they were in accord with Buddhist morals.89 The Code 
covers a wide-range of areas of law which fall into roughly five categories: public 
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law and administrative law, the administration of courts and procedural law, 
criminal law and law on delict, private law and Buddhist law. Until the 
establishment of modern laws and codes from the late nineteenth century, the 
Three-Seal Code was the supreme and universal law of the Siamese people. 
1.3.2 Traditional Thai private law 
The Three-Seal Code shows that there were a number of forms of contracts which 
can be compared to modern-day contracts, for example loan, purchase, hire, 
bailment, lease, gift and pledge and guarantee existing in Thailand prior to the 
reception of foreign private law in the nineteenth century.90 They are not arranged 
systematically.91 While loan was contained in a book of the Three-Seal Code entitled 
Pra Ayakarn Gu Nee (พระไอยการกูนี่) or the law on loans,92 the other mentioned types of 
contracts were contained in Pra Ayakarn Bed Set (พระอายการเบดเสรจ) or the law on various 
infractions.93 Robert Lingat observes that traditional Thai contracts had two 
important features. First, all types of contracts described in the Three-Seal Code 
concern a transfer of a property. Second, a contract was not enforceable until the 
property was delivered to the other party.94 The law did not distinguish between 
contractual, delictual or criminal liability.95 The law on purchase, for instance, 
stipulates that if a purchaser fails to make a payment to the vendor pursuant to the 
transfer of a property he will face both civil and criminal liabilities. The text of the 
relevant provision states that  
 
Pursuant to the purchase agreement on which the purchase price has been 
agreed, the purchaser has received the property but has not paid the 
vendor for it despite notice given. The vendor shall ask the court to 
summon him to appear before it. If the vendor’s claim is true, the purchaser 
will be liable for his dishonesty which amounts to twice the price of the 
property. Half of it will be returned to the vendor for the price of the 
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property. He will also receive half of the remaining sum as compensation 
while the other half will be treated as a fine.96 [My translation] 
 
Michael Hooker explains that individual responsibility which was constituted by a 
contract was as much a moral, ethical, or religious matter as it was a legal one.97 In 
other words, the possession of the other party’s property caused a moral obligation 
for the possessor to do something in return.98 Comparing traditional Thai contracts 
with modern Thai contracts contained in the Civil and Commercial Code of 1925 
(‘Code of 1925’), which were products of European legal science, one can claim that 
Henry Maine’s famous generalisation that the movement of progressive law and 
societies is the movement from status to contract99 appropriately explains the 
development of Thai law and society in the nineteenth century. In Hooker’s terms, 
pre-codification Thai law was overwhelmingly concerned with ‘the distribution of 
obligation between persons of different status’ and this ‘obligation was a function of 
status and was ascribed on the basis of status rather than on the basis of personal 
initiative’.100 This is consistent with Huxley’s general observation on Theravada 
legal literature that ‘no sharp distinction was made between law, morality and good 
behaviour’.101 The fact that traditional Thai economy was agriculture-based may 
also explain why traditional Thai private law, especially commercial law, was not as 
developed as some European private law of the same period. James Low observed 
in the first half of the nineteenth century that 
 
The Siamese are rather an agricultural than a trading people…The great 
body of the people, spread over the country, live chiefly by cultivating the 
soil; – and the population of their towns, by petty trades and traffick, 
chiefly in agricultural produce. For although Bangkok, the capital, exhibits 
a busy commercial scene, yet it is to the Chinese that the impulse must be 
attributed.102 
 
In such economic conditions, it is understandable that traditional Thai private law 
was concerned more with transfers of property and less on commercial activities 
and that it was more interested in the protection of farmers’ property than the 
facilitation of trade. Despite the fact Ayutthaya's income was significantly generated 
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by maritime trade especially with the Chinese since the thirteenth century,103 there 
was no evidence of the law which governed commercial activities. Huxley gave two 
plausible explanations for the absence of written commercial law in traditional Thai 
society. First, the Siamese political regime where the monarch had absolute power 
which enabled him to monopolise trade and take whatever he wishes encouraged 
the traders to use polical rather than legal tools to solve the disputes. Second, 
Thammasat may provide governing rules on trade and banking. But ‘[i]f such rules 
existed at all, they would be in the oral custom observed between local traders, 
mixing local rules with borrowing from China, Arabia and Rome’.104 
1.3.3 The administration of justice before the reform of justice in the nineteenth 
century 
According to De la Loubère, the judiciary style and form of pleading of late 
seventeenth century Ayutthaya reflected the social and political conditions of 
Siamese society.105 The Siamese people were traditionally organised in specific 
groups for military purposes and each group had its own chief or master. In cities 
other than the capital, a complaint had first to go to the plaintiff’s master, who 
simultaneously served as a member of the consultative panel (or assessors) at the 
court. The complaint was then presented to the governor of the city, who acted as 
the sole justice.106 The governor decided whether the complaint should be admitted. 
If so, he would assign one of his assessors to direct the trial. Where both parties had 
a common master, the governor often assigned their master to preside at the 
court.107 The case was processed and the witnesses were heard in the governor’s 
absence but before a panel of assessors led by the assignee. At the end of the trial, 
they gave their opinion which was written down by a clerk. The judgement, 
however, was actually made by the governor, who appeared in the court on the 
very last day of the process, after listening to the opinions of the assessors and the 
opinion of another officer who pointed out what law was relevant to the fact.108 As 
observed by Gervaise in the late seventeenth century, the governor’s decision was 
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usually the same as that of the majority of his assessors.109 De la Loubère noted that 
when the normal evidence did not suffice, the court resorted to torture, proof by 
water, proof by fire and other modes of ordeal and superstitious proof with the 
exception of trials by combat which did not exist in the Siamese system.110 These 
extraordinary proofs took place publicly. When he decided that the defendant 
deserved capital punishment, the governor had to refer the case to the king. Only 
the monarch had the authority to take a life unless he granted the justice royal 
permission for issuing death penalty.111  
In the capital, Ayutthaya, the king acted as the governor and supreme judge. 
Trials often took place at the royal chamber before a prince who represented the 
king.112 The prince consulted his assessors before he delivered the judgement in the 
same way as a provincial governor.113 There was no distinction between civil and 
criminal disputes in the modern sense. A delict case could result in a criminal 
punishment114 likely because even civil cases could undermine public order.115 
After the fall of Ayutthaya, substantive and procedural laws were put in one 
place. The 1805 Three-Seal Code dedicated seven books to dealing specifically with 
legal proceedings and the administration of justice. Book Four, Pra Thammanoon 
(พระทํานูน), particularly focused on the court’s jurisdiction in the capital. Its provisions 
show that there were several courts belonging to different government 
departments.116 This was not mentioned by De la Lubère and Gervaise in their 
memoirs, but Lingat explains that the multi-court system emerged from the late 
Ayutthaya era most likely because the royal court, which was the single court in the 
capital, was unable to cope with the increasing number of disputes.117 However, the 
trial processes of Ayutthaya and Bangkok were not significantly different. One of 
their common features was that there were various judicial officers involved in trials 
from the admission of complaints to the making of judgements. Assessors 
interrogated the parties and witnesses. Judges decided the facts and pronounced 
sentences. Interpreters recommended relevant legal provisions and punishments for 
judges.118 As witnessed by John Bowring (1792–1872), then Governor of Hong Kong, 
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who was sent to Bangkok to amend the treaty with the Siamese government in 1855, 
this complexity of legal proceedings and the separation of the judicial duties in a 
trial continued to exist in accordance with the procedural law of the Three-Seal 
Code until the nineteenth-century reform of the justice system.119   
2. CAUSES OF THE RECEPTION 
If one compares the parts of the Three-Seal Code concerning private law with the 
contemporary French Code civil of 1804, one may find the Thai law rather antiquated 
and based heavily on religious principles. Foreign visitors to Thailand in the 
nineteenth century, however, made some interesting observations about the 
traditional legal system of the country. Bowring, visiting Bangkok in 1855, 
acknowledged that traditional Thai law suited the local people reasonably well and 
was superior to Chinese law.120 Similarly, Jean-Baptiste Pallegoix (1805–62), a French 
Vicar Apostolic, stated that ‘[Siamese people] have proved very wise in general, in 
compliance with natural law and well adapted to the character and morals of the 
nation’.121 Ernest Young (1869-1952), an English educator, praised the Three-Seal 
Code for its quality: ‘Siam possesses an excellent code of laws. They are, in the main, 
just and well suited to the people for whom they were intended’.122 Pre-codification 
Thai law is even praised by contemporary experts on legal history of Southeast Asia, 
notably Huxley, who considers traditional Thai law one of the world’s great legal 
systems.123 Although trial by ordeal and cruel punishment were in theory 
recognised in traditional Thai law, in practice they were not usually used124 because 
of Buddhist virtues that encourage people to treat each other and living creatures 
humanely and benevolently.125 
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 If the traditional legal system of Thailand was as good as Westerners thought, 
the interesting question arises as to why the Thai government was so desperate to 
have a modern code. The answer to this question lies with two factors: external 
pressure and internal motivation.    
2.1 External pressure  
The Opium War in China (1839–42) signified a change in the position of the British 
Empire towards certain Asian states.126 In 1850, the government of Queen Victoria 
sent Sir James Brooks to negotiate a new commercial treaty with the aim of 
removing all restrictions on trade and in place of the first Anglo-Siamese Treaty, the 
1826 Burney Treaty, but negotiations with King Rama III, a conservative,127 who 
refused such idea of liberal trading,128 failed.129 The unsuccessful mission of Brooks 
caused great concern to the new king, Rama IV (King Mongkut), who was 
enthroned in the next year. The British Government sent another mission led by 
Bowring, then Governor of Hong Kong, with military force at his disposal for the 
same purpose in 1855. As Siam wished to avoid an armed conflict and Great Britain 
‘a repetition of the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852)’,130 the negotiation was 
completed within a few weeks and a new treaty, commonly known as the Bowring 
Treaty, was concluded on 8 April 1855.131 For Siam, signing the ‘unfair treaty’ with 
the world’s most powerful nation meant the preservation of independence.132 The 
Bowring Treaty not only gave the British commercial advantages but also provided 
them with rights of extraterritoriality. The extraterritorial clause states:  
 
II. The interests of all British subjects coming to Siam shall be placed under 
the regulations and control of a consul, who will be appointed to reside at 
Bangkok…Any dispute arising between Siamese and British subjects shall 
be heard and determined by the consul, in conjunction with the proper 
Siamese officers; and criminal offenses will be punished, in the case of 
English offenders, by the consul, according to English laws, and in the case 
of Siamese offenders, by their own laws through the Siamese authorities. 
But the consul shall not interfere in any matters referring solely to Siamese, 
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neither will the Siamese authorities interfere in questions which concern 
only the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.133 
 
To keep balance between foreign powers, the Siamese government signed similar 
treaties with other states, namely the United States of America (1856), France (1856), 
Denmark (1858), the Hanseatic Republic (1858), Portugal (1859), the Netherlands 
(1860), Prussia and the States of the German Customs and Commercial Union and 
the Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg - Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1862), 
Sweden and Norway (1868), Belgium (1868), Italy (1868), Austria-Hungary (1869), 
and Spain (1870).134 
 Extraterritorial privileges did not at first pose a threat to the Siamese authority 
and hardly anyone anticipated that extraterritoriality would become a barrier to the 
future development of Siam.135 The system of consular jurisdiction was even 
thought to be advantageous to the Siamese government since that it was relieved of 
the responsibility to provide the Western states with their accustomed system of 
law.136 The situation changed after the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. This led to a 
dramatic increase in the number of Western travellers to Southeast Asia.137 But it 
was the French annexation of Annam and Cambodia and Great Britain’s victory 
over Upper Burma that significantly caused problems for the implementation of the 
extraterritorial clauses.138 Citizens of these occupied countries began to claim that 
they also benefited from consular jurisdiction. Later, a claim to the extraterritorial 
privilege extended to subjects of other states who resided in Thailand and were 
registered for the protection from the Western powers (protégé).139 The system of 
extraterritoriality was abused to the extent that some Siamese citizens would 
register as protégés and some even secretly sold their issued certificates to others.140 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the number of people who were exempt from 
the Thai courts’ jurisdiction had increased dramatically.141 In addition to the 
problem of the expansion of consular jurisdiction, the diversity of foreign legal 
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systems operating in Siam created inequality in justice among people who lived in 
the same country.142  
The Siamese government worked tirelessly to end extraterritorial terms which 
‘contained no time limit’ and ‘could not be modified without the consent of both 
parties’.143  In 1883, it achieved some progress when Great Britain allowed its 
subjects living in some northern Siamese provinces to be tried under Siamese law by 
a special Siamese court known as the Siamese International Court but reserved its 
right to reject the court any time before judgement, and transfer the case to its 
consular court.144 Following the example of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1883, the 
French amended its treaty with Siam in 1904. Francis Sayre, a Harvard law 
professor who served as a Foreign Affairs Adviser to King Rama VI (Vajiravudh), 
explained that  
 
[t]his so-called Siamese International Court’ was not in fact international at 
all. It was only a new name for the Siamese tribunal created under the 
Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1883, a court created by and entirely within the 
control of the Siamese Government, presided over by a judge chosen and 
paid solely by the Siamese Government.145 
 
 In 1898, Siam entered into a treaty with Japan, which was given similar 
extraterritorial privileges, but for the first time this treaty contained a clause 
specifying certain conditions for the end of extraterritoriality.146 Recognising the 
Siamese progress in modernisation,147 the Japanese agreed to abolish its consular 
jurisdiction upon the completion of the reforms of law and judicial administration 
in Siam, ie the promulgation of the Siamese codes of law. The Japanese treaty of 
1898 states that:  
 
The Siamese Government consent that Japanese consular officers shall 
exercise jurisdiction over Japanese subjects in Siam until the judicial 
reforms of Siam shall have been completed, that is, until a criminal code, a 
code of criminal procedure, a civil code (with exception of a law of 
marriage and succession), a code of civil procedure and a law of 
constitution of the courts of justice shall come into force.148 
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This clause set an example for subsequent amendments to some treaties.149 In 1907, 
Siam and France signed a new treaty which allowed French Asiatic subjects and 
protégés registered before 1907 to be tried in the Siamese International Courts while 
those who registered after 1907 to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
Siamese courts. This meant that French European citizens and subjects retained 
their extraterritorial privileges. Unlike the Japanese treaty of 1898, the new Franco-
Siamese Treaty attached no condition for ending extraterritoriality but agreed to 
abolish the regime of the Siamese International Court once all the Siamese codes of 
law were established. The treaty also laid down a condition that to appeal a decision 
of the first-instance Siamese International Court, the signatures of two European 
judges sitting at the Court were required.150 This indirectly results in ‘the 
requirement of European advisers sitting as judges in Siamese courts’.151 In 1909, 
Great Britain signed a new treaty following the example of the Franco-Siamese 
Treaty of 1907. However, it did not separate its subjects of European and Asiatic 
origin meaning that all British subjects registered before 1909 were subject to the 
Siamese International Courts and those after 1909 to the ordinary Siamese courts. 
The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 required that a European judge sit at the court of 
first instance of both the ordinary Siamese courts and the Siamese International 
Courts and where a European British subject was defendant the opinion of the 
European judge would prevail.152 Despite the European powers’ interference in the 
Siamese judiciary, Sayre observes that  
 
the European adviser was in every sense a Siamese official; the Siamese 
Government freely chose him, paid him and controlled him...In practice the 
European advisers have been chiefly British and French, and they have 
generally acted quite independently of the desires and wishes of the British 
and French legations’.153  
 
Siam paid a heavy price for the relaxation of extraterritoriality which resulted 
from the French and British treaties in 1907 and 1909 respectively.154 It lost some 
north-eastern provinces, namely Battambang, Siem Reap and Serei Sophorn, which 
are part of present-day Cambodia, to France in 1906 and some provinces of the 
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Malay Peninsula, namely Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, which are part 
of present-day Malaysia, to Great Britain in 1909.155 It also had to agree to some 
conditions set by the Western powers in order to relax or amend the treaties, for 
example hiring their nationals to be judges and legislative advisers to the Siamese 
government.156 
In 1920, the US became the first country abolished entirely its consular 
jurisdiction which had been established by the American-Siamese Treaty of 1856. 
All Americans were therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary Siamese 
courts within an agreed time frame.157 This treaty marked a turning point in Siam’s 
struggle for full jurisdictional autonomy and raised its hopes of ending the unfair 
treaties. With the help of the US government, the Siamese government used the 1920 
treaty to negotiate with other countries, several of which began to accept Siam’s full 
judicial autonomy.158 The British, however, hesitated to immediately give up their 
consular jurisdiction as British trade was predominant in Siam and British interests 
were far more substantial than those of any other countries.159 It was not until 1925 
that Great Britain and France agreed to free Siam from extraterritoriality within a set 
time frame. By the end of 1927, Siam had achieved new terms setting out to abolish 
the consular jurisdictions with all the party countries. 
2.2 Internal motivation  
Bowring foresaw that 
 
The country will be absolutely revolutionised by the change, – and in a few 
years I doubt not there will be an enormous trade.160 
 
But the 1855 Bowring Treaty did not limit its effects to Thai commerce. It, in fact, 
had a wide-ranging impact on Siamese society in the sense that it forced the Siamese 
to explore their own weaknesses in every respect. However, the modernisation of 
the country, especially of Thai law, would not have been possible without its 
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internal motivation. The extraterritorial clauses of the original ‘unfair treaties’ never 
imposed any conditions for ending extraterritoriality. It was the kings and their 
governments who showed enthusiasm for creating a modern Siam and a modern 
Thai legal system in order to recover full judicial autonomy and for the future 
prosperity of the country.161 There are two internal factors in the modernisation of 
Thai law: the ineffectiveness of the traditional Thai legal system and the prestige of 
Western legal systems.  
 Despite their positive attitudes towards the Three-Seal Code, Westerners 
distrusted the Thai administration of justice and its administrators. The existence of 
consular jurisdiction was the best evidence that foreign nations did not think of it as 
a ‘civilised’ one. Bowring gave a good picture of the justice system in Thailand in 
1855. 
 
[I]n a country where the authority of the sovereign is absolute, it is obvious 
that the organisation of the tribunals and the protecting power of 
legislation can afford but very inadequate security, should the supreme 
royal will at any time supersede the ordinary course of justice. To a great 
extent, also, the power of interfering with the action of the tribunals is 
possessed and exercised by the high nobles, according to their rank and 
influence.162 
 
The court system of Siam was in disarray: there were various courts of law each of 
which was under control of a government department,163 and their jurisdictions 
were not clear-cut, which often resulted in jurisdictional conflicts.164 There was no 
legal profession. Judges were governors in provincial cities and ministers or heads 
of government departments in the capital. Every prince had judicial power and 
could set up his own court at his palace.165 Legal proceedings were complicated and 
justice was often delayed.166 The lack of effective judicial organisation and 
independence made the system vulnerable to corruption and this corruption further 
aggravated the ineffectiveness of the system.167 Referring to local sources, Bowring 
depicted the corruption situation in the Siamese judicial system in his journal saying 
‘[b]ribery is said to flourish from the judge down to the lowest clerk, – all have their 
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price’.168 Similarly, Reverend McDonald, who lived in Siam in the nineteenth-
century for more than a decade, observed that ‘the Siamese have an excellent code 
of civil and criminal laws [the Three-Seal Code], if they were properly enforced, but, 
unfortunately, the Judiciary are corrupt that justice is seldom meted out, the one 
paying the largest bribe generally gets the case’.169 There is perhaps no better way to 
picture the ineffectiveness of the traditional Siamese legal system than by borrowing 
King Rama V (Chulalongkorn)’s own words:  
 
In a usual fashion, any area in a junk found to be damaged by barnacles 
and termites will only be patched up without other areas being restored. As 
time goes by, along with many patching-ups, the whole ship deteriorates 
much more. It is high time the old planks were replaced, and it is of utmost 
vitality to do so as soon as possible. Failure to take such action means that 
the ship’s condition will get even worse and hardly be recovered and its 
life will finally come to an end. [My translation]170 
 
 The Siamese rulers realised how ineffective the Siamese legal system was and 
they showed enthusiasm for fixing it by following Western models. In the early 
nineteenth century, Prince Mongkut (1804-68), future King Mongkut was fascinated 
by Western knowledge and technology. During twenty-seven years as a Buddhist 
monk, the prince enthusiastically studied the English language and Western arts, 
science and literature171 and he ‘had perhaps the greatest intellectual curiosity of all 
the Thai nobility’.172 After being enthroned in 1851, Mongkut did not revolutionise 
his country, but he helped foster an intellectual climate in Siamese society, 
especially within the noble class, which paved the way for the revolution during the 
reign of his son, Chulalongkorn.173  
 Mongkut, best known today from his fictional depiction in Margaret Landon’s 
1944 novel Anna and the King of Siam and its famous musical adaptation, The King 
and I, encouraged modern education for royals and nobles174 and allowed printing 
and circulating legal documents175 which was formerly prohibited and could only be 
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revealed to the monarch and his officials.176 He hired many Westerners as advisors 
in various government departments.177 Bowring praised him for being a devoted 
and talented king and thought of him as a man of philosophy and literature.178 
Mongkut was considered to be pro-British and was referred by Brooke, the British 
diplomat who had failed to revise the old Anglo-Siamese Treaty during the reign of 
Mongkut’s predecessor, as ‘our own king’, who would bring a more liberal policy to 
the country.179 Nicholas Tarling believes that Siam retained its independence 
throughout the colonial period because of ‘its interaction with the policies of the 
British’180 and because of its ability to perceive ‘the nature of European rivalry more 
accurately than others’.181 
 The appreciation of Western civilisation was best reflected during the reign of 
Chulalongkorn (1853-1910), who introduced various reforms aiming at 
transforming old Siam into a modern state.182 The king mainly adopted western 
models for his reform projects, ie creating modern-style administration, legal system, 
educational system and infrastructures and abolishing slavery.183 However, unlike 
Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912) which established of the constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary system as a result of the fundamental political reform, 
Thailand remained under absolute monarchy due to Chulalongkorn’s view that 
Thai society was not ready for a radical political change.184 During his forty-two-
year reign, Chulalongkorn visited several foreign countries, particularly Europe 
twice, to observe European countries’ polity and administration and to seek allies 
against France, which from time to time threatened to use military force.185 He saw a 
reform of the legal system as his first priority since the ‘principal task of 
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modernising Siam was to establish a good law and merciful judicial system and an 
effective administration of justice’.186 To implement the law and justice reforms he 
wanted, the king needed trained manpower. For this reason, he began to send his 
children, nobles and government officials to study law abroad, mainly in Great 
Britain because of its predominance in Thailand.187 The first Thai student who 
studied law in England in 1882 and was called to the bar was Khun Luang Phraya 
Kraisri. In 1885, Prince Rabi (1874-1920), a son of King Chulalongkorn was sent to 
study law at Christ Church, University of Oxford.188 After returning to Thailand, the 
prince became a pioneer of the modernisation of Thai law.189  
3. THE MODERNISATION OF THE THAI LEGAL SYSTEM 
The modernisation of the Thai legal system began with reforms of the 
administration of justice and legal education. Codification was the last stage of the 
reform programme. The modernisation of Thai private law was not an isolated 
process but part of a series of reforms of substantive law. In order to have a full 
picture of the reform of Thai private law, a brief overview of the reforms of the 
administration of justice and legal education is needed. 
3.1 The administration of justice in Thailand  
The greatest reform of the judicial system during Chulalongkorn’s reign took place 
in 1892 when the Ministry of Justice was established as part of the modernisation of 
Siamese government.190 Walter Graham, who lived in Siam during the period of the 
reform, observed that the ‘introduction of reforms met with many grave intitial 
difficulties and it was not until the end of 1894 that a new scheme of judicial 
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adminstration had been drawn up and sactioned and new Courts constituted in 
accordance therewith, had been established even in Bangkok town’.191 The Ministry 
of Justice played the central role of judicial administration; it consolidated judicial 
power which was formerly vested in various courts and government departments 
and centralised judicial activities.192 The entire judicial system was reorganised and 
systematised. The number of courts was reduced from sixteen to seven all of which 
were under the control of the Ministry of Justice, which took charge of all matters 
ranging from the appointment of judges to administrative work of court officials. In 
terms of hierarchy, there were two appeal courts and five courts of first instance, but 
in terms of the nature of disputes, the courts of first instance consisted of one 
criminal court, two civil courts, one revenue court and one International Court.193 
For this reason, a department was established within the Ministry of Justice to admit 
and classify complaints.194 This modernisation of judicial administration mainly 
took place in the capital while the reforms of provincial courts did not begin until 
1896.195 
 Following the establishment of the Ministry of Justice, Chulalongkorn 
adopted his foreign General Adviser Gustave Rolin-Jacquemyns’s recommendation 
to set up a government body to take care of legislative work in 1894.196 Under the 
Legislative Council Act of 1894, a council was appointed and empowered to debate 
and agree on bills within the scope of its capacity determined by the monarch who 
alone had absolute legislative power to pass any law.197 The Legislative Council 
consisted of all ministers and other members, including some foreign advisors, 
appointed by the king. The Council set up a committee which usually had at least 
one foreign member to draft a law on an ad hoc basis.198 Many important statutes, 
mainly procedural law, were drafted by this legislative body prior to codification, 
for example the 1895 Law of Evidence, the 1895 Law on the Organisation of the 
Provincial Courts, the 1896 Transitory Civil Procedure Law and the 1896 Transitory 
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Criminal Procedure Law. The three procedural laws including the Law of Evidence 
were modelled on English law.199 The enactment of the Transitory Civil Procedure 
Law of 1896 marked the start of a distinction between civil and criminal cases since 
the law defined civil cases as those with no request for criminal punishment.200 
Because its members were senior government officials who were already busy with 
their day-to-day work, the Council often faced problems of quorum and its 
legislative work was transferred to the cabinet in 1900 before being discontinued.201 
 It is worth noting that, because of a lack of manpower, Chulalongkorn relied 
heavily on foreign experts to push the early reforms of the Thai legal system 
through.202 Rolin-Jacquemyns,203 the king’s first foreign General Adviser from 1892 
to 1901, was instrumental in the making of modern Thai law.204 Westerners worked 
in various positions ranging from judges in courts, advisers in governments 
departments responsible for the administration of justice to law professors. The 
Ministry of Justice hired forty-three foreign advisors between 1900s and 1930s: there 
were twenty-three Britons and nineteen Frenchmen.205 The predominance of the 
British and French in the positions relating to the administration of justice and 
judicial system reflects the Siamese government’s diplomatic policy to keep the 
balance between the two main powers and the effects of the French and British 
treaties and agreements, which required the Siamese government to appoint French 
and British nationals as judges in courts and legal advisers. The modernisation of 
Thai law was in fact linked to the ultimate aim of the Siamese government which 
was to preserve the country’s independence. 
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3.2 Legal education  
Since he saw manpower as a crucial factor for successfully modernising Siam, Rolin-
Jacquemyns proposed Western education programmes for Chulalongkorn’s sons,206 
including Rabi, who spent two years studying Latin, English and French in 
Edinburgh between 1886 and 1888207 and went back to Great Britain for a second 
time to study law at Oxford between 1891 and 1894.208 In 1897, the Belgian General 
Advisor recommended that the king should establish a law school to produce 
professional judges and lawyers.209 Chulalongkorn accepted this recommendation 
and in the same year Rabi, then Minster of Justice, established the first law school in 
Siam. The law school was not a government body210 but rather a private school of 
the prince who took care of both its administration and curriculum himself and 
allowed it to run in the Ministry of Justice’s premises.211 Since the school was 
associated with the Minister and Ministry of Justice, it was known as the Law 
School of the Ministry of Justice. The school mainly taught English law and some 
traditional Thai law, especially on the Three-Seal Code.212 Rabi gave lectures on 
various subjects and authored several books on the principles of English law used at 
the school.213 Civil-law lectures were sometimes given by some visiting European 
legal advisors of the Siamese government.214 Those who passed the final exams of 
the law school were recognised as Siamese barristers,215 and almost all of them 
served as judges in different courts.216 Given the prince’s academic background, his 
profound influence at the Ministry of Justice and Law School, and the general trend 
towards sending Thai students to study law in England, the predominance of 
English law in Thai legal education before codification is not surprising. It is also 
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not unexpected that lawyers and judges produced by the first Thai law school were 
learned men of English law.  
 The dominance of English law in the early stages of legal education in Siam 
apparently contrasted with the Siamese government’s policy to adopt European 
codes as the model for Thai codes and this displeased French diplomats and 
advisors. This is illustrated by the proposal for a reform of legal Education in 
Thailand made by Georges Padoux, a French legislative adviser to the Thai 
government and the head of the draftsmen of the Thai Penal Code of 1908 and the 
civil and commercial code. Four years after the first code, the Penal Code of 1908, 
which was mainly modelled on European codes, came into force, Padoux submitted 
a memorandum on the’ Question of Legal Education in Siam’ to the Minister of 
Justice. He described the legal education system in Siam at the time saying217  
 
The largest number have been educated in Bangkok or have taken their 
degrees in the Bangkok law school [the Law School of the Ministry of 
Justice]. They have learned the Siamese Family, Inheritance and Land law 
from Siamese professors. As to the general theories of law, lectures have 
been delivered in the Bangkok law school by Siamese lawyers educated in 
England or sometimes by European Advisers. Those who know the English 
Language have completed their training by reading English Law books. 
The best men have been sent to England where they have spent several 
years studying English law finally being admitted as Barrister – at – law. In 
one way or the other the technical training of the Siamese Judges is almost 
exclusively based on English methods and English Law.218  
 
Padoux saw Japanese legal education as a good example of the legal education 
system that was consistent with the style of the codes which were mainly modelled 
on European codes and kept a balance between the three major systems, German 
law, French law and English law, each of which had a native professor at the 
Japanese law school.219 He found the current law programme at the Siamese law 
school inadequate and therefore proposed a reform of legal education modelled on 
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Now, it is a very important point for the Siamese Government that the new 
legal system to be derived from the Codes be properly applied. The 
enactment of a large and comprehensive body of Civil, Commercial and 
Criminal Law would have but an unsatisfactory effect if the Judges 
entrusted with the decision of the cases were not familiar with the spirit 
and characteristics of the Code system.221 
 
The proposal was readily approved by Chulalongkorn’s successor, King Vajiravudh 
(Rama VI).222 Two changes were introduced.223 First, the government began to send 
Thai students to study in other Western countries, namely France and the US and, 
second, it attempted to reform the curriculum. However, the changes did not 
produce any dramatic effect as we can see from the number of Thai students who 
were sent to study law abroad between 1913 and 1925. Out of sixteen students, 
twelve students went to England and only four studied in France and in the US,224 
including Pridi Banomyong (‘Pridi’)225 who was sent to France in 1920 and who later 
became instrumental in the rise of French jurisprudence in the Thai legal system.226 
The curriculum especially in relation to private law did not undergo a significant 
change since Thailand did not have a civil and commercial code until 1923. We also 
need to consider that by the time that the changes were introduced almost all the 
Thai judges were already familiar with English law. 
 A major reform of Thai legal education took place after the promulgation of 
the Civil and Commercial Code of 1923, the controversial code of French draftsmen, 
which was repealed two years later. In 1924, the king set up a council of jurists 
named ‘สภานิติศึกษา’ (the Council of Legal Studies) to administer the Law School of the 
Ministry of Justice and its programmes of studies in accordance with the civil-law 
system.227 The Council introduced French law courses as alternatives to English law 
courses. English law was no longer the predominant foreign law taught at the Law 
School, but the new legal education policy did not significantly reduce English law’s 
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influence. The Law School, in fact, kept a balance between these two legal systems 
since in each of the first three terms law students had to study certain foreign law 
courses in both English and French versions.228 The reason for maintaining English 
law and introducing only French law as an alternative foreign law to the former was 
political. The British agreement of 1925 required that the Siamese government hire 
English law professors to teach at the Law School and in the absence of Thai civil 
and commercial law the Siamese courts had to apply English law229 while France 
asked the Siamese government to establish a department of legislative redaction, 
reform the curriculum, and hire Frenchmen to be managing director, law professors 
of the Law School and legislative adviser to the Ministry of Justice.230 
 In 1933, King Prachadhipok (Rama VII), the successor of Vajiravudh 
transferred the Law School of the Ministry of Justice to a newly-established faculty 
at Chulalongkorn University entitled ‘คณะนิติศาสตรและรัฐศาสตร’ (Faculty of Law and 
Political Science).231 Nevertheless, in the next year, with Pridi’s initiative, 
Thammasat University232 was established, and it took over Chulalongkorn 
University’s Faculty of Law and Political Science233 making Thammasat University 
the only Thai university offering a bachelor degree in law until 1971.234 Pridi became 
the first President of Thammasat University and exerted a profound influence over 
the university management and administration of education.235 Thammasat 
University’s curriculum of legal studies was considerably remodeled in accordance 
to the civil-law system, especially French law.236 As a result, the influence of English 
common law in Thailand declined despite the fact that many Thammasat law 
                                                      
228 Luang Saranaiprasas, Development of Legal Education 43–46. 
229 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter from Prince Tridos to Chao Phraya Mahidorn (2 July 
1925) cited in Foran, ‘Amendment of Extraterritoriality Clauses’ 181.  
230 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter from Prince Tridos to Chao Phraya Mahidorn (10 
September 1923) cited in Foran, ibid 158-59.  
231 Prasit Kowilaikul, ‘การศึกษากฎหมายในคณะนิติศาสตร จุฬาลงกรณมหาวิทยาลัย (Legal Education in 
Chulalongkorn University Faculty of Law)’ in 100 ป โรงเรียนกฎหมาย (A Hundred Years of the Thai 
Law School) (Institute of Legal Education of The Thai Bar 1999) 130. 
232 The original name of Thammasat University (มหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตร) is the University of Moral 
and Political Science (มหาวิทยาลัยวิชาธรรมศาสตรและการเมือง). The name was changed by the military 
government after a coup d’état in 1947. 
233 Thammasat University Act of 1934, art 5.  
234 Ramkhamhaeng University was established in 1971 with a law degree offered, and in 
1972 Chulalongkorn University successfully established a law faculty.  
235 Sawaengsak, French Influence 136. See also Charnvit Kasetsiri, ‘ปรีดี 
พนมยงคกับมหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตรและการเมือง (Pridi Banomyong and the University of Moral and 
Political Sciences)’ in Thamrongsak Petchlertanan (ed) ปรีดี ปวย กับธรรมศาสตรและการเมือง (Pridi and 
Puey and the University of Moral and Political Sciences) (Thammasat University Archive 
2006) 10-30.  
236 Thammasat University, แนวทางการศึกษาชั้นปริญญาตร ีโท และเอก ของ มหาวิทยาลัยวิชาธรรมศาสตรและการเมือง 
(Bachelor Master and Doctoral Programmes of Thammasat University) (Sri Krung 1934) 1–69. 
 81 
professors were judges who were educated in England or students of English law. 
French law replaced English law as the predominant foreign jurisprudence in 
Thailand. By 1987, France was the most popular destination for higher legal 
education among Thammasat law scholars.  
3.3 Codification of civil and commercial law in Thailand  
Chulalongkorn realised that the reorganisation of the judicial system was not 
sufficient to ‘equip Siam for its Future in the late nineteenth century’.237 Hence 
following the reforms of the judicial administration and the establishment of the 
Law School, the king carried out the next phase of the modernisation of Thai law, 
the reforms of substantive law. The project began with codification of criminal law 
in 1898 in the hope that criminal law, which is by comparison easier to make and to 
understand would help the Siamese, who had no prior knowledge of the code 
system, to adapt to the new environment.238 Nevertheless, before the work of 
codification began, a question had to be answered, would Siam adopt a common-
law or civil law system? There was a fierce debate over this question. Rabi, then 
Minister of Justice and the administrator of the Law School of the Ministry of Justice, 
was the most influential figure in Thailand’s legal community. The English-law-
educated prince preferred the English system while the king’s French and Belgian 
advisers promoted the French system.239 Rabi wrote to his father urging him to 
adopt the common law system: 
 
In my opinion, despite my appreciation of the code system, as everyone 
may know, codification is an unachievable task. One reason is that making 
a code is even more difficult than making a railway from Bangkok to 
Phetchaburi [a province around 123 km from Bangkok] or making a pond 
in Bangkok. It took the Germans twenty years to make the BGB and the 
Japanese fifteen years to make a civil code while the code of India has yet to 
be finished. Another reason is that codification is costly and it is almost 
certain that the finance department won’t be happy with this…Although 
we can successfully make a code, government officials won’t be satisfied 
with it; the code may be useful to the people, but it is too rigid for the 
officials who will be required to work along the same lines. I suspect that 
our government system is not ready for it.240 [My translation] 
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Despite this plea, the king found traditional Thai law, particularly the Three-Seal 
Code, similar to European codes and decided to adopt the code system as the model 
for Thai modern codes. This decision dismayed Rabi, who later withdrew from the 
drafting of the Penal Code.241 His withdrawal allowed French domination in the 
work over the next twenty years.  
 The drafting of the Penal Code, which began in 1898, went relatively smoothly 
and was completed in 1908. The first drafting committee chaired by Rabi contained 
no French nationals and although it completed the draft of a penal code its draft 
was never put into effect due to some disruptions, for example the quorum problem 
of the Legislative Council and the negotiation between the Siamese and French 
governments to revise the extraterritorial clause.242 Following the French agreement 
signed in 1904, the Siamese government accepted the French proposal to appoint 
Padoux as a legislative adviser in exchange for an amendment of the Franco-
Siamese Treaty243 and it set up a new drafting committee led by the Frenchman.244 
Despite the predominance of Padoux in the committee, the Code was drafted in the 
English language, which was the common language between Thai and foreign 
officials, before being translated into Thai.245 The work of codification of criminal 
law was completed in 1907 and the Penal Code came into force in 1908. The Penal 
Code of 1908 did not focus on any particular legal system, but the previous draft of 
a penal code and a variety of foreign criminal laws were taken into account with the 
dominance of the Belgian, Indian, Italian, French, Dutch, Egyptian and Japanese 
Penal Codes.246 
 Following the promulgation of the Penal Code of 1908, Padoux was tasked 
with drafting a civil and commercial code. He was assisted by four other Frenchmen, 
including René Guyon (1876-1963), who was active in all subsequent drafting 
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committees of the civil and commercial code.247 Realising that the Thai government 
was struggling to end extraterritoriality and urgently needed contract law to deal 
with commercial activities, Padoux proposed that his drafting committee could rush 
to finish the work of codification within four years (early 1913) and start with the 
drafting of the law of obligations which may be promulgated earlier than the other 
parts.248 In 1910, there was a reorganisation of the government bodies responsible 
for codification. The government set up the codification commission which had six 
divisions under it, but the drafting responsibility remained with the French 
draftsmen led by Padoux.249 In 1913, the work of codification was disrupted by 
Padoux’s resignation and return to France and the First World War made it difficult 
for the Thai government to find a replacement for him. By the time he left the 
country, Padoux managed to draft one thousand three hundred and thirty-five 
articles which provided the basis for subsequent drafts of the Civil and Commercial 
Code of 1923.250 Even though another French lawyer was appointed as the new chief 
draftsman a year later, from the viewpoint of then Minister of Justice, his ability was 
by no means comparable to Padoux’s. The drafting of the civil and commercial code 
went nowhere between 1914 and 1916.251  
 In 1916, a major change was made to the drafting committee. The French chief 
draftsman was dismissed and replaced by Prince Svastiwatvisit, then President of 
the Supreme Court, and three eminent Thai jurists, namely Phraya Jindabhirom 
Rajasabhabordi (Chitr)252, then Chief Justice of the Central Civil Court, Phraya 
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Noranaeti Banjakit (Lad), then judge of the Supreme Court and Phraya Dhebvitoon 
Pahoolsarutabordi (Boonchoi), then Attorney General, were added to the drafting 
committee in addition to the existing three French draftsmen.253 Chitr, Lad and 
Boonchoi had all received their legal education at the Law School of the Ministry of 
Justice and then in England and were all English barristers. The chairman of the 
drafting committee gave Guyon the important role of chief advisor, which was 
effectively the chief draftsman.254 The drafting committee revised and translated the 
Padoux draft of the law of obligations and the law of contract.255 The work of 
codification would have made progress if chairmanship of the drafting committee 
had remained unchanged, but Prince Svastiwatvisit’s resignation in 1918 caused 
disruption. Vajiravudh decided to introduce another major reform to the 
codification commission. The king thought that a commoner rather than a royal, 
who was usually occupied with day-to-day work, should direct the work of 
codification and asked Chao Phraya Abhai Raja, then Minister of Justice, to also be 
the president of the codification commission in 1919. Chao Phraya Abhai Raja 
reorganised the commission by reducing the divisions from six to three divisions, 
namely the drafting division (the drafting committee), the translation division and 
the Thai revisions division.256 The members of the drafting committee remained 
unchanged except that Guyon was appointed as the chief draftsman.257 The 
president of the codification commission also appointed Phraya Manavarajasevi 
(Plod), Chitr’s younger brother, as the secretary of the commission, the position 
which was previously held by a French draftsman. Plod, a Thai and English 
barrister, became instrumental in the Siamese government’s policy switch from 
French-oriented to German-oriented codification and played a leading role in the 
successful drafting of the Code of 1925. Plod’s role in the making of the Code is the 
focus of this thesis and will receive careful scrutiny in the next chapter. 
 Under the direction of Guyon, the drafting committee completed the draft of 
the first two books of the Civil and Commercial Code in 1923, which contained three 
hundred and eighty-seven provisions. The English draft was then translated into 
Thai by the translation committee (known as the High Revising Committee) 
comprised of a number of royals who were also head of ministries and 
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department.258 The draft of a civil and commercial code which was prepared by the 
draftsmen led by a Frenchman and with the French majority was principally based 
on the French Civil Code. Plod found the French draft unsystematic and 
incomprehensible and convinced the king and his ministers to redraft a new civil 
and commercial code modelled on German and Japanese law.259 An agreement 
between the French and Thai governments signed in September 1923, which 
required the latter to establish a department specifically responsible for legislative 
redaction,260 gave the Thai government a chance to change the composition of the 
drafting committee, which was dominated by the French. In October 1923, the 
codification commission became the Department of Legislative Redaction. The 
Department was run by a committee which mostly consisted of the previous 
draftsmen. However, Guyon was no longer the chief draftsman and had only an 
advisory role as chief advisor. Abhai Raja, then Minister of Justice, headed the 
committee himself.261 
 In November 1923, the Thai government decided to put the French draft into 
effect for political and technical reasons. The government could not simply 
announce that the work of the French draftsmen was imperfect but needed 
widespread criticism from Thai legal profession, especially judges, to set it aside. 
While waiting for feedback it put the French draft into effect to show the French 
government goodwill. Strong criticism of the Civil and Commercial Code gave the 
king an excuse for postponing its effective date.262 The new drafting committee 
dominated by Thai jurists then proceeded to draft a new civil and commercial code. 
They spent about seven months redrafting two books of the civil and commercial 
code and the new draft, which was mainly founded on German jurisprudence, came 
into effect in 1925. It is still in use until today. The drafting of the Code of 1925 is the 
main focus of this thesis since it shows how modern private law in Thailand 
developed and considers whether Watson’s theory of legal transplants adequately 
explains legal change in Thailand. These will therefore be thoroughly discussed 
subsequent chapters. 
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 It is worth noting that due to the lack of publications of legal texts and statutes 
in Thailand, Thai law was almost unknown to the public and even Thai lawyers. 
Padoux in 1909 observed that  
 
Every foreigner who has to deal with Siamese legal questions knows that it 
is extremely difficult to get reliable information about the existing Siamese 
statute law…Very few Siamese lawyers have a full knowledge of Siamese 
law…From my personal practice as a Judge in the Bangkok Appeal Court I 
knew that even in matters governed by rather modern texts, I mean laws 
enacted during the last 15 years, it is most common to the ordinary Judge 
to give judgment without quoting the law or even making any allusion to 
its existence.263 
 
Before the promulgation of the Code of 1925, it was common for the Thai courts to 
adopt English law and the principle of judicial precedent to decide civil and 
commercial disputes which had foreigners involved on a case-by-case basis.264 When 
they applied English law they simply stated, without any acknowledgement of the 
source of law, ‘According to the law’ rather than ‘According to English law’.265 The 
agreement between the British and Siamese governments only required the Siamese 
courts to apply English private law where there was no applicable Thai law, but 
they usually resorted to English law despite the availability of Thai law.266 The 
predominance of English law at the Siamese courts was not unsurprising given that 
the legal education of Siamese judges and lawyers prior to the promulgation of the 
Code of 1925 was overwhelmingly influenced by English jurisprudence.      
CONCLUSION 
Watson’s explanation of how legal change occurs accurately explains the 
modernisation of Thai law in general. We have seen that the reforms of law in 
Thailand from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century were 
directed by ruling and professional elites who felt impelled to modernise the 
country to regain full judicial autonomy. Most of the steps taken by the Thai 
governments to reform the traditional Thai legal system were influenced by external 
                                                      
263 ‘Georges Padoux’s Proposal on the Drafting of the Civil and Commercial Code’ 15-16. 
264 ibid 16; Kasemsup, ‘Reception of Law in Thailand’ 292. 
265 Preedee Kasemsup, นิติปรัชญา (Philosophy of Law) (Thammasat University Faculty of Law 
2000) 49. See also Kittisak Prokati, การปฏิรูประบบกฎหมายไทยภายใตอิทธิพลยุโรป (The Modernisation of 
Thai Law under the European Influence) (2nd edn, Winyouchon 2006) 112. 
266 ‘Padoux’s Proposal on the Drafting of the Civil and Commercial Code’ 16.  
 87 
pressure, for example extraterritoriality and agreements with foreign governments 
which usually required involvement of their own people in the modernisation 
process. This condition had implications for the reception of foreign private law in 
Thailand and the development of Thai private law, which will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. However, to understand fully why Watson is correct, one 
needs to consider the social and political conditions of traditional Thai society, 
which was a paternal society ruled by an absolute monarch. Legislation had long 
been kept from ordinary Thai people and was only allowed to be published and 







THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF 1925: 
METHODOLOGY FOR DRAFTING   
INTRODUCTION 
Following strong criticism of the Civil and Commercial Code of 1923 (‘Code of 
1923’), which was mainly drafted by French draftsmen and in accordance with 
French jurisprudence, a new drafting committee for the civil and commercial code, 
led by three Thai jurists, began its work in March 1925 and completed it in seven 
months. In drafting the Civil and Commercial Code of 1925 (‘Code of 1925’) the 
draftsmen followed the example of the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 (‘Minpō of 
1898’) in the belief that the Japanese had copied the BGB. The draftsmen used a 
handful of English translations and commentaries on the German and Japanese 
Civil Codes as the main sources of information and templates for the new code. 
They reviewed the provisions of the Code of 1923 article by article. The articles were 
either redrafted or amended to agree with the wording of the model rules written in 
the books on which they relied.  
 In this chapter, Thai primary sources concerning the drafting of the Code of 
1925 are examined to discover the methods which the draftsmen generally 
employed. The findings provide insights into the manner in which legal borrowing 
took place and pave the way for research on specific performance as a case study of 
legal borrowing in the next three chapters. It focuses not only on methods and 
materials which were used by the draftsmen in the work of codification but also the 
profiles of some members of the drafting committee who played prominent roles in 
this seemingly successful codification. This will shed light on why particular 




1. THE DRAFTSMEN OF THE CODE OF 1925 
The work of codification of civil and commercial code underwent several changes 
especially changes of the organisations and people who were from 1908 responsible 
for the drafting of the code.1 The last major change was the establishment of the 
Department of Legislative Redaction (กรมรางกฎหมาย) within the Ministry of Justice in 
October 1923 to replace the Codification Committee. This was followed by the 
promulgation of the Code of 1923 in November. This organisational reform was 
influenced by both external and internal factors. In order to negotiate an 
amendment of the Franco-Siamese Treaty, the Thai government accepted a French 
proposal to establish a government department which was specifically responsible 
for law drafting and legislative works and to hire the Frenchmen who were 
members of the former drafting committee to work in the new department.2 The 
French request coincided with with King Vajiravudh’s desire to reform the 
codification commission to accelerate the work of codification.3 The Department 
was run by a committee known as the Committee of Legislation (คณะกรรมการรางกฎหมาย), 
chaired by เจาพระยาอภัยราชามหายุติธรรมธร (Chao Phraya Abhai Raja Mahayuttidhamdhorn) 
(‘Abhai Raja’), then Minister of Justice. Other than Abhai Raja, the first Committee 
of the Department had four Thai members, namely พระยานรเนติบัญชากิจ (Phraya 
Noranaeti Banjakij (Lad Setabutr))(‘Lad’), พระยาจินดาภิรมยราชสภาบดี (Phraya Jindabhirom 
Rajasabhabordi (Chitr na Songkla)) (‘Chitr’), พระยาเทพวิฑุรหหุลศรุตาบดี (Phraya 
Dhebvithoon Pahoolsarutabordi (Boonchoi Vanikkul)) ( ‘Boonchoi’), พระยามานวราชเสวี 
(Phraya Manavarajasevi (Plod na Songkla)) (‘Plod’), and three French members, 
Charles L’Evesque, Remy de Planterose and René Cazeau. René Guyon, the former 
chief draftsmen, became the advisor to the Committee. Plod also took care of the 
Committee’s administrative business and was considered the first Secretary-General 
of the Department.4 According to Plod, the Thai draftsmen played a leading role in 
                                                      
1 See ch 2, 3.3 ‘Codification of civil and commercial law in Thailand’ p 81 above. 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter from Prince Tridos to Chao Phraya Mahidorn (10 
September 1923) cited in Songsri Foran, ‘การแกไขสนธิสัญญาวาดวยสิทธิสภาพนอกอาณาเขตกับประเทศมหาอํานาจ 
ในรัชสมัยพระบาทสมเด็จพระมงกุฏเกลาเจาอยูหัว (The Amendment of Extraterritoriality Clauses between the 
Thai and Foreign Governments during the Reign of King Rama VI)’ (Chulalongkorn 
University 1959) 158–59. 
3  Phraya Manavarajasevi, บันทึกคําสัมภาษณพระยามานวราชเสว ี(Transcript of the Interviews with 
Phraya Manavarajasevi) (Thammasat University 1982) 43. 
4 Phraya Manavarajasevi, ‘คํารําลึกของพระยามานวราชเสว ี(ปลอด วิเชียร ณ สงขลา) (Recollection of Phraya 
Manavarajasevi)’ in The Council of State of Thailand (ed), ครบรอบ 48 ป 2524 
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drafting of the Code of 1925 in part because they outnumbered the Frenchmen in 
the Committee.5 The minutes of the drafting committee between March and October 
1925 consistently show that all of the Committee members, except Lad and 
L’Evesque, who were absent throughout the drafting process, regularly attended 
the meetings and that the three Thai draftsmen, Chitr, Boonchoi and Plod, 
dominated the drafting work. Guyon attended the meetings in March and between 
late September and October 1925, which were the first and last months of the 
drafting process.6 Despite his irregular attendance, Guyon played a more important 
role in the making of the Code of 1925 than the other two Frenchmen. The focus of 
this part of the thesis is therefore on the backgrounds of the three Thai draftsmen, 
especially Plod, and of Guyon as the most influential foreign figure in the making of 
the Code of 1925. 
1.1 Phraya Jindabhirom Rajasabhabordi (Chitr na Songkhla) 
Chitr (1885 - 1976) was a prominent Thai judge and politician. He was later granted 
the highest title of Thai nobility as Chao Phraya Sri Dhamma Dhibej in 1931, and he 
was the last person on whom this was bestowed before the system of noble titles in 
Thailand was abolished following the Revolution of 1932.7 Chitr was educated at the 
Law School of the Ministry of Justice and qualified as a Siamese barrister before 
being sent by Prince Rabi to study law in England in 1906. He was called to the Bar 
at Gray’s Inn in 1910.8 Upon completion of his legal education in England, Chitr 
spent some months studying the French language in Paris before being recalled to 
Thailand by the Thai government.9 Upon his return, Chitr was appointed as a judge 
at the Central Civil Court. He rose quickly in the judiciary becoming the chief justice 
of the Court in 1913, President of the Siamese Bar Council in 1924 and President of 
the Supreme Court in 1925. In 1926, Chitr joined King Rama VII’s cabinet as 
                                                                                                                                                         
สํานักงานคณะกรรมการกฤษฎีกา (48 Years of the Council of State (BE 2524)) (The Council of State of 
Thailand 1981) 1. 
5 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 4, 43. 
6 National Archive of Thailand, Office of the Council of State Doc No 3, Book 
4(2),‘รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมายตั้งแตวันที่ 1 กันยายน ถึง 27 มีนาคม พ.ศ. 2467 (Minutes of the Meetings of 
the Committee of Legislation)’ (1 September 1924 - 27 March 1925); ibid Doc No 3, Book 
5(1),‘รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมายตั้งแตวันที ่1 สิงหาคม ถึง 27 ตุลาคม พ.ศ. 2468 (Minutes of the Meetings of 
the Committee of Legislation)’ (1 August - 27 October 1925). 
7 Nattawut Sutthisongkram, 29 เจาพระยา (29 Chao Phrayas) (Samnak Sritham 1966) 934. 
8 Phraya Vichiensiri and Banturng Poolsilp, อนุสรณงานพระราชทานเพลิงศพ 
มหาอํามาตยเอกเจาพระยาศรีธรรมาธิเบศ (จิตร ณ สงขลา) (In Memory of Chao Phraya Sridhammadhibej (Chitr 
na Songkhla)) (Chuanpim 1976) 3–7. 
9 ibid 19-22. 
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Minister of Justice. He was appointed to several important political positions in 
subsequent governments both under absolute and constitutional monarchs, for 
example as Minister of Finance (1933), Member and Speaker of the House of 
Representatives (1934), Minister of Justice three more times (1937, 1944 and 1946), 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1938), Minister of Public Health (1944), Member and 
Speaker of the Senate House (1947), Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Council 
(1948), Speaker of the Parliament and President of Constitutional Tribunal (1949) 
and President of the Privy Council (1963).10 He also taught at the Law School of the 
Ministry of Justice for several decades and was appointed as a professor 
extraordinarius at Thammasat University in 1939. He wrote several law books while 
teaching at the Ministry of Justice Law School, including texts on the law of 
partnerships and companies in 1913, on the law of evidence in 1915, on the 
administration of courts and civil procedure 1918 and a commentary on the Code of 
1923 in 1924.11  
Chitr was one of the first three Thai jurists who were appointed as draftsmen 
of the civil and commercial code since 1916.12 Along with his brother, Plod, Chitr 
played a prominent role in the drafting of the Code of 1925. Despite being the 
President of the Committee of Legislation, Abhai Raja, then Minister of Justice, was 
too busy to lead the drafting meetings himself and therefore Chitr always presided 
over the meetings of the drafting committee. If one considers only the minutes of 
the meetings one may be of the opinion that Chitr was the most important figure in 
the drafting process since he often engaged in discussions and usually had the most 
persuasive voice while his brother, Plod, only occasionally expressed his opinions.13 
However, this research will demonstrate that Plod played the leading role in the 
establishment of the Code of 1925. 
1.2 Phraya Dhebvithoon Pahoolsarutabordi (Boonchoi Vanikkul) 
Like Chitr, Boonchoi (1889-1949) was one of the first three Thai jurists who were 
appointed as draftsmen of the civil and commercial code since 1916.14 He was 
educated at the Ministry of Justice Law School and was sent with Chitr and some 
other Thai students by Rabi to study law in England in 1906. He completed his legal 
                                                      
10 ibid 13-19. 
11 ibid 16-18. 
12 Government Gazette (7 May 1916) Book 33, 40. 
13 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (3 March - 26 October 1925). 
14 Government Gazette (7 May 1916) Book 33, 40 
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education at Gray’s Inn with a First Class Honours and was called to the Bar in 1909. 
Boonchoi was appointed as a judge when he returned to Thailand. He had a 
successful career in the judiciary being promoted to judge in the Court of Appeal 
and Supreme Court respectively. In 1923, he was appointed as Attorney General 
under the Minister of Internal Affairs and remained in the Department of Public 
Attorney until 1928 when he moved back to the court of justice to assume the 
presidency of the Supreme Court. In 1932, he briefly went into politics and joined 
the first cabinet under the constitutional monarch as Minister of Justice but resigned 
in the next year. Boonchoi played an important role at the Law School of the 
Ministry of Justice as a lecturer and an administrator. He wrote several important 
law books, for example on torts in 1910, the law of agency in 1911, Commentary on 
Books I and II of the Civil and Commercial Code of 1923 and most importantly 
Commentary on the Civil and Commercial Codes of 1925 from Articles 1 to 240 in 1959. 
Boonchoi was the only draftsman of the Code of 1925 who produced, though only 
partly, a commentary on it.15 
1.3 Phraya Manavarajasevi (Plod na Songkla)  
Plod (1890-1984) was a younger brother of Chitr. Despite the fact that Chitr presided 
at the drafting meetings, Plod was the architect of the Code of 1925. He introduced a 
new methodology to the work of codification of civil and commercial law which led 
to its successful enforcement. He described his role in the drafting committee and 
gave his account of the work of codification in a series of interviews which were 
crucial for later understanding of the origin of the Code of 1925.  
 Plod qualified as a Siamese barrister before being sent by the Ministry of 
Justice to study law in England in 1913. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple 
in 1916. Upon his return to Thailand, he was appointed as a judge at the Siamese 
International Court in Bangkok briefly in 1917 before being transferred to the law 
department of the royal household as the deputy head of the department in the 
same year. In 1919, Vajiravudh appointed Plod as secretary to the Codification 
Commission, which was later transformed into the Department of Legislative 
Redaction in 1923. Unlike Chitr and Boonchoi, Plod did not take part in preparing 
the English draft of the Code of 1923, but from 1919 to 1921 he was assigned the task 
                                                      
15 Court Museum of Thailand, ‘พระยาเทพวิทุร พหุลศรุตาบดี (Phraya Debvitoon Pahoolsarutabordi)’ 
(Office of the Court of Justice) 
<http://www.museum.coj.go.th/SpPerson/witulpahun.htm> accessed 28 December 2012.  
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of translating it into Thai.16 After the promulgation of the Code of 1925, Plod had a 
successful career in the judiciary becoming the chief justice of the Siamese 
International Court in Bangkok in 1926 and Privy Councillor in 1927. He was 
transferred to the Department of Public Attorney assuming the office of the 
Attorney General in 1928. Plod also played an important role in Thai politics after 
the change from absolute monarchy to democracy in 1932. He became a Member of 
Parliament in the same year and Minster of Finance in 1934. Plod was Speaker of the 
House of Representatives from 1936 to 1943 and Speaker of the Parliament from 
1944 to 1946. He was chosen by the House of Representatives to be the Chairman of 
the Constitution Drafting Council in 1946. Plod was a Privy Councillor (king’s 
advisor) of the current King of Thailand (King Bhumibol) for twenty-nine years. In 
academia, Plod taught at the Law School of Ministry of Justice, where he was Head 
of the School from 1923, Chulalongkorn University, and Thammasat University, 
where he was appointed as a professor extraordinarius.17 
 Some of the knowledge and experience which Plod had gained while studying 
in England between 1913 and 1917 was particularly vital to codification of civil and 
commercial law in Thailand since it provided the foundation for the new 
methodology for drafting the civil and commercial code in 1925 and therefore 
deserves attention. A group of academics from Thammasat University Faculty of 
Law conducted three interviews with Plod on 12 September 1980, 10 December 1980 
and 16 June 1981.18 The main purpose of these was to clarify many unresolved 
issues about the modernisation of Thai law, especially the making of the Thai Codes 
during the reigns of Chulalongkorn and Vajiravudh.19  
 In the interviews, Plod explained why he was sent to study in England and 
how the Japanese method of drafting a code of law became attractive to him. Plod 
claimed that Prince Rabi, then Minister of Justice, sent him to study in England with 
the expectation that either he qualified as an English barrister and then returned to 
Siam to become Attorney General or that he would study German law so as to be 
able to draft a civil code.20 If Rabi, the leading opponent of the adoption of the code 
system, intended to adopt German law in establishing a civil code a question arises 
as to why Plod was sent to England instead of Germany. The answer can be found 
                                                      
16 Bangkok University, อนุสรณงานศพพระยามานวราชเสว ี(In Memory of Phraya Manavarajasevi) 
(Amarin Printing 1984) 24–39. 
17 ibid.  
18 The interviewers were Professor Predee Kasemsup, Professor Sawaeng Boonchalermvipas 
and Professor Kittisak Prokati and Professor Mali Prukpongsawali.  
19 Manavarajasevi, Interviews Preface. 
20 ibid 3. 
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in the previous chapter which showed the predominance of the British Empire in 
Thailand and the general trend towards sending Thai students to study law in 
England in the nineteenth century.21 The Thai were more familiar with British 
culture including the English language than any other foreign cultures as Plod 
pointed out: ‘at the time, it was difficult to find a Thai student who knew foreign 
languages other than the English language’ [my translation].22 
 Despite being educated in the common law system, Plod took a positive 
attitude towards German law while he spoke of French law with disapproval. He 
said: 
 
It is strange that a person with knowledge of English common law can 
easily understand the German Civil Code but finds the French Civil Code 
unreadable. So [I think that] the Japanese decision to choose the German 
Code rather than the French Code was right and we simply followed 
them….A good English translation of the German Civil Code was 
produced by Chung Hui Wang, which I have read since I studied in 
England and found it comprehensible….Unlike the French Civil Code, the 
German Civil Code is arranged from general to specific, which is easy to 
understand.23 [My translation] 
 
Despite his admiration of the BGB, it seems that Plod was not willing to study 
German law seriously either in Great Britain or in Germany. Plod told the 
interviewers that he was strongly encouraged by Rabi to further his legal studies at 
Heidelberg University after he was qualified as an English barrister. However, after 
he had spent some time learning German, which enabled him to read some German 
texts, Plod returned to Thailand instead of going to Germany to pursue another law 
degree, which he jokingly considered this a lucky escape.24 He claimed to have read 
some German law books during his time in Britain,25 but there is no indication about 
how much German law he knew. Despite his claim that he could read German,26 his 
level of German reading skill was doubtful since all the books of German law that 
he mentioned in the interviews were published in English. Furthermore, the 
literature on German and Japanese law that Plod and other draftsmen consulted 
during the drafting of the Code of 1925 is almost all written in English. However, it 
can be argued that since English was the only communicating language between the 
                                                      
21 See ch 2, 3.2 ‘Legal education’ p 77 above. 
22 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 8. 
23 ibid 8–9. 
24 ibid 8. 
25 ibid 3 
26 ibid 8.  
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Thai and French draftsmen, the foreign materials they consulted had to be 
published in English. 
 Besides German law, Japanese law and Japan’s experience of modernisation of 
law, especially the story about how the Japanese had established their civil code, 
drew Plod’s admiration while he was in England. Plod was impressed by the 
methodology that the Japanese draftsmen used to draft the Minpō of 1898 and by 
the Japanese experience with the failed Minpō of 1890 drafted under the influence of 
French law, in which he saw parallels to the situation in Siam. According to Plod, 
while studying in England he was looked after by a close friend of Rabi, John Simon 
First Viscount Simon (1873-1954), who was a prominent British politician.27 Plod 
spent his first eight months in England learning English. He then joined the Inner 
Temple spending two more years there before being called to the Bar in 1916. Plod 
told the interviewers that he had brought a copy of an early draft of the Code of 
1923 which was prepared by the French draftsmen with him to England and 
showed it to Simon seeking his opinion on it.28 The British politician told Plod that, 
despite their bold attempt, the Frenchmen had not been skilful enough in their 
drafting of a code of law. He suggested that the Thai should learn from the French 
failure and should not waste time on making an original code. Simon described 
Japan’s experience with the drafting of the Civil Code which bore a similarity to 
Thailand’s and further suggested that Thailand should adopt the Japanese method 
for drafting a code.29 After qualifying as a barrister Plod spent nearly a year 
practising at the chambers of Simon’s friend, Sir Hugh Fraser. There, he received 
similar advice on drafting a Thai code.30 
 Plod admitted that his knowledge and the advice about the drafting of the 
Minpō of 1898 he received in England inspired his work on the drafting of the Code 
of 1925.31 When he returned to Thailand in 1917, Plod was briefly appointed as a 
judge before being transferred to the law department of the Royal Household as the 
deputy head in the same year. There he had the chance to serve Vajiravudh closely. 
The king complained about the inefficiency of the drafting of the civil and 
commercial code under the direction of the French and it had taken so much time 
                                                      
27 ibid 40. 
28 ibid 41. 
29 ibid 41–42. 
30 ibid 41. 
31 ibid 42. 
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and millions of baht, but no results had been presented to him.32 The king asked 
Plod to take on the task and get results. At that moment, Plod’s solution ‘was to 
copy Japanese law’.33 [My translation] 
 Plod was appointed as secretary to the Codification Commission in 1919. His 
appointment was followed by three important events, the translation of the draft of 
the Code of 1923 and the promulgation of the Code of 1923, the establishment of the 
Department of Legislative Redaction in 1923, and the redrafting of the civil and 
commercial code in 1925. According to Plod, when the king appointed him to be the 
secretary to the Codification Commission in 1919, he had high expectations for him 
to complete the task of drafting the civil and commercial code speedily. Plod 
translated the draft of the Code of 1923 into Thai and submitted this to the king, 
who assigned a translation committee to examine it.34 Plod recalled the events which 
took place between 1919 and 1925:  
 
After I was appointed as the secretary of the Codification Commission [in 
1919], I followed the example of the Japanese in translating the French draft 
and then circulating the translation among judges…I translated the French 
draft of [around] 200 articles and asked Thai judges to review the 
translation. But the judges could not accept it. This was so similar to the 
Japanese experience that their French draft was also rejected by their judges. 
Eventually, King Vajiravudh set up a committee consisting of mostly royal 
family members to examine my translation…At that time, it was risky to 
express my negative view on the French draft; it is not easy to make Thai 
people who generally strongly held a positive view of western products 
and ideas believe that the French draft was defective. I had to pretend to 
say that the draft was good and therefore needed to be translated into Thai. 
However, I privately told the king that it was a bad one and also referred to 
several other Thai law experts who held the same view…The High 
Revising Committee also read the translation and found it was unreadable, 
incoherent and incomprehensible. They asked me as to how to solve this 
problem. I suggested that we circulated copies of the translation among 
judges and lawyers to see how they responded to it. As expected, the 
French draft attracted heavy criticism from Thai judges and professional 
lawyers. The new drafting committee was therefore established.35 [My 
translation] 
 
It is certain that Plod meant the Committee of Legislation of the Department of 
Legislative Redaction, which replaced the Codification Commission. This 
                                                      
32 ibid 43. See also National Archive of Thailand, Miscellaneous Doc No Bor 9/115, 
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34 ibid 12. 
35 ibid 29–30. 
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reorganisation took place on 27 October 1923 while the French draft of the civil and 
commercial code was promulgated on 11 November 1923. This indicates that Plod’s 
account of how the Japanese strategy was exploited to reject the French draft seems 
reliable. The Thai government chose to promulgate the law to satisfy the French but 
foresaw widespread criticism of the Code of 1923, which was expected to result in a 
demand for redrafting the law. This could then be used by the government as a 
legitimate excuse for rejecting the Code of 1923. However, it is unclear when Plod 
began to lobby Vajiravudh to set aside the French draft. It is reasonable to assume 
that this took place between 1922 and 1923 because there is evidence that the 
English draft of the Code and its Thai translation were completed in 1922 and the 
king appointed the High Revising Committee, which consisted of mostly royal 
ministers of the government, on 15 June 1922 to examine the drafts.36 This is 
consistent with Plod’s account above. 
1.4 René Guyon 
Guyon (1876-1963) was a Frenchman who eventually became a naturalised Thai 
citizen, acquired a Thai name as Pichan Boonyong, and lived in Thailand until the 
end of his life. Guyon, a doctor of law from the University of Paris, had spent some 
years working as a judge in France.37 He was hired by the Siamese government to 
work as a judge at the Siamese Appeal Court in 1908 on the recommendation of 
Georges Padoux, the Legislative Advisor to the government and the chief draftsmen 
of the civil and commercial code between 1908 and 1916.38 Guyon therefore served 
as a draftsman of the civil and commercial code from the beginning of the process 
and he was the only French draftsman who joined the drafting committees of both 
the Codes of 1923 and 1925. He assumed the role of chief draftsman during the 
major reform on the drafting committee in 1916, which saw the Thai draftsmen’s 
first involvement in the process. Despite the participation of Lad, Chitr and 
Boonchoi and despite the shift from the French structure of the draft to the German 
                                                      
36 National Archive of Thailand, Ministry of Justice Doc No Yor 12 1/4, 
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one, the draft was still considerably influenced by French law,39 and the French 
continued to dominate the drafting of the Code. It was not until Plod’s appointment 
as secretary to the Codification Commission in 1919 that the dominance of French 
law and the French draftsmen began to decline.  
 Guyon’s role in the drafting of the Code of 1925 remains unclear. Despite 
holding an advisory position in the Committee of Legislation, Guyon attended the 
drafting meetings sporadically and only in March,40 September41 and October 1925.42 
According to the minutes of the meetings of the Committee of Legislation (or the 
drafting committee), De Planterose and Cazeau attended meetings regularly and the 
latter in particular often participated in the discussions. Despite their active role, 
Plod on several occasions during the interviews mentioned only the name of Guyon 
as a member of the Committee of Legislation43 while on one occasion he understated 
the role of De Planterose and Cazeau.44 Plod’s memory of Guyon’s position in the 
Committee was inaccurate since Guyon was in fact the advisor to the Committee. 
The reason Plod recognised Guyon’s contribution while ignoring the two 
Frenchmen’s may be that Guyon actually played a more important role in the 
drafting process than de Planterose and Cazeau. Despite being the most influential 
foreign figure in the drafting of the code of 1925, in comparison with his previous 
role in the drafting work of the Code of 1923, Guyon was not instrumental in the 
drafting process of the Code of 1925. 
 There are two explanations for Guyon’s limited role in the drafting of the new 
Code. First, among the persons who were appointed to the Committee of 
Legislation of the Department of Legislative Redaction, other than Abhai Raja, the 
President of the Committee and Minister of Justice, Guyon was the most senior 
draftsman and was the most recent chief draftsmen of the Code of 1923. However, it 
was not Guyon but Chitr who presided at the drafting meetings. Moreover, the Thai 
members of the Committee of Legislation outnumbered the French. This implies 
that the Thai Government expected the Thai draftsmen to lead the drafting process. 
                                                      
39 See Kasemsup, ‘Reception of Law in Thailand’ 293; Phagagrong, ‘Drafting of the Siamese 
Civil and Commercial Code’ 89.   
40 Guyon attended the meetings of the Committee of Legislation on 3, 6, 10, 13, 17 and 24 
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41 Guyon attended the meetings of the Committee of Legislation on 25, 26 and 29 September. 
‘Meeting Minutes’ (25, 26 and 29 September 1925). 
42 Guyon attended the meetings of the Committee of Legislation on 12–17, 20–24 and 26 
March. ‘Meeting Minutes’ (12–17, 20–24 and 26 March 1925). 
43 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 4, 7, 29–30, 32, 43–44, 48. 
44 ibid 38. 
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 The second explanation is Guyon’s disagreement over the revision of the Code 
of 1923 and the adoption of the German Civil Code as the principal model for the 
redrafting of the new civil and commercial code. In the first drafting meeting of the 
Committee of Legislation on 3 March 1925, in which the draftsmen discussed how 
to revise the Code of 1923, Guyon proposed that the draftsmen should only amend 
some of its articles. However, the majority of those at the meeting, namely Chitr, 
Boonchoi, Plod and Luang Sarasaas Prapan (Chuen Charuvatr), who attended the 
meeting as its recorder, insisted that all of books I and II must be revised.45 
Following his defeat at the first meeting of 3 March 1925 , Guyon wrote to Abhai 
Raja, then Minister of Justice and President of the Committee of Legislation on 7 
March 1925, discussing the Western powers’ concern about the policy of the 
Siamese government for the publication of the drafts codes and therefore proposing 
a note which explained the position and the policy of the Department of Legislative 
Redaction in this matter. He reminded Abhai Raja about their prior verbal 
agreement on the position and policy of the Department.46 Guyon’s letter was 
clearly aimed at persuading the Minster of Justice to adopt his policy on the drafting 
of the Civil and Commercial Code, which was reflected in the note attached to the 
letter, as the official policy of the Department. This note, prepared by Guyon, shows 
his disapproval of the use of the BGB as the principal model for the Thai Civil and 
Commercial Code. He wrote: 
 
They are far from contending that the German Code of 1900 is not a 
masterly piece of law. Everybody agrees that it was made very carefully 
and with a special scientific method. But the Department want to remind 
[you] that, from the beginning of the Codification in Siam, it was admitted, 
as a matter of policy, that the German Code was not a suitable model for 
this country [my emphasis]. The presentation of the German Code is so 
abstract, the system of connections between the different parts is so 
complicate[d], that, even in Germany, there have been many difficulties 
and contentions between German trained lawyers for the true meaning and 
construction of many provisions.47 
   




                                                      
45 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (3 March 1925) 1-3.  
46 National Archive of Thailand, Office of the Council of State Doc No 9, ‘Letter No 75/131 
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When Switzerland – [a] country where a great deal of citizens are of 
German language – have made their Civil Code and Code of Obligations 
(from 1900 to 1912) they have refrained [from taking] the German Code as 
an exclusive model, and, being anxious before all to make a practical work, 
they have referred to both German and Latine precedences, taking the best 
in each of them. This has been the ideal also of the Commission of 
Codification in this country [Siam], and, if the draft[s]men have been 
frequently closer to the solutions of the Code Napoleon, that is only 
because each solution appeared to be the clearest. It seems that this has 
been also the impression of so many countries who have taken the Code 
Napoleon as a model (Begium, [the] Netherland[s], Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, the South American Republics, etc. etc.).48 
 
 There is no evidence about how the Minister of Justice responded to Guyon’s 
proposal. But at the meeting on 13 March 1925 Guyon again opposed Chitr’s 
suggestion to arrange the new Civil and Commercial Code in accordance with the 
BGB’s structure and advised the draftsmen to concentrate on the revision of some 
early provisions instead.49 However, on 17 March, Guyon presented the meeting 
with a draft of the structure of Books I and II of the Code of 1925, which obviously 
followed the Pandectist system.50 The minutes of the 17 March 1925 meeting did not 
record what happened prior to the meeting where Guyon changed his position. 
There were no drafting activities with regard to the new Code in April 1925. The 
drafting work resumed in May 1925 and the committee met regularly until the end 
of the process on 26 October 1925. Guyon attended the meeting until the end of 
March. He was absent between May and August but resumed his attendance in late 
September and attended almost every meeting in October. Even when absent, 
Guyon voiced his opinions via the French draftsmen51 and despite his irregular 
attendance, Guyon had a role in the drafting process behind the scenes. A complete 
draft was sent to him for his comments before it was officially submitted to the High 
Revising Committee. He, however, made only some small linguistic changes.52 
 Guyon’s subsequent involvement in the drafting process, especially his 
comments on the drafts of new Books I and II prepared by the draftsmen, shows no 
sign of his continuous strong opposition to the adoption of German law. In fact, 
they were mostly minor language corrections. The French draftsmen, particularly 
Cazeau, who attended the drafting meetings regularly, also did not show any 
reluctance to follow the method adopted by the Thai draftsmen and only 
occasionally proposed provisions in the French Civil Code as a model for the Thai 
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drafts. From these facts, it would, however, be mistaken to conclude that the 
Frenchmen eventually accepted that German law was superior to their own law. It 
is more convincing to conclude that they found that resistance to the new policy on 
codification was pointless. Another possible explanation is that the Thai 
government may have made it clear to them that the German and Japanese models 
were preferred.  
2. METHODS AND MATERIALS FOR DRAFTING THE CODE OF 1925 
When conducting research on how the Code of 1925 was drafted, there are two 
main types of available primary sources. The first type is the minutes of the 
meetings of the Committee of Legislation. These minutes show what the draftsmen 
of the Code of 1925 discussed. There is usually an English draft of the discussed 
provisions attached to each report. In the English drafts, there are often notes 
showing which foreign law provisions were used as models. The minutes show a 
brief and summarised discussion of the draftsmen in each meeting. The second type 
is a compilation of the English drafts of Books I and II of the 1925 Code (‘the Book of 
the Revised Drafts’). The English drafts which are contained in this book are not 
merely copies of the original English drafts which were attached to the minutes of 
the meetings of the Committee of Legislation. They are in fact copies which were 
finalised by the draftsmen and later examined and corrected by the High Revising 
Committee. It is widely believed that the Book of the Revised Drafts was compiled 
on Plod’s instructions53 as he also claimed.54  
 The way the Book of the Revised Drafts was compiled deserves careful 
attention and should be examined in greater detail as it provides a clue as to how 
the whole process of codification was carried out. The compilation contains the 
English and Thai drafts of Books I and II of the Code of 1925, but several parts of the 
drafts are interrupted by correspondences between the members of the Committee 
of Legislation and the High Revising Committee, mostly between Plod and Prince 
Paribatra, the President of the High Revising Committee. The contents of the drafts 
show several handwritten linguistic corrections most likely made either by the 
draftsmen in accordance with the High Revising Committee’s recommendations or 
by the Committee themselves. In each provision in the English draft, there is a 
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Figure 3 - 1: A sample of the English draft in the Book of the Revised Drafts. The page 
contains arts 81 and 82 with some corrections and annotations.56 
 
 
 Although both types of primary sources provide valuable information on the 
drafting process of the Code of 1925, they do not give a full picture of how it was 
made, especially how foreign private law had been used to form the basis of each 
provision of the code, and why it replaced the Code of 1923. This insufficiency led 
to the series of interviews with Plod between September 1980 and June 1981 as 
discussed above. The interviewers paid more attention to the making of the Code of 
1925 and Plod’s answers clarified several important issues about, inter alia, the 
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reason for repeal of the Code of 1923 and the shift from French law to German law, 
the methods and foreign materials which were used by the draftsmen to draft the 
Code of 1925. When studying the history of the codification of private law in 
Thailand one must consult Plod’s interviews. However, in doing so, one must 
consider their limitations. First, Plod was ninety when he started to give the 
interviews, almost sixty years after the promulgation of the Code of 1925. Despite 
his old age, he was physically and mentally in good health.57 His memory, though 
generally good, was not entirely accurate. For example, he told the interviewers that 
Guyon was the only French member of the drafting committee of the Code of 192558 
although later he mentioned the names of the other two French draftsmen.59 Second, 
Plod only gave a general account of the making of the Codes of 1923 and 1925 and 
did not provide details about how specific legal principles were established. 
 To find out how the Code of 1925 was established, the two primary sources 
and the transcripts of the tapes of the three interviews with Plod, published by 
Thammasat University, have been consulted. The reliability of Plod’s information 
especially on the methods and foreign materials used in the drafting of the code, 
which was given in the interviews will be examined below. It is notable that the 
English draft of the Code of 1925 was never recognised in Thailand either as a 
source of law or as its official English translation despite the fact that the first draft 
of the code was made in English. The Code of 1925 is in fact only officially available 
in Thai. 
2.1 Drafting the Code of 1925  
In the interviews, Plod revealed the method which the Thai draftsmen employed 
when drafting the Code of 1925. This general method is the main focus of this thesis 
since it illustrates how foreign law was received and helps to confirm the thesis’s 
main hypotheses about Alan Watson’s theory of legal transplants, namely whether 
the reception of foreign private law in Thai law is, in Watson’s terms, a legal 
transplant and whether the ‘a systematic knowledge of the law’ was not necessary 
for the success of the legal transplant in Thailand. This research not only focuses on 
the method for the drafting of the Code of 1925 but also on why the Thai draftsmen 
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adopted this method. This will help us fully understand legal borrowing in 
Thailand. 
2.1.1 The Japanese method  
In all three interviews, Plod often mentioned ‘copying method’ or ‘Japanese 
method’: he used these terms interchangeably. According to Plod in the first 
interview, his translation of the French draft of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code 
of 1923, as he envisaged, attracted heavy criticism from the High Revising 
Committee, who summoned him and his brother, Chitr, for consultation. The 
Committee posed a question about improving the situation. While his brother was 
deliberately silent on the matter, Plod enthusiastically offered a solution.60 He 
proposed that 
 
We use the method that the Japanese did - that is ‘to copy’ - in drafting 
their Civil Code…we therefore simply copied Japanese law. This is a 
simple and quick way [to complete a draft]. Even the French drafters were 
not skilful enough at drafting a good Civil Code. We, Thais, with relatively 
limited skills and experience, would do it even worse. To adopt the 
Japanese method is efficient because the Japanese copied from the German 
Civil Code, which was a product of hundred of years of development. The 
Japanese carefully chose comprehensible German legal principles which 
were suitable for them but ignored complicated ones.61 [My translation] 
 
In the third interview, Plod revealed that using the Japanese method had been in his 
mind since he was a law student in England. When Vajiravudh asked him to get the 
task of drafting the Civil and Commercial Code done quickly, Plod already had an 
idea about how to carry out the task. He recalled that 
 
At that moment, I had already had a solution, which was to copy Japanese 
law. The copying is easy. I just took the contents of Books I, II, and III [of 
the foreign Codes], to form the basis of Books I and II of the Thai Civil and 
Commercial Code and then translated them into Thai language.62 [My 
translation]  
 
In the second interview, Plod claimed that following widespread criticism of the 
Code of 1923, Vajiravudh preferred the new code to be made within the German 
Pandectist framework. It is not clear whether the King’s preference for German law 
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was widely known among the people involved in the drafting process or was 
revealed in a private conversation with Plod. Plod claimed that the other draftsmen 
accepted his proposal to adopt the Japanese method. He recalled that 
 
Since the king preferred the new code to be modelled on the Pandectist 
system and drafted in accordance with the Germanic system, I proposed 
that we follow the Japanese model. Once we reached an agreement, we 
four draftsmen began to translate. We then drafted the Code both in 
English and Thai.63 [My translation] 
 
Interviewed by officials of the Council of State of Thailand (formerly Department of 
Legislative Redaction) on 30 October 1981, Plod admitted that he drafted the Code 
of 1925 ‘mostly by copying the Japanese Civil Code’ [my translation] and the 
draftsmen’s claim that the Thai code was a product of ‘comparative system’ was 
exaggerated.64    
 Having examined the minutes of the meetings of the Committee of Legislation, 
especially on 3 March 1925, which was the first meeting for the revision of the Code 
of 1923, it was found that Plod’s account is authentic. In that meeting, there was a 
debate about how to revise the Code of 1923. Guyon, who had anticipated that the 
Thai draftsmen were preparing to make major changes to the Code of 1923, 
suggested that the draftsmen should only revise some provisions and expressed the 
idea that revising the whole code was not appropriate because the Code of 1923 had 
just come into effect.65 However, Chitr proposed revising the entire code. 
Responding to Guyon’s opposition, he referred to Vajiravudh’s wish for the whole 
of Books I and II to be revised.66 In support of his brother’s proposal, Plod claimed 
that the High Revising Committee, whose members were mostly cabinet ministers 
and members of the royal family, had already agreed that the Code of 1923 could be 
revised as much as necessary. In Plod's opinion, it was more appropriate to consider 
the law article by article.67 The meeting resolved the disagreement with a vote: the 
majority were in favour of Plod’s proposal that the draftsmen considered revising 
every provision of the Code of 1923.68 The defeat at this meeting prompted Guyon 
to write the letter to Minister of Justice to reconsider the policy on the adoption of 
the BGB as a model.69 
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 After the meeting on 24 March 1925, the drafting resumed on 25 May 1925. 
The draftsmen agreed to adopt the Minpō of 1898 as a template for structuring the 
drafts of the revised provisions. At the end of the meeting, the draftsmen only 
obtained a rough, incomplete and disorganised draft of the first set of provisions for 
the new code. The meeting then assigned Plod the task of improving the draft in 
accordance with the Minpō of 1898. The minutes of the meeting state: 
 
The meeting thought that the revising of the provisions, which has been 
done so far, was not thorough and that they needed to be restructured in 
accordance with the Japanese Civil Code. The meeting agreed to assign 
Phraya Manavarajasevi [Plod] to carry out this task whose result was to be 
submitted to the next meeting.70 [My translation] 
 
The minutes of the meeting of the draftsmen and Guyon’s letter to Minister of 
Justice on 7 March 1925 prove that there was a shift in policy from adopting French 
law to adopting German law. The continuous use of the German and Japanese Civil 
Codes as the principal models despite Guyon’s opposition implies that the change 
of policy was backed or approved by Vajiravudh and cabinet ministers as Plod 
claimed. Moreover, the adoption of the Minpō while the new policy was to use the 
BGB means that the Thai draftsmen understood that the Japanese Code was closely 
related to the German Code and this verifies Plod’s claim that he had proposed that 
the Thai government adopt German instead of French law and that the example of 
the Japanese redrafting the civil code should be followed.71 We may thus construct a 
narrative about how the Japanese method became the principal method for making 
the Code of 1925. The work of codification in Thailand between 1908 and 1925 was 
mainly influenced by French law, but the Thai government switched the policy to 
adopt German law following Plod’s recommendation. The Thai draftsmen adopted 
the Japanese method and Japanese law alongside German law because they inclined 
towards Plod’s belief that Japanese law was a modified version of German law.72 
But was the Japanese Civil Code simply a reflection of German law as Plod thought? 
This will be answered by historical and comparative research of German and 
Japanese law in the next two chapters respectively. 
 In summary, Plod introduced the Japanese method to the drafting of the Code 
of 1925 in the belief that this method was to ‘to copy’ legal texts73 and that the 
Minpō of 1898 was a reflection of the BGB. This seems to be a case of what, in 
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Watson’s terms, is known as a ‘legal borrowing’ or ‘legal transplants’ in the making 
of the Code of 1925. To be certain, we need to examine how the Thai draftsmen 
actually employed the so-called Japanese method. This will be done later in this 
chapter. First, we need to answer an important question as to why the Japanese 
method was chosen. 
2.1.2 Explanations for adopting the Japanese method  
There are a number of explanations for why the draftsmen generally used the 
Japanese method or the copying method in drafting the Code of 1925.  
 The primary explanation is Plod’s powers of persuasion. Plod introduced the 
copying method to the drafting of the Civil and Commercial Code and this led to its 
successful promulgation. Although there is no conclusive proof of his dominant role, 
significant progress had been made in the drafting process since 1919 in which he 
was appointed as the secretary to the Codification Commission. Although, unlike 
Chitr and Boonchoi, Plod did not take part in preparing the English draft of the 
Code of 1923 between 1919 and 1921 he had been assigned a task of translating it 
into Thai.74 The Thai draft of the Code of 1923 prepared by Plod became law in 
November 1923 and drew severe criticism from Thai judges and lawyers. Plod 
successfully persuaded the king and senior members of the royal family who held 
seats in the cabinet and his draftsmen colleagues to adopt the Japanese model. This 
resulted in the dramatic shift in policy on codification in early 1925 that the new 
Civil and Commercial Code was drafted principally based on the BGB and by 
means of copying. Plod claimed that the issue of adopting the Japanese model had 
never been raised and that foreign advisers to the government, including Tokichi 
Masao, a Japanese advisor, and Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, had never discussed the 
Japanese experience in making the civil code.75 
 The second explanation is the similarity between Japan’s and Thailand’s 
experiences with the drafting of the civil codes and Thailand’s admiration for 
Japan’s success in simplifying the BGB. Plod’s persuasion alone may not have been 
the decisive factor in following the Japanese model. The experience and success the 
Japanese had in modernising their law were intrinsically attractive to Thai policy 
makers. Moreover, the Japanese system had emerged as a preferred model for the 
modernisation of Siam. Japan not only exerted influence in the making of modern 
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Thai civil law, but it also provided precious lessons for a Thailand wanting to 
escape from colonisation from the start of its modernisation process.76 
 The third reason is the failure of the French draftsmen to create a viable code. 
As we saw above, the drafting work of the Civil and Commercial Code in Thailand 
was controlled by French draftsmen from 1908 to 1923. The product of this 
prolonged work was the abortive Code of 1923. In 1919, Guyon, as the chief of the 
drafting committee of the Siamese codes of law, published a report in the name of 
the Siamese Ministry of Justice outlining an historical account of the work of 
codification in Siam and showing progress in codification.77 Guyon revealed the 
methodology for making the Code of 1923 saying 
 
The aim of the members of the Commission has been above all to 
accomplish a work which would prove consistent with the requirements of 
the country. Consequently, they have, with the greatest care, avoided 
indulging in the too easy plan of copying any foreign Code, perfect as it 
might be, and of transferring their provisions, with slight alterations, into 
the Siamese legislation. They have, for each Draft, pursued the same 
method: first, they have made a general study of the matter as it stands in 
the existing Siamese texts (laws or judgments) and in the principal foreign 
Codes. They have frequently referred to such valuable guides as the French 
Code, with its traditional lucidity, the English law with which the Siamese 
lawyers are often better conversant, the practical and modern rules of the 
Swiss and Japanese Codes, the technical precisions of the German Codes, 
the improvements which recently have often been made in the legislations 
of Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, America, etc. They have always given 
preference to the most practical solution, and to the best adapted to 
modern requirement. They have, therefore, tried, without being sheer 
imitators, to benefit from the experience and wisdom of their predecessors. 
References, to the above mentioned works have enabled the members of 
the Revising Committees easily to look for precedents when examining the 
Drafts.78 
 
 Guyon’s attempt to produce an original work by reconciling traditional Thai 
law and several foreign legal systems and by avoiding blindly copying from them 
failed since the Code of 1923 which he and his fellow draftsmen produced was 
heavily criticised. Plod viewed the Code of 1923 as ‘an incoherent and muddled 
code which neither represented good French legal principles nor could be regarded 
as a follower of the German or Swiss Civil Codes’79 [my translation]. For Plod, this 
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failure proved the impracticability of the method used by the Frenchmen and 
therefore a simpler way to draft a code was preferred.80 
 The fourth possible explanation is that the Thai draftsmen belived that the 
copying method would accelerate their work. The draftsmen carried out their work 
under the pressure of two time frames. First they had to establish a civil and 
commercial code quickly so that the Thai government could relax or end 
extraterritoriality.81 Plod revealed that Siam was desperate to regain full judicial 
autonomy without delay and that the copying method effectively expedited the 
drafting process.82 Their work was also dictated by the time frame for the 
implementation of the Code of 1923. The Code containing Books I and II was 
promulgated on 11 November 1923, but as a result of Plod’s recommendation its 
enforcement was postponed until 1 January 1925. After promulgation, copies of the 
Code of 1923 were circulated among judges and professional lawyers for feedback. 
The draftsmen first met to discuss the revision of the Code of 1923 on 3 March 1925 
and they completed the draft of the Code of 1925 on 26 October 1925, which was 
later than the date set for the enforcement of the Code of 1923. However, according 
to Plod, the Code of 1923 was never used in practice.83 When the interviewers asked 
him how the draftsmen finished the drafting task in less than two years, Plod 
answered that the drafting of the Code of 1925 was easily done by means of copying 
of the Minpō.84 Time pressure is also well illustrated in a letter from Prince Paribatra, 
the President of the High Revising Committee, to Plod of 19 July 1925 expressing 
concern about the time frame for the enforcement of the new Civil and Commercial 
Code. In this letter, Paribatra suggested that in addition to the English draft of some 
first articles of new Book I he had expected to receive its Thai translation from the 
draftsmen but that in order to save time he and his fellow committee members 
agreed to translate the draft into Thai themselves.85 For consistent translation, the 
High Revising Committee translated the English drafts of all of Book I while in 
examining of Book II it was provided with both English and Thai versions of the 
drafts.86 
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 The last plausible explanation for the adoption of the copying method is that it 
offered an effective defence of the new Code. As discussed above, extraterritoriality 
was a great motivation for completing the work of codification quickly. However, 
colonial powers continued to interfere with Thai government affairs. Their 
interference did not allow the draftsmen to work on their task in freedom. Great 
Britain and France, in particular, competed to dominate the work of codification in 
Siam. The latter seemed to be more successful in influencing the Siamese 
government’s policy on law reforms mostly by means of offers to relax the consular 
jurisdiction clause in the treaty in exchange for French appointments in legislative 
bodies;87 a number of Frenchmen had taken part in the drafting of the Penal Code of 
1908, where Padoux held the position of the chief draftsman and the civil and 
commercial codes, where the Frenchmen almost completely dominated the drafting 
committees from the beginning. The dominance of the French in the drafting of the 
civil and commercial code displeased the British as illustrated in the letter from the 
British Ambassador, Robert Greg, to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Tridos, 
dated 5 December 1923. Greg wrote: 
 
As the Code Committee, where not Siamese, is French, I think it more than 
probable that the new Code will have at least something of a Gallic turn. In 
this connection Your Highness will not forget the Annex to the 1909 Treaty 
about Siamese and English law in which it is laid down that, where no 
Siamese Statute or precedent exists, the Siamese Courts will be guided by 
English Statutes and cases as far as circumstances permit, especially in 
commercial matters. The introduction therefore of a new Commercial Code, 
drawn up presumably on a Latin basis, will probably prove something of a 
hardship to our merchants, reared and nurtured on Anglo-Saxon Common 
Law which, as I reminded the late Prince, is peculiar to the United States of 
America as well as to Great Britain.88 
 
Drafting a civil and commercial code satisfactory to all the major powers was a 
formidable task. An original code would be more vulnerable to criticism. For Plod, 
the adoption of the copying method and adherence to the Japanese example seemed 
to be the safest option at least on the grounds that it offered protection from 
conceptual challenges. Plod told the interviewers that: 
 
Following completion of the drafting of [the Code of 1925] but before 
promulgation, the British Embassy remonstrated fiercely with the Siamese 
government. Despite being an ex-student of the English law school myself, 
I was outraged by their action. They tried to block promulgation and 
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criticised several provisions as conceptually incorrect…That is why we 
must have defended our work from their criticism. I told them that the 
provisions they challenged were not the products of my wisdom but the 
products of the copying. My argument could silence them. At the time, 
Great Britain had already protested the draft of the new code. The French 
protest was imminent. I told them that if the new provisions were not 
workable then our model laws, namely German law and Japanese law, 
would not be workable too…The British wanted us to adopt the common 
law system fully. I told them that it was not possible because that mission 
would take ages to complete. We better adopted codification because we 
could write something down and copy from others, which was not too 
difficult for us.89 [My translation] 
2.2 Materials 
Legal materials are vitally important for legal borrowing not only because they are 
sources of legal knowledge, but they are also the object of borrowing and more 
specifically the object of copying. This is exemplified by the use of legal materials in 
the making of the Code of 1925 where the draftsmen consulted a number of English 
publications of foreign law not only as a source of knowledge but also as linguistic 
models for the provisions of the Code. Plod repeatedly affirmed that the Code of 
1925 was principally copied. To assess whether they focused on the principles 
behind the model rules or uncritically copied the wording of the printed rules, the 
materials the draftsmen consulted for the drafting of Code of 1925 need to be 
considered. The use of legal materials is crucial to legal borrowing and may affect 
the success of legal borrowing in Thailand, which is to be discussed in subsequent 
chapters.  
 In the English draft of the Code of 1925, each provision contained a reference 
note which shows which foreign provisions were used as the models.90 In the Book 
of the Revised Drafts, there is a list of abbreviations for foreign statutes and legal 
sources which were used in the references attached to each English draft of the 
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A.   Australian Civil Code 
 Arg.   Argentine Civil Code 
 Arg. Com.  Argentine Commercial Code 
 B. of Ex. Act.  Bill of Exchange Act 1882 
    45 & 46 Vict. C. 16 
 Becker Com.  The Principles and Practice of the Civil Code of  
Japan by J. E. De Becker 
 Brazil. (Er.)  Civil Code of Brazil 
 Brazil Com.  Commercial Code of Brazil 
 Fr.   French Civil Code 
 F.C.P.   French Civil Code of Procedure 
 F. C. P.   French Commercial Code 
 G.   German Civil Code 
 G. C. P.  German Code of Civil Procedure 
 G. Com.  German Commercial Code 
 It.   Italian Civil Code 
 It. Com.  Italian Commercial Code 
 J.   Japanese Civil Code 
 J. Com.  Japanese Commercial Code 
 Jenk’s   Jenk’s Digest of English Civil Law 
 Old text.  The Siamese Text of B.E. 2466 (1923) 
 Plan.   Traité [é]lémentaire de [d]roit [c]ivil 
 Sch.   The Principles of German Civil Law by  
    J. E. Schuster 
 S. C. (S.)  Swiss Civil Code 
 S. O.   Swiss Code of Obligations 
 Section.  Section in the text of revision 
 C/P   Compare 
 Baud.    Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil 
    par G. Baudry-Lacantinerie  
 Huebner  The History of Germanic Private Law  
    by Rudolph Huebner91 
 
Since the German and Japanese Civil Codes were adopted as the principal models 
for the drafting of the Code of 1925, the focus of this research is therefore on the 
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publications which relate to these two legal systems and which were consulted by 
the draftsmen. This is also consistent with Plod’s interviews in which he mentioned 
only books which were associated with German and Japanese law.92 
 The publications on German and Japanese law used by the draftsmen were 
codes of law, namely the German Civil Code, the German Code of Civil Procedure, 
the German Commercial Code, the Japanese Civil Code and the Japanese 
Commercial Code and commentaries on the German and Japanese Civil Codes, 
namely The Principles of German Civil Law by Ernst Schuster and The Principles and 
Practice of the Civil Code of Japan and the first and second volumes of Annotated Civil 
Code of Japan by De Becker all of which were published in English. Rudolph 
Huebner’s The History of Germanic Private Law, which deals with the history of 
German private law was also consulted.93 It is not clear which English translations 
of the German Code of Civil Procedure, the German Commercial Code and the 
Japanese Commercial Code were used by the Thai draftsmen as the minutes of the 
drafting committee meetings and Plod’s interview accounts did not provide clues 
about them. It is, however, certain that the draftsmen used Chung Hui Wang’s The 
German Civil Code: Translated and Annotated published in 1907 and De Becker’s 
Annotated Civil Code of Japan Volumes I and II published in 1909 as the main English 
translations of the German and Japanese Civil Codes.94 
 Plod’s interviews reveal interesting facts about the use of Wang’s and De 
Becker’s books. Plod said that the copying method was employed mainly with the 
help of these two books.95 Their significance extended beyond the mere principal 
sources of knowledge of German and Japanese civil law. The minutes of some of the 
draftsmen’s meetings show that some parts of the books were even used to 
construct a number of provisions of the Code of 1925. For example, in drafting 
Article 8 concerning the definition of force majeure, the draftsmen excerpted the 
summary of a Japanese Supreme Court’s decision from De Becker’s The Principles 
and Practice of the Civil Code of Japan, which the draftsmen thought explained the 
concept well.96 Similarly, in drafting Article 210 concerning the creditor’s default in 
the case of reciprocal obligations, the draftsmen initially agreed that Schuster’s 
commentary on Article 298 of the BGB was more articulate than Wang’s translation 
                                                      
92 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 8–9. 
93 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’, 13; ‘Meeting Minutes’ (24 July 1925) 3.  
94 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 8-9; ‘Meeting Minutes’ (1 June 1925) 2. See Table 6-3, pp 179-81. 
95 Manavarajasevi, ibid 9. 
96 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (13 March 1925) 3. See also JE de Becker, The Principles and Practice of the 
Civil Code of Japan: A Complete Theoretical and Practical Exposition of the Motifs of the Japanese 
Civil Code (Butterworth 1921) 210. 
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in The German Civil Code: Translated and Annotated and therefore copied the wordings 
from Schuster.97 However, on 28 August 1925, after reviewing the draft of this 
provision, the drafting committee found that the phrase ‘the required counter-
performance’ was missing from Schuster and consequently overturned its original 
decision and decided to copy from Wang’s translation of Section 298 of the BGB 
instead.98 The Book of the Revised Drafts consistently shows wording of Article 210 




Texts of the models 
 
Texts of the drafts 
Original draft of 
Article 210  
 
(attached to the 
minutes of the 
meeting of 22 
August 1925) 
In case of reciprocal obligations 
the creditor is in mora if he is 
willing to accept the other party’s 
performance, but fails to tender 
performance on his part.100 
(Schuster) 
In case of reciprocal obligations 
the creditor is in default if he is 
willing to accept the other party’s 
performance, but fails to tender 
performance on his part.101  
(Original draft of Article 210) 
Revised draft of 
Article 210  
 
(contained in the 
Book of the 
Revised Drafts) 
If the debtor is bound to perform 
his part only upon counter-
performance by the creditor, the 
creditor is in default if, though 
prepared to accept the 
performance tendered, he does 
not offer the required counter-
performance.102  
(Wang) 
If the debtor is bound to perform 
his part only upon counter-
performance by the creditor, the 
creditor is in default if, though 
prepared to accept the 
performance tendered, he does 
not offer the required counter-
performance.103 
(Revised draft of Article 210) 
Table 3 - 1: Comparisons between the texts of the original and revised drafts of Article 
210 and their models 
 
                                                      
97 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (22 August 1925) 2-3. See also Chung Hui Wang, The German Civil Code: 
Translated and Annotated (Stevens and Sons 1907) 161; Ernest J Schuster, The Principles of 
German Civil Law (Clarendon Press 1907) 161. 
98 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (28 August 1925) 3.  
99 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’, 108.  
100 Schuster, Principles 161. 
101 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (22 August 1925) 6.  
102 Wang, German Civil Code 67. 
103 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’, 108.  
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 Among the publications on the BGB and Minpō of 1898, De Becker’s works, 
especially Annotated Civil Code of Japan, deserve careful scrutiny. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the Thai draftsmen relied heavily on De Becker’s books for 
understanding Japanese civil law and copying the English translation of Minpō 
provisions. Plod confirmed the importance of Annotated Civil Code of Japan: 
 
In employing the copying method, we looked at two publications of the 
Japanese code...De Becker’s books were very helpful in this.104 [My 
translation] 
 
Although Plod did not name the books of De Becker which were used by the Thai 
draftsmen, there is no doubt that the two publications of the Japanese Code Plod 
meant are Volumes I and II of De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan. 
 Second, De Becker’s commentary on the Minpō of 1898 was a product of the 
complicated reception of foreign law in Japan. This will be thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter 5 below.105 De Becker, an English-born lawyer, who resided in Japan from 
the late 1880s, produced various works on Japanese law.106 His series of Annotated 
Civil Code of Japan of 1909, consisting of four volumes, and The Principles and Practice 
of the Civil Code of Japan of 1921 have been particularly regarded as key to the 
English-speaking world’s understanding of Japanese civil law.107 De Becker’s 
Annotated Civil Code of Japan is significant because it was one of the earliest 
translations into English. This work offers extensive commentaries on each Japanese 
provision which includes references to foreign provisions. De Becker did not reveal 
the purpose of having these references attached to the translation of each Japanese 
provision. For example, on Article 415, he wrote: 
 
When the debtor does not perform the obligation in accordance with the 
true intent and purpose of the same (in forma specifica), the creditor may 
demand compensation for accruing damage. The same applies when 
performance has become impossible owing to a cause attributable to the 
debtor. 
(In reference vide Art. 414; also Arts. 250, 286 and 325 of the German Civil 
Code)108 [My emphasis] 
 
                                                      
104 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 9. 
105 See 1.2.3 ‘The tracing of De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan and examining of Plod’s 
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This referencing has potentially made the reader believe that the provisions to 
which were referred were the models of the Japanese provision in question. It seems 
that Plod was led into believing so. Plod referred to De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code 
of Japan and remarked that 
 
The Japanese did not conceal the sources; they expressly told us where each 
provision came from.109 [My translation] 
 
On another occasion, he said: 
 
About how Hozumi adopted the BGB, he simply copied it. When the 
Japanese drafted their Civil Code, they had the list of references included 
in the draft.110 [My translation] 
 
This method of referencing most likely inspired Plod to do the same thing – that is 
to write down the foreign sources of each Thai provision.111 The question is whether 
the Japanese draftsmen really did reveal the source of law and statutes that they 
consulted.  
 More interestingly, for almost all of the Minpō provisions, De Becker only 
refers to the BGB or cross-refers to provisions of other Japanese statutes. Contrary to 
De Becker’s adherence to German law and Plod’s remark above, Nobushige 
Hozumi (1856-1926), one of the draftsmen of the Minpō of 1898, pointed out that the 
Code was modelled not only on the BGB but also on many other systems of law, 
including the French Code civil, English common law, the Swiss Federal Code of 
Obligations, the Spanish Civil Code, the Property Code of Montenegro, the Indian 
Succession and Contract Acts and the Civil Code of Louisiana.112 This throws doubt 
on Plod’s conception of the reception of German law in Japan – that is whether 
German law was the only foreign source of the Minpō provisions as showed in De 
Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan. Because of the concentration of German law in 
De Becker’s books, one may suspect that in relying on them Plod was led into 
believing that the Minpō of 1898 was a copy of the BGB. A historical inquiry of these 
questions is crucial to our understanding of legal borrowing in Thailand and 
therefore will be made in the next two chapters. 
                                                      
109 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 9. 
110 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 23. 
111 See eg Figure 3-1, p 102 above. 
112 Nobushige Hozumi, The New Japanese Civil Code as Material for the Study of Comparative 
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2.3 An overview of the drafting process 
The discussions of the methods and materials used in the drafting of the Code of 
1925 give us a rough idea of how foreign law was borrowed, but to have a full 
picture of legal borrowing in Thailand one needs to see the drafting process 
holistically.  
 In the drafting of Books I and II of the Code of 1925, there were two main 
organisations involved, namely the Committee of Legislation of the Department of 
Legislative Redaction (the drafting committee) and the High Revising Committee, 
an independent, ad hoc government body. The former consisted of legal experts as 
discussed above while members of the later were princes and nobles most of who 
were cabinet ministers or head of departments without legal backgrounds. The 
work of codification was therefore concentrated in the drafting committee while the 
revisers focused on linguistic revisions and translations. Most of the existing 
evidence concerning codification shows how the draftsmen worked, but only some 
of it provides clues about how the revisers carried out their task. Unfortunately, 
there are no records for the meetings of High Revising Committee. 
 The meetings of the drafting committee were often attended by three Thai 
members, Chitr, Boonchoi and Plod, and two French members, De Planterose and 
Cazeau as well as a few Thai assistants, for example Laung Sarasaspraphan. Chitr 
always presided over the meetings and Plod in addition to participating as a 
member took care of administrative work and acted as the coordinator between the 
drafting committee and the High Revising Committee.113 The draftsmen began work 
on the new Books I and II on 3 March 1925. At the first meeting, they discussed the 
framework for the drafting of the Code of 1925 and, after long debate, decided to 
review the Code of 1923 article by article. The draftsmen did not meet in April. The 
drafting work resumed in May and continued until 26 October,114 in which the last 
draft of Book II was completed. According to the minutes of the meetings, the 
draftsmen principally relied on two foreign codes – the BGB and the Minpō of 1898. 
They used the English drafts of Books I and II of the old Code of 1923 as the basis 
                                                      
113 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (25 May 1925). Plod often contacted the High Revising Committee on 
behalf of the drafting committee. See Book of the Revised Drafts. He also instructed 
Department of Legislative Redaction officials to compile and index the documents relevant 
to the work of codification. See Plod, Interviews 19, 50. 
114 The draftsmen met twelve times in March, twice in May, thirteen times in June, seventeen 
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in October 1925. See the minutes of the draftsmen between 3 March 1925 and 26 October 
1925.  
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for Books I and II of the Code of 1925 and examined them article by article.115 They 
compared the drafts of the former Thai Code with the English translations of the 
BGB and Minpō, written by Wang and De Becker respectively. Most of the Code of 
1925 rules were newly imported from the BGB and Minpō. Swiss law appeared to 
be another popular foreign model after German and Japanese law while some other 
foreign laws, such as the Civil Code of Brazil, were also taken into account but 
minimally.116 The old articles which were consistent with the German and Japanese 
Codes were preserved (although revised) while those that were inconsistent were 
removed. Some provisions, which were products of French jurisprudence, were 
kept when they were consistent with the German and Japanese rules, but the Thai 
draftsmen, who were critical of the French Code, avoided adopting any new French 
rules. Some old articles which originated from Swiss law were also spared but all 
amended, for example Article 4 concerning juristic methods, which was copied from 
Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code.117 At the end of the meeting on 25 May, the 
draftsmen obtained a draft of a number of first provisions for the new Code which 
was in total disarray. As a result, the meeting tasked Plod with reorganising the 
draft in accordance with the Minpō of 1898.118 It can be concluded that none of the 
articles of the Code of 1923 were retained in their original form; they were removed, 
combined, altered or moved to other parts of the Code in accordance with the 
structures and contents of the German and Japanese Civil Codes. 
 The nature of the discussions in the meetings of the Committee of Legislation 
also deserves careful consideration. Although they appear to be summarised and 
therefore do not record full details of the discussions, the minutes of the meeting 
present a general picture of what the draftsmen had discussed and what they did. It 
is unfair to conclude that the draftsmen neglected to pay attention to the principles 
behind the rules. However, the way they looked into the principle behind a rule on 
which a Thai provision was modelled casts doubts on their methodology. The 
meeting reports suggest that, when examining whether the provisions of the Code 
of 1923 were consistent with the German and Japanese Codes, the draftsmen 
concentrated their attention on linguistics rather than other aspects of the rules. 
They did not discuss, for example, the sources of the Japanese model’s rules or how 
they had developed. They were often satisfied with the Thai rules provided that 
their wordings were in line with those of Japanese and German provisions. When it 
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came to a choice between German and Japanese provisions, whichever was 
linguistically superior prevailed; the draftsmen chose the clearer and more concise 
one. For example, at the meeting on 18 August they considered Article 401 of the 
Minpō, which concerns the situations where the subject of obligation is indicated by 
its kind (species) only. Plod proposed that because the wordings of the Japanese law 
were excessively long the draftsmen should draft the rule following the wordings of 
s 243 BGB instead. The meeting accepted this proposal.119 
 It is noteworthy that in their presence Guyon and Laung Sarasaspraphan, the 
recorder, had an equal voice to that of the draftsmen.120 The drafting committee had 
lively debates over the theoretical foundations of the provisions concerned since 
both of them seemed to champion French law while being more cautious about 
adopting German law. It is also interesting to note that, after the drafting of the 
Code of 1925 resumed in May, Guyon began to be absent from the meetings while 
Laung Sarasaspraphan continued attending but with abstention from debating. 
Laung Sarasaspraphan was absent from the meetings after 10 June, and another 
Thai official replaced him as recorder. This replacement acted as a mere 
administrative officer and did not participate in the discussions. 
 On rare occasions, the draftsmen amended the wording they copied from the 
foreign models to suit the needs of the Thai people. For example, on 22 August, the 
meeting reconsidered a provision concerning Effect of Obligations drafted in the 
previous meeting. Cazeau suggested that the article was still imperfect and 
therefore needed to be amended in accordance with Article 269 of the Civil Code of 
Tunisia and that the notice which the creditor had to give to the debtor to perform 
his obligation within a reasonable time should be in writing. Chitr, chair of the 
meeting, adopted his suggestion about copying the Tunisian provision but argued 
that a written notice might be impractical for some groups of Thai people, especially 
those who were not able to write and those who lived in the suburbs. The meeting 
favoured Chitr’s argument.121 
 After completing a certain number of provisions in English, the draftsmen 
submitted the complete draft to the High Revising Committee. The first submission 
of the draft of the first sixty-seven articles took place on 18 July,122 and by 28 July the 
High Revising Committee completed examining the draft and translating it into 
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Thai.123 It is not surprising that the revisers spent less than two weeks examining 
and translating sixty-seven provisions. This is because they were busy senior 
government officers, mostly cabinet ministers without legal backgrounds.124 This 
may also explain why, in every meeting of the revisers, a draftsman was required to 
be present to provide explanations regarding the draft when needed125 and why 
they only made some minor linguistic corrections on the English drafts. For example, 
when examining the draft of Articles 163 to 81, the revisers only removed one word 
from Article 165.126    
 The High Revising Committee initially expected to receive both the English 
draft and its Thai translation.127 However, most likely due to miscommunication 
between the two organisations, the first English draft without the Thai translation 
was sent. To avoid delay, the revisers decided to translate the draft into Thai 
themselves, and for reason of consistency they kept this practice until they finished 
examining Book I. The codification work on Book II was slightly different. Plod 
instructed one of his assistants to translate the English draft of some first provisions 
of Book II128 and submitted the Thai translation along with the original draft to 
Prince Paribatra, who was satisfied with Plod’s initiative and thus asked Plod to 
keep providing the revisers with both English and Thai versions of the drafts to 
correct.129  
CONCLUSION 
The adoption of the copying method in the drafting of the Code of 1925 was 
influenced by external and internal factors. The external factor was worsening 
consular jurisdiction while the internal was conscientiousness of lawmakers and the 
draftsmen, notably Plod, who were instrumental in setting aside the Code of 1923 
and introducing the Japanese model to the ruling elites. The examination of the 
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drafting process reaffirms that the reception of foreign private law in the Thai Code 
is a perfect example of Alan Watson’s legal transplants: the draftsmen’s main 
concern was the copying of the texts of the rules and they did not investigate the 
principles behind the legal rules they copied. The draftsmen put their trust in the 
English publications of the German and Japanese Civil Codes, especially De 
Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan, which led Plod into believing that the Minpō 
of 1898 was a reflection of the BGB. But the question is ‘is this belief correct?’. We 
will find the answer in the next three chapters which examine legal borrowing 
specifically and will also examine whether Watson’s claim that successful legal 









THE GERMAN CONCEPT OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE   
INTRODUCTION 
Two important facts about the drafting of the Civil and Commercial Code of 1925 
(‘Code of 1925’) were considered in Chapter 3 above. First, when drafting the Code 
of 1925, the draftsmen copied English translations of foreign provisions. Second, the 
BGB was the main model for the Thai Code, but the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 
(‘Minpō of 1898’) was also heavily relied upon because of Plod’s belief that it was a 
copy of the German Code. These findings have provided a general idea of how legal 
borrowing took place in Thailand in 1925. However, the examination of the 
borrowing of foreign law is not the only aim of this thesis. It also seeks to discover 
the consequences of the use of the copying method, or in other words the success of 
reception to examine particularly whether Alan Watson’s contention that a 
successful legal transplant does not require ‘a systematic knowledge of the law’ is 
correct. The success of reception cannot be determined only from the general 
investigation of the drafting process conducted in Chapter 3 but also requires a 
thorough exploration of the reception of each rule or concept of the Code of 1925. To 
investigate every provision or every concept is, however, not a possible approach 
within the context of a PhD thesis. This thesis therefore selects a particular example 
as a case study, namely specific performance. The results obtained from the research 
on this case study will provide not only the answer to the question about whether 
the reception of the concept of specific performance was successful but will also 
contribute a wider picture of the development of the law which was borrowed. 
 Since the BGB provided the principal blueprint for the Code of 1925, the 
research on the reception of specific performance and the success of reception 
begins with the German concept of specific performance. This is based on the 
presumption that the German concept of specific performance, including the 
relevant rules in the BGB, were used by the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 as the 
principal model for the Thai rules of specific performance. However, they did not 
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simply copy the entire system of breach of contract directly from German law. Some 
provisions were copied indirectly from Japanese law. The Japanese concept of 
specific performance will be examined in the next chapter. The concept of specific 
performance has been chosen as the subject of this research because it is not only 
one of the defining distinctions between civil law and common law but because 
there are also differences within the civil law family. John Dawson observed that 
‘the contrast between the French and the German treatment of specific performance 
is one among many demonstrations of the great differences between the ‘civil law’ 
system’.1 In Germany, the primacy of specific performance has long been upheld,2 
and it was not undermined by the reform of the German law of obligations, mainly 
breach of contract, in 2002.3 This distinctiveness of the German concept of specific 
performance will pave the way for the examination of the consequences of reception 
in Chapter 6 in the sense that the distinction between major legal systems regarding 
specific performance makes it easier to identify which legal tradition the Thai 
concept of specific performance has followed. 
 This chapter therefore explores the historical development of the primacy of 
specific performance in German law mainly until 1925 and enquires whether 
knowledge about this principle was available to the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 
when they drafted the provisions concerning specific performance. Since their 
principal source of knowledge of the BGB was Ernest Schuster’s book The Principles 
of German Civil Law,4 it will be the subject of this enquiry, which will help us 
ascertain in Chapter 6 whether the draftsmen had knowledge of these foreign rules 
of specific performance when they copied them. Although Chapter 3 above showed 
that the focus of the drafting was on the text of the rules and not the principles 
behind them, this does not provide definite proof that the draftsmen blindly copied 
foreign rules concerning specific performance.   
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1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THE GERMAN LEGAL 
TRADITION PRIOR TO THE BGB  
1.1 Specific Performance in Roman law and the ius commune  
The BGB was the product of Pandectism, the dominant German school of legal 
thought in the nineteenth century.5 Since the main interest of the Pandectists was to 
develop systems and concepts out of the substantive ius commune,6 the BGB can be 
considered a product of the reception of Roman law in Germany, which, in Franz 
Wieacker’s terminology, may be called ‘the intellectualization of German law’.7 It 
should be borne in mind that this process was not an isolated event in European 
legal history but in fact part of the whole European movement of 
intellectualisation.8 This European movement began after the rediscovery of 
Justinian’s Digest in Italy in the eleventh century, which resulted in a renewed 
interest in the studies of Roman law. From the twelfth century, Bologna became the 
learning centre of Roman law, which attracted thousands of students across 
Europe.9 These students returned to their homelands with common learned law and 
legal methodology. This ‘historical process…gradually soldered differing people 
together into one cultural and professional amalgam by means of a common 
method based in the use of one language – Latin – and by an appeal to common 
legal concepts, doctrines, and institutions’.10 It is this process carried out by German 
learned men that caused, in Germany, ‘an almost revolutionary change in legal 
personnel, legal education, legal thinking, in trials, judicature, and most written 
sources of law’.11 Since the reception of Roman law in Germany was part of 
European legal development, to understand the legal rules of the BGB we need to 
understand their development in European legal history. However, this thesis does 
not intend to repeat well-documented sudies on the development of specific 
                                                      
5 Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe: With Particular Reference to Germany 
(Tony Weir tr, Clarendon Press 1996) 376, 379; Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative 
Law 144; Arthur von Mehren and James Russell Gordley, The Civil Law System: An 
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (2nd edn, Little, Brown 1977) 78. 
6 Wieacker, ibid 341. 
7 ibid 95. 
8 Paul Koschaker, Europa und das ro ̈mische Recht (4th edn, CH Beck 1966) 142; Wolfgang 
Kunkel, ‘The Reception of Roman Law in Germany: An Interpretation’ in Gerald Strauss (ed), 
Pre-Reformation Germany (Macmillan 1972) 265; Wieacker, History of Private Law 97. 
9 Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History (CUP 1999) 52. 
10 Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000-1800 (Lydia G Cochrane tr, Catholic 
University of America Press 1995) 219. 
11 Wieacker, History of Private Law 97. 
 125 
performance in European legal history, for example Tilman Repgen’s Vertragstreue 
und Erfüllungszwang in der mittelalterlichen Rechtswissenschaft, The Right to Specific 
Performance: the Historical Development edited by Jan Hallebeek and Harry Dondorp, 
and Janwillem Oosterhuis’s Specific Performance in German, French and Dutch Law in 
the Nineteenth Century. Instead, it provides an overview of the historical basis of the 
German concept of specific performance before discussing the rules of specific 
performance in the BGB. 
 Whether specific performance existed in classical Roman law is a matter of 
controversy. Many scholars hold the view that damages were the only remedy 
available for non-performance, owing to the nature of the formulary procedure, and 
therefore conclude that specific performance was not recognised under Roman 
law.12 Laurens Winkel, however, has argued that specific performance existed in 
Roman society long before the time of Justinian.13 It was, at least, used as a 
procedural means to enforce a court decision that the debtor could be temporarily 
enslaved until he performed his duty.14 However, the development of the Roman 
concept of specific performance seems to be significantly determined by changing 
economic conditions.15 After the introduction of the use of coined money to the 
Roman Empire around 200 BC, the use of specific performance became much less 
evident.16 As specific performance was in decline, the principle of condemnatio 
pecuniaria, a condemnation to pay a sum of money, came to the fore. Under the 
formulary system of Roman procedure, every action had a formula which could be 
found in the Praetorian Edict. The final part of the formula, known as the condemnatio, 
directed the judge to decide the case.17 According to the principle of condemnatio 
pecuniaria, ‘every judgement for a performance had to be for a definite sum of 
money’.18 The logic behind this principle may be that a Roman citizen could not lose 
his freedom merely because he did not fulfil his obligations and ‘by fixing an exact 
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amount for ransom, anybody who could raise this sum, was to be enabled to 
liberate the debtor’.19 A confirmation of the existence of this remedy is a text of 
Gaius, Institute Iv.48, which states that damages were the only remedy for non-
performance under classical Roman law.20 Gaius’s statement is, however, 
contradicted by a controversial text of Ulpian, D. 6.1.68, which was produced 
around fifty years later. This text suggests that specific performance was available at 
the time.21 The origin of this text is a matter of controversy. Since Justinian’s 
compilers revised it to express common practice at the time,22 some scholars suggest 
that the text was interpolated by Justinian, and therefore it may not reflect the actual 
situation at the time of Ulpian.23 Following the inflation problem which the Roman 
Empire experienced during the post-classical era,24 specific performance was 
reintroduced to replace damages. Around 342 AD, the Roman system of procedure 
changed from the formulary system to the cognitio procedure.25 Max Kaser 
contended that under this new procedure, ‘the principle of condemnatio pecuniaria 
was no longer valid; judgement could also be for performance other than payments 
of money, and such performance was directly enforced by exectution’.26 This theory 
and especially Kaser’s reference to the texts C. 7.4.17, C. 6.2.22.3, C. 7.54.3.3 and C. 
7.39.8.327 as proof of the dominance of specific performance and the abolition of the 
principle of condemnatio pecuniaria in Justinian law were rejected by Winkel, who 
argued that damages were still in use during Justinian’s time.28  
                                                      
19 Kaser, ibid. 
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in a money estimate; and even if our claim be for some corpus, – land, a slave, a garment, 
gold, silver, the judge does not condemn the defender in the thing itself, as used to be done 
under the older system but, having put a value upon it, condemns him in money. Gaius and 
Ulpian, The Institutes of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian: The Former from Studemund’s Apograph of the 
Verona Codex (James Muirhead tr, T&T Clark 1895) 294. 
21 [D. 6.1.68 Ulpian, Edict, book 51] A party is ordered by the judge to hand something over, 
does not obey, and claims that he is unable to do so. If, indeed, he has the thing, then he is 
dispossessed by armed forced at the judge’s direction, and the judgment against him is 
restricted to profits and matters arising out of the action. Theodor Mommsen and Paul 
Krueger, The Digest of Justinian, vol 1 (Alan Watson tr, Penn Press 1985) 210–11. See also 
Winkel, ‘Specific Performance’ 11. 
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 Whether condemnatio pecuniaria continued to exist during Justinian era and 
specific performance was the only remedy under the Corpus iuris civilis is debatable, 
but what is certain about these two concepts is they were not systematised by 
Justinian’s compilers and their relationship was not the same as it is today.29 In 
Justinian’s law the nature of these two remedies was procedural, and they 
concerned ‘the issue of enforcement’.30 One may think that the Roman concept of 
specific performance is a crudely primitive form of the modern one, but if Roman 
law lays the foundations for the German concept of specific performance there must 
be a fundamental change in concept that makes the Roman and German rules of 
specific performance greatly different.  
 The revival of the study of Roman law by the glossators of Bologna in the late 
eleventh century marked the new era of European legal studies.31 ‘European 
jurisprudence and the continental legal tradition emerged within the context of the 
twelfth century’.32 The glossators ‘regarded Justinian’s texts as sacred and ascribed 
to them almost biblical authority’.33 They believed that they contained no 
contradictions and that they provided the solutions to all legal problems.34 Their 
duty was thus to explain and expound the texts of Roman law.35 The glossators tried 
to ‘build them into a coherent doctrinal structure’36 while the correction of the 
corrupt texts was not their concern.37 The study of Roman law by the glossators and 
growth of canon law laid the foundations for European legal science, which led to 
common legal tradition and common law of Europe, the ius commune.38 The 
development of the ius commune nurtured the conceptualisation and systematisation 
of specific performance. 
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 Despite the fact that the Corpus iuris appears to treat specific performance as a 
procedural means, the glossators discussed it as an issue of substantive law39 which 
revolved around the contract of sale.40 On the question of a transfer of ownership, 
they all seemed to agree that the creditor must claim for specific performance, not 
damages41 but held different views on the question of the delivery of the object 
sold42 due to the fact that this obligation could be categorised as the obligation to do 
something. Based on D. 42.1.13.1, 43 most of the leading glossators rejected specific 
performance as the enforcement of delivery.44 However, a leading glossator 
Martinus (around 1100-67) maintained that the creditor could enforce the vendor to 
perform his duty specifically on the ground of equity ‘– equity being a corrective to 
a general rule found in the Corpus juris, viz. that a debtor discharges his obligation to 
do by paying damages’.45 As for obligations to do something, D. 42.1.13.1 merely 
provided a source of discussion of whether the debtor could choose damages over 
specific performance, but there was no general rule that acts must be resolved in 
damages, such as the concept nemo praecise cogi potest ad factum, which was 
developed in France in at the beginning of the seventeenth century.46 Other leading 
glossators, notably Azo (1190-1220) and Accursius (around 1182-1260), were of the 
opinion that, if the law permitted, damages could be sought as an exception to the 
general rule that obligations to do something must be enforced specifically.47 
 Although they continued the work of glossators, the commentators used a 
different method to study the texts of the Corpus iuris: they wrote in-depth 
commentaries on every part of the code of Justinian but added personal legal 
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opinions (consilia) on numerous practical questions.48 One of the best known 
commentators is Bartolus (1314-57) who reinforced the distinction between 
obligations to give and obligations to do.49 Bartolus adopted this distinction to 
explain the availability of specific performance.50 Before his time, there was ‘no 
fundamental distinction between contractual obligations and other duties’ in the ius 
commune51 since medieval jurists adopted different approaches to distinguishing 
situations where specific performance was available. Bartolus brought ‘the various 
distinctions together in a single, coherent system’.52 According to Dawson, ‘the 
authority of Bartolus was so enormous that his adoption of this distinction… made 
it a familiar part of civilian doctrine thereafter’.53 Regarding obligations to do 
something, Bartolus distinguished between being bound by law, by testament and 
by agreement. The obligations of the first two types were to be performed 
specifically while contractual obligations could be discharged by payment of 
damages54 on the grounds that ‘when the debtor was in default of his contractual 
obligation to do something the law added an obligation to pay damages to this main 
obligation, and upon payment the creditor had obtained his interest in the contract 
after all’.55 However, Bartolus, like most of the glossators, viewed an obligation to 
deliver the object sold as an obligation to do something, but he explained that, 
because it could also be regarded as an obligation to transfer the ownership, the 
vendor was specifically obliged to make delivery.56 Although his contemporaries 
and followers did not always agree on his interpretation of the Roman rules of 
specific performance,57 Bartolus left at least two important legacies for subsequent 
development of specific performance: the adoption of the distinction between 
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obligations to give and obligations to do to explain specific performance and the 
general rule that obligations to do resolves themselves into damages.58 
 By the end of the fifteenth century the ius commune developed by Bartolus and 
his followers, had expanded throughout Europe with the help of university 
professors and trained jurists who were increasing in number.59 Subsequent debate 
about specific performance in the ius commune revolved around Bartolus’s legacy. In 
1601 the maxim nemo praecise potest cogi ad factum was coined by a French jurist 
Antoine Favre (1557-1624). Favre explained that ‘[t]o justify the principle that one 
cannot be forced to an act – precise [sic] expresses that the debtor cannot choose to 
pay damages instead…acts cannot be enforced without the use of physical force 
against the debtor; hence a payment of damages succeeds the obligation to do 
something’.60 Since then this maxim became a focus of debate on specific 
performance in the ius commune.61 Jurists held different views on specific 
performance throughout the early modern period, but no view proved to be as 
influential as that of the French jurist Robert Joseph Pothier (1699-1772) whose 
works, a product of ‘the application of rationalistic methods to existing law, in 
particular Roman law and customary law’,62 provided the foundation for the French 
Code civil of 1804.63 The Code’s influence extended beyond the French territories and 
its promulgation ‘was also a major event in the history of German private law’ as 
several German states, such as the Rhineland and Baden, later enacted their own 
law modelled on it.64  
 Most of the rules concerning the law of obligations, including those relating to 
specific performance, in the Code civil derived from the works of Pothier.65 Pothier 
drew a basic distinction between obligations to give and obligations to do and not to 
do.66  For obligations to give, the creditor has the right to compel the debtor to 
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perform his duty specifically67 while for obligations to do and not to do the creditor 
could only claim damages. Pothier wrote: 
 
When a person is obliged to do any act, this obligation does not give the 
creditor a right of compelling the debtor specifically to perform the act 
which he is obliged to do, but only a right to have him condemned in 
damages for not performing his obligation. To this obligation of damages, 
all obligations of doing any act may be resolved, for nemo potest praecise cogi 
ad factum…When a person is obliged not to do any act, the right which this 
obligation gives the creditor, is that of proceeding against the debtor, in 
case of his contravening the obligation to recover the damages, arising from 
such contravention.68 
 
Pothier’s conception of the maxim nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum was readily 
accepted by the French draftsmen and legislative body and was incorporated into 
the French Code.69 It is reflected in Article 1142 that obligations to do and not to do 
resolved themselves into damages.70 To understand why this concept was adopted 
in the Code civil, as John Dawson has pointed out, one needs to consider the political 
climate in France in the late eighteenth century. The French Revolution resulted in 
the spread of liberalism throughout the country and fostered public feeling against 
arbitrary power, including distrust of the judicial powers of judges who were 
controlled by the Parlements, institutions of noble and bourgeois privileges, under 
the ancient régime.71 Pothier’s influence also extended to the next two provisions 
concerning obligations to do and not to do (Articles 114372 and 114473).74 His 
conception of performance was that the enforcement of performance varied 
depending upon types of obligations.75 This was consistent with his recognition of 
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the distinction of obligations, which was also adopted in establishing Article 112676 
and became a fundamental principle of the French law of obligations.77 Article 1142 
appears to effectively place specific performance and damages in equal positions. 
However, in the drafting the rules concerning performance, the French draftsmen 
did not rely solely on Pothier, they also looked at theories of other jurists, notably 
Jean Domat (1625-96). Domat’s conception of performance, borrowed in drafting 
Article 1134,78 can be compared with s 241 BGB. It states: 
 
        Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those 
who have made them.  
        They may be revoked only by mutual consent, or for causes 
authorized by law. 
        They must be performed in good faith.79 
  
This article implies that ‘all obligations have to be actually performed regardless of 
their nature’.80 This implication is consistent with Article 1184, which, in case of non-
performance, gives the creditor the right to choose between enforcement of 
performance, where possible, and rescission accompanied with the right to 
compensation for damage. However, rescission can only be sought through court 
judgment.81 Unlike Article 1142, the distinction of obligation is not a consideration 
for determining the right to performance in Article 1184, which implies that the 
debtor can claim performance regardless of the nature of the obligation. The conflict 
between Pothier’s and Domat’s doctrines has polarised the understanding and 
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interpretation of the French concept of specific performance.82 For Marcel Planiol 
(1853-1931), an eminent French jurist and author of a famous series of books on 
French civil law, the creditor’s right to performance is the primary remedy for non-
performance.83 But the existence of Article 1142 meant that the primacy of specific 
performance in French law was not as clear-cut as in German law. This will be 
discussed below. There are still French jurists today who do not agree with Planiol’s 
view. Denis Tallon, a renowned French scholar, for example, argued that ‘it is a 
fundamental rule of French law that all remedies are equivalent and that the 
aggrieved party has a free choice among them’.84 
1.2 The formation of the principle of the primacy of specific performance in Germany 
in the nineteenth century 
While the maxim nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum is the dominant character of the 
French concept of specific performance, in nineteenth-century Germany the notion 
that specific performance was the primary claim for all obligations prevailed in 
most parts of Germany, especially the states where the gemeines Recht applied.85 The 
principle of the primacy of specific performance developed ‘in harmony with the 
socio-economic condition of the German states at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century’,86 and it was fostered by ‘writers of the late usus modernus, Pandectists and 
other legal scholars’.87 Oosterhuis observed that the right economic condition for the 
development of specific performance was the primary remedy for non-performance 
in early nineteenth-century Germany: 
 
 
                                                      
82 See the conflicting notions of specific performance in French law in Laithier, ‘Comparative 
Reflections’ 113–16. See also Solène Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Protection of Performance (OUP 2012) 37-42. 
83 Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law 100, 105. 
84 Denis Tallon, ‘Contract Law’ in George Bermann and Etienne Picard (eds), Introduction to 
French law (Kluwer 2008) 232. 
85 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations 776; Janwillem Oosterhuis, ‘Industrialization and Specific 
Performance in the German Territories during the 19th Century’ in Jan Hallebeek and Harry 
Dondorp (eds), The Right to Specific Performance  : The Historical Development (Intersentia 2010) 
99; Franz Dorn, ‘Begriff des Schuldverhältnisses und Pflichten aus dem Schuldverhältnis’ in 
Mathias Schmoeckel, Joachim Rückert, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Historisch-kritischer 
Kommentar zum BGB: Band II: Schuldrecht: Allgemeiner Teil 1: Teilband: §§ 241-304 (Mohr 
Siebeck 2007) 147-58; Tilman Repgen, ‘§§ 362-371. Erfüllung’ in Mathias Schmoeckel, 
Joachim Rückert, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), ibid 2138. 
86 Oosterhuis, Specific Performance 88–89. See also Dorn, ibid 151-58. 
87 Oosterhuis, ibid 95. 
 134 
all German territories, including for instance Prussia, the Rhineland and 
Baden, had a predominantly agricultural economy; trade and industry only 
existed on a minor scale and did not yet involve the massive transportation 
of new materials and goods. The principal transactions concerned land, 
houses and other specific (species) goods, and not the trade in fungible 
(genus) goods. In such an economy, actual delivery of things to which the 
creditor is entitled was of the utmost importance.88 
 
 Many German scholars viewed specific performance as the normal right 
suitable for all types of obligations and some insisted that it was the creditor’s 
primary remedy for non-peformance.89 In his commentary on the Digest Christian 
Friedrich Glück (1755-1831) stated that ‘on the basis of Natural law everybody who 
had entered into a valid agreement could be coerced to the most precise 
performance of his promises’.90 For Glück the distinction between obligations to 
give and to do was not necessary.91 Some Pandectist writers, such as Johann 
Nepomuk von Wening-Ingenheim (1770-1831),92 Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-
1846),93 and Friedrich Mommsen (1818-92),94 insisted on the primacy of specific 
performance in all situations, including obligations to do. Mommsen in his famous 
text on the law of obligations, the third volume of Beiträge zum Obligationenrecht 
published in 1855, opined that ‘the pecuniary condemnation for claims…in classical 
Roman law…were not relevant to contemporary legal practice’.95 
 Legislative trends towards specific performance in nineteenth century 
Germany can be illustrated by the Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten 
(the General National Law for the Prussian States), which came into effect in 1794. 
According to I.5 s 270, specific performance was recognised as the primary 
remedy.96 It states ‘in general, the debtor has to fulfill his obligation as he 
promises.’97  Christian Friedrich Koch (1798-1872) justified this provision with the 
Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda, which means that the debtor has to fulfil his 
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promise. Koch commented that an obligation could resolve itself into damages and 
interest if specific performance was not possible.98 This general rule covered all 
kinds of obligations including obligations to do and not to do which, according to 
I.5 s 276, could be enforced by legal coercive methods as prescribed by the 
procedural rules.99 The rules concerning enforcement of sentences were contained in 
a separate law, the Revidierte Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung für die Preußischen Staaten of 
1793. This law ‘clearly aimed at achieving actual enforcement of performances of 
acts’.100 However, in 1834, the rules of the Revidierte Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung für 
die Preußischen Staaten with regard to execution of civil sentences, were replaced by 
a new procedural provision, which allowed the creditor to choose between 
performance by the debtor himself, performance by a third party, and damages and 
interest.101 The amendment of 1834 hence effectively undermined the primacy of 
specific performance.  
 Changing political and economic situations in Germany in the nineteenth 
century began to have some effect on the primacy of specific performance. Most 
German states had experienced rapid industrialisation from 1830. Industrial 
production processes played an increasingly important role in the German economy. 
This fundamental economic change affected the position of specific performance as 
the primary remedy. Oosterhuis pointed out that ‘the time factor started to become 
increasingly important…the remedy of actual performance was no longer adequate 
for a buyer needing to receive goods in time’.102 The promulgation of the Allgemeines 
Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code: ‘ADHGB’) in Germany in 
1861 marked the victory of the supporters of the three-choice remedies which was 
modelled on Article 1184 of the Code civil, deemed to keep up with the demand of 
commercial intercourse.103 It recognised all three remedies, specific performance, 
damages and rescission, which were contained in ss 355, 356 and 357 ADHGB. S 355 
ADHGB gives the buyer the right to choose between specific performance, damages 
and rescission if the seller defaults.104 However, according to s 356, if he opts for 
damages or rescission instead of specific performance, the buyer must give to the 
seller some time to perform his duty.105 In case of contracts with the fixed date of 
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delivery, s 357 ADHGB allows the buyer to seek rescission or damages 
immediately.106 Under s 357 ADHGB, specific performance was no longer the 
primary remedy for breach of contract with the fixed date of delivery. In fact, all the 
three remedies were of equal importance. It is noteworthy that the change 
introduced by the ADHGB of 1861 was limited only to the contract of sale. The 
Civilprozeßordnung of 1879 (Code of Civil Procedure: ‘CPO’), which was enforced in 
the entire German Empire,107 confirmed that specific performance was the primary 
remedy for enforcement of obligations to do and not to do something and 
obligations to give generic goods.108 S 774 CPO provided measures to enforce 
obligations to do something, including betrothals.109 As long as the performance 
neither requires special skills from the debtor nor depends solely on his will, the 
debtor can be compelled to perform his obligation by means of money fine or 
detention.110 The same kinds of measures were also adopted in enforcement of 
obligations not to do something as stated in s 775 CPO.111 However, s 774 CPO 
rejected enforcement of matrimonial cohabitation while betrothals were still 
enforceable but only indirectly through compensation. Following the drafting of the 
BGB, which came into effect in 1900, the CPO was amended in the same year. 
Betrothals could no longer be enforced through specific implement.112  
 Despite some economic, social and legislative changes over the course of the 
nineteenth century, by the time that the BGB was enacted, the principle of the 
primacy of specific performance had taken root in Germany. 
2. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THE BGB  
2.1 The primacy of specific performance in the BGB 
The BGB, which came into force in 1900, was the product of Pandectism and is often 
said to have mirrored the social, political and economic situations of Germany at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.113 This German Code had admirers not only in 
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113 Wieacker, History of Private Law 380. 
 137 
the West, where scholars, such as Frederic William Maitland (1850-1906), viewed it 
as ‘a great achievement’114 but also in the East, especially in Japan and Thailand, 
where it provided the basis for their civil codes. However, some were not impressed 
with this product of ‘the deep, exact, and abstract learning of the German Pandectist 
School’.115 According to Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz’s subsequent assessment, 
the BGB  
 
… is not addressed to the citizen at all, but rather to the professional 
lawyer; it deliberately eschews easy comprehensibility and waives all 
claims to educate its reader; instead of dealing with particular cases in a 
clear and concrete manner it adopts throughout an abstract conceptual 
language which the lay-man, and often enough the foreign lawyer as well, 
finds largely incomprehensible, but which the trained expert, after many 
years of familiarity, cannot help admiring for its precision and rigour of 
thought.116 
 
These advantages and disadvantages of the BGB can be illustrated in the provisions 
concerning non-performance and remedies for non-performance. Under the BGB, 
there was neither a unitary concept of breach of contract nor a generalisation about 
the rights of the party aggrieved by non-performance of a contractual obligation.117 
In fact, the BGB only recognised two types of non-performance: where non-
performance was caused by impossibility and where the debtor fails to perform his 
promise because of delay. This structure has followed the authoritative view of 
Frederick Mommsen that all kinds of irregularity of performance could be caused 
either by impossibility or delay.118 The third category, positive breach of contract 
(positive Vertragsverletzungen), had to be developed by the German courts and 
lawyers who soon realised that the there were some forms of non-performance 
which fell outside impossibility and delay.119 This disintegration of the concept of 
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breach of contract in the BGB was thought to result from the influence of the action-
based Roman law system which was used by nineteenth-century German 
Pandectism to provide the basis for the law of obligations.120 As a result, the BGB of 
1900 dealt with contracts one by one creating a considerable number of special rules 
for various typical contractual regimes.121  
 The system of remedies for performance, another legacy of Pandectism, was 
developed from the contract of sale which focused on delivery of a thing. Norbert 
Horn, Hein Kötz and Hans Leser observed that: 
 
Even if there were irregularity in performance, the claim for delivery of the 
thing itself could remain unimpaired. If the specific object could no longer 
be delivered, perhaps because it had been destroyed, the buyer might, as a 
substitute or surrogate, claim damages instead of the thing.122 
  
This statement illustrates a traditional German view of the primacy of specific 
performance in the BGB. However, there is no provision straightforwardly 
expressing the existence of this principle or the recognition of specific performance 
as a remedy for non-performance. One needs to have a systematic knowledge of 
German law of obligations to discover that the recognition of the primacy of specific 
performance is hidden behind a number of provisions since  ‘a number of 
provisions assume its existence’.123 This implicit recognition of specific performance 
reflects a general disadvantage of the BGB (1900) in that it contains several abstract 
rules and principles which those who do not have German private law background 
may find difficult to understand. In drafting s 360 BGB (1900), which concerns the 
right to rescission,124 the Second Commission125 confirmed that performance was the 
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contract parties’ primary concern and therefore in case of non-performance, the 
contract could be rescinded only by law or agreement, not by a unilateral act.126 The 
primacy of performance is also reflected in provisions concerning delayed 
performance. In case of breach of contract caused by delay, the position of specific 
performance as the primary right is not unaffected.127 This is evidenced by the 
concepts of Mahnung and Nachfrist.128 A general rule is that if the debtor is 
responsible for not performing his promise on time (s 285 BGB (1900)),129 the 
creditor can be put in default by means of warning (Mahnung) – an unconditional 
request for performance (s 284(1) BGB (1900)).130 Warning is not needed where the 
actual date of performance is fixed (s 284(2) BGB (1900))131 or where the debtor 
expressly or impliedly refuse to perform his duty.132 ‘The purpose [of Mahnung] is to 
make clear beyond doubt that the creditor retains an interest in the performance of 
contract.’133  The principle of the primacy of specific performance is reflected more 
obviously in the concept of giving a period of grace (Nachfrist) in the case of 
reciprocal contracts. Under s 326 BGB (1900)134, the creditor must give the debtor an 
additional period of time to allow him to perform his duty within this period and 
the creditor must make it clear that upon the expiry of the period any performance 
will be refused. After the period of grace expires, specific performance is barred and 
the creditor has a choice between damages in lieu of performance or rescission. A 
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Nachfrist is not necessary where it is clear from nature of the contract that after a 
certain date the performance is of no use to the creditor (s 326(2) BGB (1900)).135  
 However, among the BGB (1900) provisions which, by implication, recognise 
the primacy of specific performance, ‘the best clue is s 241’,136 which states: 
 
Kraft des Schuldverhältnisses ist der Gläubiger berechtigt, von dem 
Schuldner eine Leistung zu fordern. Die Leistung kann auch in einem 
Unterlassen bestehen. (By virtue of an obligation the creditor is entitled to 
claim performance from the debtor. The performance may consist in a 
forbearance.)137 
 
It is apparent that this provision defines the term obligation, but on the other hand 
the definition is the confirmation of the primacy of specific performance. The First 
Commission, which included Franz Philipp von Kübel (1819-84), who was 
responsible for the law of contract, and the Second Commission, agreed that the 
creditor’s right to performance was the essence of an obligation.138 According to 
Florian Faust and Volker Wiese, German lawyers usually derived this principle 
from the Latin maxim pacta sunt severanda139 and they ‘would not raise the question 
whether specific performance should be granted in case of breach of contract, 
because in their understanding a claim for specific performance has been in 
existence since the contract was concluded, long before the breach’. Instead, ‘they 
would rather ask whether the breach led to the loss of the claim for specific 
performance (for instance because performance became impossible140) and, perhaps, 
to its replacement by a claim for ‘damages in lieu of performance’ (Schadensersatz 
statt der Leistung)’.141 In other words, the primacy of specific performance is 
manifested by the principle that, once a contract takes effect, the creditor has the 
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right to claim performance and even in case of non-performance he retains this 
primary claim (Erfüllungsanspruch or Primäranspruch) until he has and chooses 
secondary claims (Sekundär – or Schadensersatzanspruch), namely damages in lieu of 
performance and rescission. The BGB (1900) provisions consistently require that, in 
normal circumstances, in order for the creditor to seek other remedies such as 
damages, he must prove that performance is impossible or that he exhausts all 
options that the law requires to enforce performance.142 The confirmation of this 
implied primacy of specific performance can be found in the statement of motive of 
§ 241, which declares that it is the general principle that the creditor has the right to 
claim performance.143   
 From the principle of the primacy of specific performance, it follows that 
regardless of the nature of the subjects of obligations, namely obligations to give, 
obligations to do and not to do, the creditor can claim performance. But whether the 
claim can be enforced by the court is another question – a question of procedural 
law. This is confirmed by Faust and Wiese’s observation that ‘German lawyers 
strictly distinguish between the existence of a claim which is a question of 
substantive law, and the enforcement of a claim, which is a question of procedural 
law’.144 For this reason, unlike in French civil law, where the distinction between the 
objects of obligations is a starting point of the law of obligations and therefore a 
condition for the right to performance, in German civil law there is no distinction 
between obligations to give, obligations to do and not to do for the purpose of 
determining the right to performance. A statement of Zweigert and Kötz can be 
used to summarise the concept of specific performance in the BGB prior to the 
reform of the law of obligations in 2002: 
 
In German law and in related systems it is axiomatic that a creditor has the 
right to bring a claim for performance of a contract and to obtain a 
judgment ordering the debtor to fulfill it. For this purpose it is immaterial 
whether the debtor’s obligation is to deliver goods pursuant to a sale, to 
vacate dwelling house, or to produce a work of art. The view that it is of 
the very essence of an obligation that it be actionable in this sense is so 
fundamental that it is not expressly stated in any legislative text, but the 
words of § 241 of the Civil Code, that the creditor is entitled, on the 
grounds of the creditor-debtor relationship, ‘to demand performance from 
the debtor’, imply that actual performance may be demanded before a 
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court and that a judgment ordering performance in kind may be issued by 
it.145 
 
 In 2002, the BGB underwent its greatest change since it came into effect in 1900. 
The reform mainly concerned the law of obligations, especially provisions regarding 
breach of contract and remedies for breach of contract.146 However, according to 
Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, the primacy of specific performance was not affected by 
this change and was ‘even strengthened by the reform:147 the creditor may insist on 
performance and may even enforce this right (except for personal services, § 888 II 
ZPO)’.148 This firm adherence to the principle of the primacy of specific performance 
has distinguished the civil law of Germany from that of its French counterpart.  
 The research on the historical development of the German concept of specific 
performance above proves that it has been clear at least since the BGB came into 
effect in 1900 that in Germany specific performance has been the primary remedy 
for non-performance.  However, because the primacy of specific performance was 
not expressly written down in any BGB provision and because this principle is 
abstract in nature, it may be inaccessible to those who have no knowledge of 
German civil law. Since the BGB (1900) was the principal model for the Thai Code of 
1925, a question arises here as to whether knowledge about the German concept of 
specific performance was available to the draftsmen. To investigate this question, 
we examine the publications on German law the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 
relied upon to discover how they engaged with the German concept of specific 
performance. The answer to this question is associated with another question as to 
whether the draftsmen had knowledge of the German concept of specific 
performance when they drafted the provisions relating to specific performance, 
which will be investigated thoroughly in Chapter 6.  
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2.2 The concept of specific performance in Ernest Schuster’s The Principles of 
German Civil Law 
In borrowing provisions of the BGB (1900), the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 
consulted three English language publications: Wang’s The German Civil Code: 
Translated and Annotated (1907), Schuster’s The Principles of German Civil Law (1907) 
and Rudolf Hübner’s A History of Germanic Private Law (1918).149 These three books 
were included in the Book of Revised Drafts’ list of the abbreviations of the foreign 
laws and legal materials which were supposedly used as the models for Code of 
1925 provisions.150 In reality, however, the draftsmen copied English translations of 
the texts of BGB provisions only from Wang’s,151 which does not include any 
annotation as its title suggests. Schuster’s The Principles of German Civil Law is a 
comprehensive text on the BGB while Hübner’s A History of Germanic Private Law, 
originally written in German, provides a broad historical account of German 
concepts of private law.152 On one occastion, the Thai draftsmen copied a text from 
Hübner’s book to draft Article 107 on a component part of a thing,153 but Schuster’s 
book seems to be the main source of information about the BGB rules in the drafting 
of the Code of 1925.154 To discover whether knowledge about the German concept of 
specific performance was available to the draftsmen at the time of codification, 
Schuster’s book needs to be examined. Unlike other commentaries on the BGB 
which provide comments on each provision in numerical order, The Principles of 
German Civil Law, published by the Clarendon Press, deals with the BGB provisions 
systematically and often provides comparisons with English private law. Schuster, a 
doctor of law from Munich and barrister at Lincoln’s Inn, 155 appeared to have a 
good knowledge of both legal systems.  
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 Schuster dealt with the concept of specific performance in Chapter 6 entitled 
‘Remedial Obligatory Rights’.156 However, the term ‘performance’ was explained in 
his comment on s 241, which was subsumed under Chapter 1 (Nature of Obligatory 
Rights and Duties). He wrote: 
 
The term Schuldverhältniss (obligatory relation) was substituted by the 
B.G.B. for the term ‘obligation’, formerly used in Germany…It denotes a 
relation between two persons which entitles one of them to claim from the 
other some act or omission recognized as capable of producing a legal 
effect – B.G.B. 241. The B.G.B. describes such an act or omission by the 
general term Leistung which in the course of this treatise will be translated 
by ‘performance’.157 
 
Schuster did not expressly claim that s 241 BGB laid the foundation for the principle 
of the primacy of specific performance, but he implied so when discussing remedial 
obligatory rights. He submitted that there were two primary ‘remedial rights’ under 
the German law of obligations, a right to performance in case of contractual 
obligations and a right to restitution in kind in case of delictual obligations. He 
wrote: 
 
The primary remedial right under German law is a right to performance 
[my emphasis] where the obligation results either from an act in law, or 
from surrounding circumstances, and a right to compensation 
(Schadensersatz) where the obligation results from an unlawful act.158  
 
Schuster did not draw a distinction between obligations to give, obligations to do 
and not to do for the purpose of determining the right to performance. Instead, he 
made it clear that in German law, the general rule was that ‘every obligation [my 
emphasis] gives rise to a claim for specific performance or restitution in kind’.159 
This general rule was, according to Schuster, however, subject to certain exceptions, 
namely on the ground of public policy where the creditor made a claim for personal 
services, a claim for the performance of a promise of marriage (s 1297 BGB) and a 
claim for the restitution of conjugal rights, in certain events where the creditor who 
was entitled to the performance of an agreement chose to claim rescission in lieu of 
performance and in the event where the right to performance or restitution in kind 
was transformed into a claim for pecuniary damages.160 The events of this last 
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exception were, for example, where performance (s 280(1) BGB)161 or restitution in 
kind (s 251 BGB)162 was impossible. In the later case, the creditor could claim 
damages only if the impossibility was caused by a circumstance for which the 
debtor was responsible.163 
 In affirming that specific performance was the primary remedy for non-
performance and every obligation gave rise to the right to performance, Schuster’s 
The Principles of German Civil Law seems to have portrayed the interpretation and 
understanding of the concept of specific performance in Germany broadly correctly. 
This is perhaps not surprising since in writing his book he consulted a number of 
native sources.164 If Plod’s claim that he and the draftsmen borrowed German rules 
with the assistance of this book, we can assume that they must have had sufficient 
knowledge of the German concept of specific performance. However, the adoption 
of specific performance rules in the drafting of the Code of 1925 was not as simple 
as this. The draftsmen did not only copy the German rules of breach of contract, but 
they also looked at some rules in the Minpō of 1898 in the belief that both German 
and Japanese rules were closely related. But was this belief correct? How similar 
was the Japanese concept of specific performance to the German one? These 
questions will be investigated in the next chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
Specific performance can be traced back to Roman law, but it is during the course of 
the development of the ius commune that it was conceptualised by medieval lawyers 
who used different methods of interpretation to produce various doctrines based on 
the texts of Corpus iuris. While the maxim nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum 
expounded by Pothier formed the basis of the rules of specific performance in the 
Code civil, the German jurists seem to have adhered to the maxim pacta sunt servanda 
to explain specific performance in the BGB. German lawyers have stood firm on the 
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primacy of specific performance which requires that every obligation gives rise to 
claim for performance regardless of the nature of the obligation. However, the BGB 
does not state this principle explicitly. Its existence can be assumed from a number 
of BGB provisions, mainly s 241, by those who have sufficient knowledge of 
German civil law. The abstract nature of the German concept of specific 
performance raises doubts about whether the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 were 
aware of this complexity. Their reference to Schuster’s book which they consulted in 
the drafting of the Code, demonstrates that information about the primacy of 
specific performance in German law was available to them, but it is questionable 
whether they read this book or understood this German principle. This will be 
investigated in Chapter 6. Based on Plod’s perception about the relationship 
between the German and Japanese Civil Codes, the next chapter will demonstrate 







THE RECEPTION OF GERMAN LAW IN JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE 
CONCEPT OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE  
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely held that the Japanese Civil Code (‘Minpō’) of 1898 was predominantly 
founded on German law, more specifically the two drafts of the BGB of 1900, in both 
structure and content. This belief was affirmed by many leading western Scholars, 
notably Frederic William Maitland, 1 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz.2 Alan Watson 
even went as far as to suggest that ‘the first three books of the [Japanese Civil] Code 
are virtually a translation of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’.3 Whether the Minpō was 
principally based on the BGB of 1900 is not only a question of a comparative study 
of German and Japanese law but is also the key to our historical and doctrinal 
understanding of Thailand’s Civil and Commercial Code of 1925 (‘Code of 1925’). 
This is because the reception of Japanese law in Thailand in 1925 was based on 
Plod’s conviction, like Watson’s, that the Minpō was a virtual copy of the BGB.4 To 
establish a legal system in the Code of 1925, the Thai draftsmen could copy one 
provision from the BGB of 1900 and another from the Minpō without concern about 
their theoretical conflicts because for them there were not many differences. One can 
assume that, if German and Japanese rules were adopted side by side in drafting the 
provisions concerning specific performance in the Code of 1925, this was the result 
of Plod’s perception of the relationship between German and Japanese law. If Plod 
was correct, it should follow that the Japanese concept and rules of specific 
performance at the time of the Code of 1925 had a German flavour.  
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 This chapter thus has two aims. First, it examines the adoption of foreign 
law in the making of the Minpō of 1898 to discover whether Plod’s perception of the 
relationship between the BGB and the Minpō is correct. Second, it investigates more 
specifically whether the concept and rules of specific performance in the Minpō 
were German in nature. If so, one should expect to find main features of the German 
concept of specific performance, identified in Chapter 4 above, in Japanese law. 
1. THE RECEPTION OF FOREIGN PRIVATE LAW IN JAPAN  
1.1 Causes of the reception 
In the process of the making of a modern state, Japan provided a great source of 
inspiration for Thailand. Japan exerted influence not only in the drafting of modern 
codes but also provided precious lessons to Thailand on how to escape from 
colonisation.5 On the surface, the situations in Japan and Thailand at the turn of the 
nineteenth century were similar. One of the major challenges which Japan had been 
facing, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, was threats from 
western territorial and commercial expansion.6 A typical tool that western powers 
used to penetrate weak countries was a commercial treaty, to which a consular 
jurisdiction term was usually attached. In a similar manner that Thailand entered 
into the Bowring Treaty with Great Britain in 1855, which was the first unequal 
commercial treaty giving rise to extraterritoriality, Japan concluded several 
commercial treaties with western powers from the 1850s7 which led to consular 
jurisdiction that allowed the consular court to exercise jurisdiction over foreign 
subjects in both civil and criminal cases.8 The effect of extraterritoriality in Japan 
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was unexpected; it seemed limited in the treaty but was expansive in effect.9 To 
regain full tariff and judicial autonomy, it was necessary for Japan to establish a 
modern legal order.10 
 External pressure is crucial to the modernisation of law, but, without internal 
motivation, the external factor alone may not have been sufficient to bring about 
legal change in Japan. Despite the fact that it had a moderately developed social and 
economic system,11 Japan lacked a comprehensive system of law and legal science in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.12 A modern legal system was therefore 
needed to further the modernisation process.13 Whether the desire for law reform 
was triggered by the unfair treaties or self-motivated, the Charter Oath of 1868, 
promulgated at the enthronement of Emperor Meiji, states that: 
 
By this oath, we set up as our aim the establishment of the national wealth 
on a broad basis and the framing of a constitution and laws…Evil customs 
of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just laws.14 
 
While traditional Thai law was overwhelmingly influenced by Hindu-Buddhist 
moral ideologies originating from India, traditional Japanese law was a mixture of 
fragmented indigenous law, a product of the feudal system, and the principles of 
Confucianism and Buddhism imported from China.15 As in Thailand, the legal order 
in Japan during the pre-modern period ‘had been always viewed as a 
quintessentially ethical order’.16 However, unlike traditional Thai law, traditional 
Japanese law relied to a limited degree on written statute but heavily on reason 
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(dōri) and custom. Japanese statutes were not systematised and were not accessible 
to the public.17 One of the most important problems of the traditional Japanese legal 
system was therefore the lack of a general system of law applicable to the whole 
country.18 This provides a clue as to why the western powers viewed the Japanese 
legal order as inferior to their own and why consular jurisdiction was required.19 
The lack of a unified system of law means the lack of a tool for effective 
administration, and this explains why the Japanese government, which seemed to 
be more interested in order than legal rules, needed a modern legal system.20 
1.2 Foreign influence in the making of the Minpō 
The codification of civil law in Japan was part of the modernisation of the country 
which began from the second half of the nineteenth century as a result of the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868.21 By the time the work of codification was embarked on in the 
late 1870s, the Japanese had introduced a number of political and social reforms, 
which from the 1880s began to bear fruit. This included the enforcement of the Penal 
Code and the Criminal Procedure Code in 1882 and the establishment of the first 
constitution, which was promulgated in 1889 and came into effect in 1890, which 
also saw the opening of the first parliament. In 1879, Gustave Émile Boissonade 
(1825-1910), a French scholar, who completed the drafting of the Japanese Penal and 
Criminal Procedure Codes in 1880, was tasked with drafting a civil code, excluding 
the parts concerning family and succession law which were left to Japanese 
lawyers.22 Modeled on the French Code civil, the first civil code was promulgated in 
1890 but never enforced due to disagreements between its proponents and 
opponents. This led to a new drafting in 1892. The new draft, which has been 
thought to be a product of the BGB of 1900, came into effect in 1898 and is still in use 
today. Over the course of codification, two major European legal systems, namely 
French and German law predominated. Although codification was a battlefield 
between two legal camps, French and English law, the supporters of English law 
appeared to align with the German legal system to compete with their rivals.  
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1.2.1 French influence 
The nineteenth century saw the predominance of the French and British Empires in 
East and Southeast Asia. While British culture, especially the English language and 
style of education, was overwhelmingly received by the ruling classes and nobles in 
Thailand from the beginning of the century, continental legal systems, especially 
French law, seem to have been more attractive to the Japanese.23 The Japanese 
government sent two students to study law in the Netherlands in the 1860s. One of 
them, Tsuda Masmichi (1829-1903), became a leading figure who introduced 
Western law to Japan, particularly by publishing the first book on Western law and 
inventing several important legal terms, including ‘minpō’ (civil law) in Japanese.24 
However, French law emerged as the favoured model for Japan’s modernisation of 
civil law. There are two main reasons for this. First and foremost, the Japanese 
government looked for ‘a rational, abstract code that was proven in practice and 
that was widely hailed as the greatest legal achievement of the Western world’.25 
This desire could undoubtedly be satisfied by the Code civil of 1804, which was 
recognised throughout nineteenth century Europe as the ideal model for 
codification which aimed to promote equality for all citizens of a centralised nation 
state.26 German law was not yet codified and the English system of common law 
‘was far too diffuse and complicated to be understood and incorporated within a 
short period of time’.27  Second, the French influence was reinforced by some 
Japanese students sent to France to study law, notably Mitsukuri Rinshō (1846-97),28 
French experts, most notably Boissonade, who came to Japan 1873,29 and the 
establishment of the Law School of the Ministry of Justice in 1871 in which French 
law was predominantly taught.30 There were also some private law schools which 
offered French law courses.31 It is noteworthy that while French law was 
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enthusiastically promoted by the Ministry of Justice,32 English law was taught in the 
Imperial University of Tokyo (later University of Tokyo) since 1874 as well as in 
other law schools. Graduates of English legal science rose to prominence as judges 
and senior government officials.33 
 Japan’s first attempt to import French civil law took place in 1870 when 
Rinshō Mitsukuri was assigned by the Civil Code Committee to translate the Code 
civil of 1804 speedily, but the seventy-nine article translation draft was eventually 
abandoned due to its incompatibility with Japanese customary and statutory law. 
The first complete draft of a civil code modeled on French law, harmonised with 
traditional Japanese law, was however made available in 1872 with the help of the 
Law School of the Ministry of Justice.  Although it was not successful, this draft 
drew Japanese attention to foreign civil law.34 From 1872, the codification work did 
not progress smoothly mainly because of changes in relevant personnel and 
organisations and attempts to incorporate the traditional values of Japanese society 
into a modern civil law.35 In 1879, the project of a civil code revived after Boissonade, 
who made substantial contribution to the successful enactment of the Penal Code in 
1880, was entrusted with it.36 Boissonade was responsible for most parts of the draft 
except those concerning family and succession law which were prepared by 
Japanese draftsmen.37 It is noteworthy that while Boissonade was tasked with the 
making of a civil code, Karl Friedrich Hermann Roesler (1834-94), a German scholar, 
was asked to prepare a draft of a commercial code in 1881.38 The Civil Code project 
was completed in 1889 and the draft of the Civil Code was promulgated in 1890. By 
the time of its promulgation, there had already been a debate between its supporters 
and opponents, which eventually prevented the Minpō of 1890 from coming into 
effect as planned and which resulted in ‘a thorough shift in the orientation of 
Japanese legal science’.39    
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 Arguments against the Minpō of 1890 were related to three main issues: 
namely nationalistic sentiments, turf wars between proponents of English and 
French schools of law, and concerns about a lack of systemic coherence in the 
Japanese legal system and incompatibility of the French model.40 First, critics 
accused the Minpō of 1890 of blindly copying Western legal concepts which could 
undermine Japanese moral values.41  This accusation was, however, often linked to 
the second reason, that is, that it was part of turf battle between supporters of rival 
schools.42 Nobushige Hozumi (1856-1926), one of the draftsmen of the Minpō of 
1898, reported that: 
 
after the arduous toil of fifteen years, Japan possessed a code of private law 
for the first time in her history. It was quite natural that the Code should 
become a topic of earnest consideration for all educated classes of people. 
Especially among lawyers and politicians, a violent controversy arose 
regarding the merits of the new Code. Those jurists, who had studied 
English law in the [Tokyo] University or in England or America, first raised 
their voices against the Code and demanded the postponement of the date 
of its going into operation, with a view to its complete revision. The French 
section of Japanese lawyers, on the other hand, supported the Code and 
insisted upon the necessity of its going into operation at the date originally 
appointed.43 
 
Several law schools operated in Japan during the 1880s and 1890s. Based on their 
curricula, they could roughly be divided into French-law-oriented and English-law-
oriented schools.44 These schools and their professors naturally competed against 
each other to promote and defend their academic systems.45 The nature of these 
arguments has been questioned as to whether it was personal or academic. Hozumi 
claimed that the disagreement was an ideological conflict between the supporters of 
the School of Natural Law and the Historical School.46 After the abolition of the Law 
School of the Ministry of Justice, where French law was predominantly taught in 
French, in 1885 the Law School transferred to the newly established French law 
sections at the Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo. English law had been taught 
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there since 1874.47 The Tokyo Law Faculty therefore accommodated two competing 
English and French factions. A German section was added to the Law Faculty in 
1887 and enjoyed increasing popularity.48 The campaign against the Minpō of 1890 
was led by professors in the English section of the University of Tokyo Faculty of 
Law, notably Hozumi, and supported by a number of law students.49 Hozumi 
compared the disagreement between the supporters and opponents, including 
himself, of the Minpō of 1890 to the controversy over codification between Thibaut 
and Savigny, but it can be viewed as merely a turf war between two rival camps.50 
 Despite the fact that debates between supporters of different schools brought 
delay and uncertainty to the modernisation of civil law in Japan and regardless of 
the reasons behind the opposition, arguments over the Minpō of 1890 can be seen as 
part of the rationalisation of Japanese civil law in the sense that the issue of the 
reception of civil law in Japan had been discussed critically among educated classes, 
eg academics, judges and private lawyers.51 By contrast, Thailand, before 1917, had 
no higher education institutions. Only children of the royal and other noble families 
could afford a bachelor degree abroad, mainly in England. The Law School of the 
Ministry of Justice was established in 1897 under the overwhelming influence of 
English common law prompting a prominent French legal adviser, Georges Padoux, 
urged in 1913 the Thai government to reform legal education to facilitate the 
country’s newly-established legal system based on civil law. The Thai government 
needed to reorganise and diversify legal education following the Japanese model.52 
The intellectual climates prior to codification of civil law in Thailand and Japan 
were therefore different. 
 The Minpō of 1890 was fiercely criticized for lacking systemic coherence.53 
While the Japanese Civil Code was drafted under French influence, Japan’s Code of 
Civil Procedure, which was promulgated in 1890 and came into effect in 1891, and 
its Commercial Code were drafted by German lawyers. The application of these 
three codes would cause practical difficulties.54 The content of the Minpō of 1890 
was also criticised. Despite being educated in France, Masaaski Tomii (1858-1935), 
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one of the draftsmen of the Minpō of 1898, was critical of the Minpō of 1890. Tomii 
observed that there were a number of imitations and contradictions, and that many 
provisions were in fact of procedural or public law nature.55 Hozumi, educated in 
three different countries, England, France and Germany and the author of the article 
‘Comparative Analysis of English, French and German Legal Theory’ (Ei-futsu-doku 
hōgaku hikakuron) published in 1887, also criticised the Minpō of 1890 for its 
inconsistency, structural problems and defects.56 This technical problem was 
similarly experienced in Thailand after the promulgation of the Thai Code of 1923 
modeled on French law. This Thai Code never came into effect because of heavy 
criticism from some judges, lawyers and senior government officials who found it 
incoherent and incomprehensible. 
1.2.2 German influence 
The opponents of the Minpō of 1890, mainly from the English faction, prevailed as 
in 1892 the Japanese parliament passed a bill to postpone the operation of the Code 
until 31 December 1896. Upon the postponement of the Code, a Codification 
Committee, consisting of members of both Houses of the Diet, University of Tokyo 
professors, judges, eminent lawyers and representatives of private sectors under the 
chairmanship of the Prime Minister, was established. Three law professors of the 
Imperial University of Tokyo Faculty of Law, Kenjirō Ume (1860-1910), Hozumi and 
Tomii, were appointed as a special committee to prepare a new draft.57 While none 
of the draftsmen of the Thai Code of 1925 was formally educated in a German law 
school, two Japanese draftsmen were students of German law. Ume, a former leader 
of the proponents of the Code of 1890, studied law in both German and French 
universities. Despite holding a doctorate in law from France, Tomii was a fierce 
critic of French law. Hozumi, who studied law in England, France and Germany, 
championed German law. He praised German law as being the most advanced 
jurisprudence in the world and the BGB for being superior to the French Code civil.58  
                                                      
55 Frank, ibid 179–80; Ryōsuke Ishii, Japanese Legislation in the Meiji Era (William Chambliss tr, 
Pan-Pacific Press 1958) 588. 
56 Frank, ibid 180. 
57 Hozumi, New Japanese Civil Code 9; Takayanagi, ‘Century of Innovation’ 30. 
58 Nobushige Hozhumi, ‘Doitsugaku no Nippon ni Oyoboseru Eikyō’ quoted in Yoshiyuki 
Noda, ‘Nihon ni okeru hikakuhō no hatten to genjō’ in Hideo Tanaka (ed), The Japanese Legal 
System  : Introductory Cases and Materials (University of Tokyo Press 1976) 204; Noda, 
Introduction to Japanese Law 52. 
 156 
 In Thailand, after the failure of the Code of 1923, German law suddenly 
gained prominence. By contrast, Japan had been familiar with German 
jurisprudence for several years before it became the basis of the new Japanese Civil 
Code. Roesler, a German professor, was appointed by the Japanese government as a 
legal adviser in 1870s. He had been a leading figure in the drafting of the Meji 
Constitution and the Commercial Code. Moreover, the Code of Civil Procedure, 
which came into force in 1891, was almost a literal translation of the German Civil 
Procedure Code.59 In terms of legal education, German jurisprudence began to be 
recognised formally when the German Section was established at the Faculty of Law 
of the University of Tokyo in 1887.60 
 The three draftsmen of the new Code divided the drafting work and ‘all the 
topics of the code were shared among them, each choosing topics in which he 
believed himself most knowledgeable’.61 Hozumi revealed that the new Minpō kept 
a balance between major legal systems. He wrote: 
 
The Constitution of the Committee, especially that of the Drafting 
Committee made it clear, that they could not agree to take the law of any 
one country as an exclusive model upon which to frame the new Code.62 
 
Learning the lesson from the making of the Minpō of 1890, which relied heavily on 
French law, the draftsmen agreed to collect the codes, statutes and judicial reports 
from all ‘civilised’ jurisdictions. The materials were written in a variety of languages 
including English, French, German and Italian. International treaties relating to 
private law were also considered. The Drafting Committee was able to collect more 
than thirty civil codes, including several drafts, such as the first and second drafts of 
the BGB, the Belgian Civil Code and even the draft of the Civil Code of New York.63 
Huzumi claimed that the new Minpō was a product of comparative law since: 
 
The method of preparing the draft gave a characteristic feature to the new 
Code. The Japanese Civil Code may be said to be a fruit of comparative 
jurisprudence. At first sight, it may appear that the new code was very 
closely modeled upon the new German Civil Code; and I have very often 
read statements to that effect. It is true that the first and second draft of the 
German Code furnished very valuable material to the drafting committee 
and had a great influence upon the deliberations of the Committee. But, on 
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close examination of the principles and rules adopted in the Code, it will 
appear that they gathered materials from all parts of the civilized world 
and freely adopted rules or principles from the laws of any country, 
whenever they saw the advantage of doing so. In some parts, rules were 
adopted from the French Civil Code; in others, the principles of English 
common law were followed; in others again, such laws as the Swiss Federal 
Code of Obligations of 1881, the new Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the 
Property Code of Montenegro, Indian Succession and Contract Acts or the 
Civil Codes of Louisiana, Lower Canada or South American Republics or 
the draft Civil Code of New York, and the like have given materials for the 
framers of the Code.64 
 
The Drafts of Book I (General Provisions), Book II (Rights in rem) and Book III 
(Rights in personam), were approved by the Japanese parliament in 1896 with some 
trivial modifications. The last two Books, Book IV on Family and Book V on 
Succession, were adopted by the parliament in 1898.65 The whole Civil Code came 
into effect in July 1898.  Despite the fact that it still largely contains foreign legal 
elements just as the old one did, following its promulgation, the new Minpō did not 
attract strong criticism from the public.66 Considering the division of six Books of 
the new Code alone, it is easy to conclude that the draftsmen preferred the BGB to 
the Code civil, but one may wonder why the victory of the English camp led to the 
adoption of German law. A simple answer may be that the opponents of the Minpō 
of 1890 rejected French law’s domination over codification of civil law and the only 
alternative was German law. This can also be seen as a compromise introduced 
because of the conflict between the French and English camps.67  
 The general structure of Minpō follows the Pandectist system, but a perennial 
question remains as to whether Japanese civil law belongs to the German or French 
legal families and this has attracted a great deal of interest from comparative 
lawyers.68 Zweigert and Kötz contends that the Minpō of 1898 ‘showed sporadic 
influences of French law and Common Law here and there but followed the two 
drafts of the German BGB in important points of structure and content’.69 Alan 
Watson even claimed that the first three books of the Minpō were almost a copy of 
the BGB.70 The Code in fact follows the structure and many provisions of the drafts 
of the BGB but borrows much of its French content from both the Code civil of 1804 
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and the Minpō of 1890 drafted by Boissonade.71 Charles Sherman observed that 
‘about one-half of the provisions of the Japanese code are derived from the French 
either directly or through the intermediary code of Boissonade’.72 The French 
influence over the Minpō of 1898 was confirmed by Ume, the chief draftsman, who 
remarked in 1904: 
 
The code that replaces it and that resembles the German Civil Code in form 
has often wrongly been believed to follow exclusively the pattern of the 
German code. In truth, however, it does not. The new [Japanese] code is 
based on the French code and other codes of French origin at least as much 
as it is on the German code.73 
 
Why was the influence of French civil law in the Minpō of 1898 downplayed for so 
long despite this confirmation? Zentarō Kitagawa74 may well have answered this 
question by pointing out that ‘the legal concepts, Institutions (hōseido) and 
Conceptual Systems (hōtaikei) which we know today as Japanese civil law science 
were built through overwhelming reliance on German civil law science’75 and by 
Kenzo Takayanagi, an eminent scholar at Tokyo University, who observed that ‘one 
of the most striking phenomena of [the development of Japanese civil law between 
1900 and 1913] was the dominance of German legal science in Japan’.76 After the 
new Minpō of Japan came into force in 1898, English, French and German law 
continued to be taught at the University of Tokyo, but it was obvious that the 
Japanese were turning their attention to German legal science.77 Thanks to Ume’s 
civil-law commentary which was significantly based on French jurisprudence, the 
influence of French law survived for a short period after the enforcement of the new 
Civil Code. Following his death in 1910, Ume’s interpretation of the Minpō of 1980 
                                                      
71 Noda, Introduction of Japanese Law 51; Sherman, ‘Debt of Modern Japanese Law’ 201; Oda, 
Japanese Law 115–16; Frank, ‘Civil Code’ 187–88. 
72 Sherman, Roman Law 301. 
73 Kenjiro Ume’s Speech at French Civil Code Centenary Celebrations in 1904 at the Faculty 
of Law of the Imperial University of Tokyo quoted in Noda, Introduction to Japanese Law 52. 
74 Zentarō Kitagawa, an emeritus professor of law at Kyoto University, whose work on the 
reception of German law in Japan (Rezeption und Fortbildung des europäischen Zivilrecht in 
Japan) in 1970 has shed new light on understanding the reception phenomenon and attracted 
academic attention on the subject. See John O Haley, ‘The Revival of German Scholarship on 
Japanese Law’ (1982) 30 AJCL 335, 336. 
75 Zentarō Kitagawa, ‘Theory Reception - One Aspect of The Development of Japanese Civil 
Law Science’ in Kōichirō Fujikura (ed), Japanese Law and Legal Theory (New York UP 1996) 3. 
76 Takayanagi, ‘Occidental Legal Ideas’ 747. 
77 ibid 747–48; Zentarō Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law and German Law - From the 
Viewpoint of Comparative Law’ in Kitagawa Z and Riesenhuber K (eds), The Identity of 
German and Japanese Civil Law in Comparative Perspectives (De Gruyter Recht 2007) 30; 
Takayanagi, ‘Century of Innovation’ 34–35; Shusei Ono, ‘Comparative Law and the Civil 
Code of Japan (2)’ (1996) 25 Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 29, 47. 
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in the French manner was completely forgotten.78 There emerged a common belief 
in the legal community in Japan that the Minpō of 1898 was a product of German 
law as Hiroshi Oda observes: 
 
Because of the belief that the new Code was based on German Law, 
Japanese scholars and lawyers have worked hard to digest German civil 
law theories. The most common destination of Japanese academics 
studying abroad was Germany, especially before the Second World War.79   
 
To summarise German law’s influence in the Japanese system of private law 
between the enforcement of the Minpō of 1898 and the Second World War,80 we 
may borrow a statement of Kitagawa, an eminent expert on this subject, who wrote: 
 
Generally, reception of foreign law may be divided into two processes: the 
process of reception of foreign law(s) and the process of assimilation of 
such law(s). Between these two processes, historical significance and [the] 
role of the reception of German legal theory lies in the assimilation process 
which occurred subsequent to the enactment of the Japanese Civil Code. 
This assimilation process can be regarded as a process for developing 
Japan’s domestic civil law system by casting the product of the mixed-type 
reception of foreign codes (ie Japanese Civil Code) into a mould imported 
from a foreign country (ie German jurisprudence). In other words, by 
grafting the German legal system onto the product of a mixed type 
reception foreign codes, the Japanese civil law system had developed its 
unique two-tiered structure. This is the prototype of Japanese civil law 
jurisprudence from the viewpoint of comparative law and, in this sense, 
Japanese civil law can be regard as a system homogenous to German civil 
law. In this, German jurisprudence attained its unique position as a 
homogenous foreign system that had directly contributed to development 
of de lege lata analysis of the Japanese Civil Code, in addition to its role in 
comparative study of law.81 
1.2.3 The tracing of De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan and examining of 
Plod’s perception of the reception of German law in Japan 
Kitagawa’s research on the reception of German law in Japan had a profound 
impact on the traditional perception of German influence in Japanese civil law.82 
German law exerted less influence in the drafting of the Minpō of 1898 than many 
                                                      
78 Ono, ibid 47. 
79 Oda, Japanese Law 115. See also Takayanagi, ‘Century of Innovation’ 34–35; Stevens 
'Modern Japanese Law' 666. 
80 Takayanagi observed that ‘during the period of the Allied occupation of Japan between 
1945-1951, there was an unprecedented inflow of American laws and institutions’. 
Takayanagi, ‘Contact of the Common Law’ 64. 
81 Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law’ 33–34. 
82 See Haley, ‘Revival of German Scholarship’ 336. 
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have believed, but it was, in fact, overwhelmingly influential in the application and 
interpretation of the Code. The reception of German law in Japan was concentrated 
more on the process of interpreting legal concepts and institutions of the Minpō in 
1898 than on the process of drafting the Code. Kitagawa is not the first person who 
discovered the myth of this Japanese reception. It appears that Japanese scholars 
were alerted to the complexity of the reception of foreign law in Japan since Eiichi 
Hoshino published a paper whose title can be translated as ‘Influence of French 
Civil Law on the Japanese Civil Code’ in 1965.83 This publication dramatically 
changed Japanese legal scholars’ perception of the relationship between Japanese 
and French civil law since ‘before then, the study of civil law in Japan generally had 
little relevance with French law’.84 Hoshino’s work might also have inspired 
Kitagawa to conduct extensive research on the reception of German law in Japan. 
 Based on the new conception of the reception of German law in Japan, it is 
reasonable to assume that De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan, published in 
1909, was a product of the ‘germanisation’ of Japanese civil law. In Volume I’s 
Preface, De Becker revealed the native principal source of his book saying that: 
 
I desire to acknowledge with grateful thanks the kind and generous 
permission of Mr. Tomioka (Kaji) Yasuro to adopt, practically intact, that 
gentlemen’s ‘Gembun-Itchi Mimpō-Seigi’  [my emphasis] as a basis and 
framework for this book. I am also infinitely indebted to Mr. Nagahara 
Eiichi for most valuable assistance given to me by him in the preparation of 
the work.85  
 
Written in Japanese, Yasuro Tomioka’s Gembun-Itchi Mimpō-Seigi, which is 
translated as ‘A Colloquial-style Commentary on the Civil Code’, is a five-volume 
commentary on the Minpō of 1898 published in 1903. When comparing De Becker’s 
commentaries on Articles 412 to 416 with those of Tomioka’s book as examples,86 it 
is found that the referencing to BGB provisions in the Annotated Civil Code of Japan 




                                                      
83 See E Hoshino, Minpō ronshū (Collection of Theories on Civil Law), vol 1 (Yūhikaku 1970). 
84 Taro Kogayu, ‘French Law Research in the Study of Civil Law in Japan’ in Zentarō 
Kitagawa and Karl Riesenhuber (eds), The Identity of German and Japanese Civil Law in 
Comparative Perspectives (De Gruyter Recht 2007) 92. 
85 JE de Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 1 (Butterworth 1909) VI. 
86 This research was conducted with the help of Hiromi Sasamoto-Collins, Lecturer in 
Japanese Studies at the University of Edinburgh. 
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[Annotated Civil Code of Japan]’s style, content, and format, such as the 
translation of the articles itself, references, Meanings of Words, and 
Explanation (in this order) conform to [Tomioka]'s book…But [Tomioka]'s 
book, as far as Arts 412-6 are concerned, does not include German 
references. For instance, the references for Art 412 in [De Becker]’s book are 
‘Arts. 415, 541 and 542 [of the Japanese Civil Code]; also Art 284 of the 
German Civil Code’. In [Tomioka]’s book, however, the equivalent passage 
is ‘Arts 415, 541 and 542 [of the Japanese Civil Code]’ but does not include 
‘Art 284 of the German Civil Code’.87 
 
Although De Becker’s adherence to the BGB was not inspired by the native source, 
one cannot assume that his referencing was original work by him. The minutes of 
the meetings of the Japanese drafting committee and the apparent characters of the 
Japanese provisions merit exploration. This research therefore examines the 
stenographic minutes of the meeting of the Commission for Inquiry into 
Codification (法典調査会民法議事速記録 第十八巻) in relation to Articles 414 and 
415. These two provisions are the most important rules concerning the concept of 
specific performance in the Minpō; Article 414 established the creditor’s rights to 
specific performance while Article 415 deals with damages. These were used as the 
models for drafting Articles 213 and 215 of the Thai Code of 1925 respectively. 
Hozumi, the draftsman responsible for the preparation of the drafts, informed the 
Commission, which was tasked with the examination of the drafts, of statutes and 
literatures about what he had consulted in drafting Articles 414 and 415 concerning 
specific performance and damages. According to Hozumi, the model provisions of 
Article 414 (Article 408 at the time of drafting) included: 
 
Article 382 of the old Japanese Civil Code of 1890 [drafted by Boissonade]; 
Articles 1143, 1144 of the French Code civil, Section 1323 of the Austrian 
Civil Code [Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch] of 1811, Article 1267 of the 
Dutch Civil Code [Burgerlijk Wetboek] of 1838,88 Articles 1220 and 1222 of 
the Italian Civil Code of 1865,89 Sections 111 and 112 of the Swiss Code of 
Obligations of 1881, Articles 540, 542, 1098 and 1099 of the General 
Property Code of Montenegro of 1888, Section 219 of the First Draft of the 
BGB, Section 213 of the Second Draft of the BGB, [my emphasis] Sections 
79 and 80 of Chapter 6, Part 1 of the General National Law for the Prussian 
States [Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten], Section 687 of the 
                                                      
87 Email from Hiromi Sasamoto-Collins to author (18 January 2013). 
88 The Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838 was considerably influenced by the Code civil. See Harry 
Dondorp and Hylkje de Jong, ‘Coercive Measures to Enforce Obligations under Dutch Law 
(1838-1933)’ in Jan Hallebeek and Harry Dondorp (eds), Right to Specific Performance: The 
Historical Development (Intersentia 2010) 138. 
89 The Italian Civil Code of 1865 was mainly based on the Code civil. See PG Monateri, ‘The 
Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures’ (2003) 13 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 575, 
584–88. 
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Civil Code of Saxony of 1865 and Article 73 of Chapter 1, Part 2 of the Paris 
Draft.90 
 
The list of statutes which Hozumi consulted in drafting Article 415 (Article 409 at 
the time of drafting) included: 
 
Articles 381, 383 and 384 of the old Japanese Civil Code of 1890; Articles 
1143 and 1146 to 1148 of the French Code civil, Section 1295 and 1306 of the 
Austrian Civil Code of 1811, Article 1275, 1280 and 1281 of the Dutch Civil 
Code of 1838, Articles 1218, 1225 and 1226 of the Italian Civil Code of 1865, 
Sections 110 of the Swiss Code of Obligations of 1881, Articles 540 and 541 
of the General Property Code of Montenegro of 1888, Article 1105 of the 
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Sections 219 and 247 of the First Draft of the 
BGB, Sections 213 and 242 of the Second Draft of the BGB, Sections 285 
and 291 of Chapter 5, Part 1 of the General National Law for the Prussian 
States, Section 687 of the Civil Code of Saxony of 1865, Article 109 of 
Chapter 1, Part 2 of Paris draft, and Articles 1065, 1071 and 1072 of the Civil 
Code of Lower Canada of 1866.91 [My emphasis] 
 
Hozumi gave the draft examiners only papers containing the list of sources that he 
claimed to consult, but he neither told the meeting which provisions were adopted 
as the principal models nor did they specifically discuss the sources.92 Among the 
foreign provisions in the list of Article 414 above, there appear two provisions from 
the two drafts of the BGB: s 219 of the First Draft, which developed into s 213 of the 
Second Draft. S 213 was eventually separated into three provisions, ss 249, 250 and 
251 of the BGB, which came into effect in 1900.93 For the list of sources of Article 415, 
Hozumi mentioned ss 219 and 247 of the First Draft and ss 213 and 242 of the 
Second Draft of the BGB. S 247 was the predecessor of s 242, which became s 286 of 
the BGB of 1900.94 Based on these findings, in linking the Japanese Article 414 with 
ss 249 and 251 BGB and Article 415 with ss 249, 251 and 286 BGB in his Annotated 
Civil Code of Japan volume 2, De Becker was, at least, partially right. The question, 
                                                      
90 ‘法典調査会民法議事速記録 第十八巻 (Stenographic Minutes of the Proceedings on Civil 
Code in the Commission for Inquiry into Codification)’, vol 18, pages 33-42, 34 < 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/pdf/digidepo_1367545.pdf?pdfOutputRangeType=R&pdfPageSiz
e=&pdfOutputRanges=35-44 and> accessed 8 February 2013 translated by Hiromi Sasamoto-
Collins in email from Sasamoto-Collins to author (10 February 2013).  
91 ‘Stenographic Minutes’, vol 18, pages 49-51, 50 < 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/pdf/digidepo_1367545.pdf?pdfOutputRangeType=R&pdfPageSiz
e=&pdfOutputRanges=51-53 > accessed 14 February 2013 translated by Wei-sheng Hong in 
email from Hong to author (14 February 2013).  
92 See ‘Stenographic Minutes’, vol 18, 34.  
93 See Benno Mugdan, Die gesammten Materialien zum Bu ̈rgerlichen Gesetzbuch fu ̈r das Deutsche 
Reich, vol 2 (Keip 2005) III; Horst Heinrich Jakobs and Werner Schubert, Die Beratung des 
Bu ̈rgerlichen Gesetzbuchs: in systematischer Zusammenstellung der unveröffentlichten Quellen (§§ 
241 bis 432) (de Gruyter 1978) 101-02. 
94 See Mugdan, ibid X; Jakobs and Schubert, ibid 306. 
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however, remains as to why he mentioned only these BGB provisions while 
according to the minutes of the meetings above, the draftsman clearly referred to 
various foreign rules. De Becker did not even mention Article 382 of the old Minpō 
of 1890, which Hozumi claimed to use as one of the models for current Article 414. 
Examining every provision from Articles 399 to 724 in his second volume, where 
there are references, the only foreign law to which De Becker referred is the BGB.95 
Without a need to examine the minutes of the meeting of the Japanese draftsmen on 
every Japanese provision, we can confidently conclude that the information about 
his referencing to the BGB in the second volume of De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code 
of Japan is misleading.  
 If this conclusion is correct, it follows that Plod’s belief that De Becker’s 
referencing was authentic in that it revealed the Japanese draftsmen’s foreign 
sources used as the model of the Japanese provisions and that the Minpō was a 
virtual copy of the BGB was incorrect.96 Since German law was the only foreign law 
referred to in the second volume of De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan, we can 
now discover the underlying reason why Plod thought that the Japanese simply 
copied the BGB when making the Minpō. Furthermore, Plod erroneously believed 
that De Becker’s referencing authentically represented the Japanese draftsmen’s: he 
did not check their official documents, ie the minutes of the meeting.  Had he done 
so, he would have found that the BGB was one among many foreign statutes that 
Hozumi claimed to consult. Although his list of sources presented to the draft 
examiners shows that the Japanese Article 414 was based on various statutes and 
doctrines, one cannot be sure that Hozumi really incorporated all of them in the 
drafting of Articles 414 and 415 unless one examines the text of the provisions. 
2. THE CONCEPT OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THE MINPŌ  
2.1 An anatomy of Articles 414 and 415 of the Minpō of 1898  
To discover which foreign law influenced a Japanese provision of the Minpō by 
examining official documents of the Japanese draftsmen and examiners, one needs 
to bear in mind that during the period of codification, there was a certain amount of 
                                                      
95 JE de Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2 (Butterworth 1909) 6–285. 
96 See Phraya Manavarajasevi, บันทึกคําสัมภาษณพระยามานวราชเสว ี(Transcript of the Interviews with 
Phraya Manavarajasevi) (Thammasat University 1982) 9, 23. 
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antipathy between supporters of the English and French schools of law in Japan. 
Even among the three draftsmen, there were representatives of both factions with 
Hozumi from the English camp and Ume from the French camp. Furthermore, 
unlike in Thailand, where the Code of 1925 was drafted by a committee appointed 
by an absolute monarch and linguistically examined by a committee comprised of 
senior ministers, thereby limiting the people involved in making the Code, in 
democratising Japan, a variety of groups examined the drafts of the Minpō. One can 
reasonably speculate that Huzumi’s claim that he consulted a wide range of statutes 
and publications was his tactful strategy for not showing any favouritism toward a 
particular legal system while in fact he did not really use all the sources he 
mentioned. Thus to discover whether Japanese provisions have German elements, 
one needs to examine what the draftsmen and the examiners discussed in relation to 
the rules of specific performance.  
At a meeting of the Commission for Inquiry, Hozumi was asked why the first 
paragraph of Article 414 (See Article 414 in Table 5-1 below), whose provision 
number was 408 at the time, was needed. Hozumi reasoned that, although some 
people may have thought that in case of non- performance, performance could be 
enforced without any express provision, the creditor’s right to compulsory 
performance should be confirmed in writing. If there was no such legal provision, 
Hozumi thought that while the creditor could claim compensation for damages it 
was unclear whether he could enforce performance.97 Ume, the chief draftsman, 
who also attended the meeting, defended Hozumi’s draft of Article 414 by arguing 
that the provision was needed to affirm that damages was also a remedy for non-
performance and that the notion that compulsory performance was the only remedy 
for non-performance was wrong.98 In his Minpō Yōgi (A Basic Commentary on the 
Civil Code), Ume maintained that Articles 414 and 415 were not the full adoption of 
either the principle of specific performance or the principle of damages, but they 
were rather a combination of these two principles. Ume explained that, if the latter 
principle was fully adopted, Article 414 would not have provided other means of 
enforcement, for example the creditor’s right to hire a third person to perform the 
obligation at the expense of the debtor.99  
Based on the minutes of the meeting and the commentary above, it can be 
observed that both Hozumi and Ume recognised both specific performance and 
                                                      
97 ‘Stenographic Minutes’, vol 18, 39. 
98 ibid 46.  
99 Kenjirō Ume, Minpō Yōgi (A Basic Commentary on the Civil Code), vol 3 (Yūhikaku 1984) 51. 
However, the drafts of arts 414 and 415 were prepared by Hozumi, not Ume. See Tamura, 
‘Modernization Process in Japan’ 39-41. 
 165 
damages as primary remedies for non-performance. However, one cannot be certain 
which foreign rules were actually used as the models for Articles 414 and 415 since 
neither the draftsmen nor the examiners discussed foreign provisions which 
Hozumi claimed to consult specifically. This shows the differences between the 
Japanese and Thai codification processes. The former appeared to focus on the 
question ‘why was each rule adopted?’ while the latter on ‘which foreign law 
should be copied?’. To identify the underlying foreign principles behind the 
Japanese provisions, one needs to examine their text thoroughly.  
A brief glance at Articles 414 and 415 gives an impression that the Japanese 
draftsmen relied on the text of Articles 382 and 383 of the Old Japanese Civil Code 
(the Minpō of 1890),100 which were drafted in French by Boissonade, who did not 
reveal the foreign models of these provisions. Linguistically, the text of Article 414 
appeared to be based on the text of Article 382 while the text of Article 415 agrees 

















                                                      










Article 382 of the Minpō of 1890 Article 414 of the Minpō of 1898 
If the creditor claims for the direct 
performance of the obligation in accordance 
with its form and true meaning, then the 
court has to order it insofar as the direct 
performance is possible without to 
[depriving] the debtor of any physical 
freedom. 
        If the purpose of the obligation is some 
physical things among the property of the 
debtor under his power, then the court has 
to attach them by virtue of its authority and 
to hand them over to the creditor. 
        If the purpose of the obligation consists 
in [a] certain action, then the court has to 
allow the creditor to hire a third person for 
this 
action at the expense of the creditor.  
        If the purpose of the obligation consists 
in [a] certain inaction, then the court has to 
allow the creditor to remove the outcome of 
the unjustified action performed by the 
debtor at [the] expense of the debtor and to 
take suitable measures to prevent possible 
breach of the obligation in the future. 
        Even in cases of Paragraph 1 to 4, the 
creditor may still demand compensation for 
damage. 
        The procedure of enforcement against 
the debtor has to be provided in the Law of 
Civil Procedure.101 
 
When a debtor does not voluntarily perform 
the obligation, the creditor may make a 
demand for compulsory performance to the 
Court, unless the nature of the obligation 
does not permit it. 
        When the nature of the obligation does 
not permit of compulsory performance of an 
act for its subject, the creditor may demand 
the Court to cause a third person to do the 
same at the expense of the debtor; but with 
regard to an obligation which has a juristic 
act for its subject, a judgment may be 
substituted for an expression of intention by 
the debtor. 
        With regard to an obligation which has 
a forbearance for its subject the creditor may 
demand the removal of what has been done 
at the expense of the debtor and have proper 
measures adopted for the future. 
        The provisions of the preceding three 
Paragraphs do not affect a demand for 
compensation for damages.102 
 
Table 5 - 1: Comparisons between the texts of the rules concerning specific 
performance in the Minpōs of 1890 and 1898 
 
 
                                                      
101 Japanese Civil Code of 1890, art 382 tr by Shiori Tamura in email from Tamura to author 
(21 May 2012). The original French texts of art 382 is available at  
http://jalii.law.nagoyau.ac.jp/civil_code/pdf/codeciviljapon1890.expose_01/01.biens/01.b
iens_02/codeciviljapon1890.expose_01_00040.b.01150.01020000_a.10000400.pdf. 
102 Japanese Civil Code of 1898, art 414 in De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 22. 
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Article 383 of the Minpō of 1890 Article 415 of the Minpō of 1898 
In cases where the debtor refuses to effect 
performance, the creditor may demand 
compensation for damage if he fails to claim 
for enforcement, or if the performance 
cannot be enforced due to its nature; the 
same shall apply if the performance becomes 
impossible for any cause for which the 
debtor is responsible. 
        The creditor may demand compensation 
for damage also in case of simple delay.            
        The amount of compensation should be, 
so long as the parties have reached no 
agreement on it, determined by the court 
according to the distinctions and conditions 
provided in the following articles unless a 
certain amount of compensation is 
prescribed by law.103 
 
When the debtor does not perform the 
obligation in accordance with the true intent 
and purpose of the same, the creditor may 
demand compensation for accruing damage. 
The same applies when performance has 
become impossible owing to a cause 
attributable to the debtor.104 
Table 5 - 2: Comparisons between the texts of the rules concerning damages in the 
Minpōs of 1890 and 1898 
 
 
 It is worth repeating that in his Annotated Civil Code of Japan, De Becker linked 
Article 414 to Article 415 of the same Code, Articles 73 to 76 of the Japanese Code of 
Civil Procedure, and ss 249 and 251 of the BGB,105 and he linked Article 415 to 
Article 414 of the same Code and ss 250, 286 and 325 of the BGB.106 The BGB is the 
only foreign law to which De Becker referred; he mentioned none of provisions of 
the French Code civil. However, having considered the texts of both Articles 414 and 
415, at least three noticeable features stand out. First, Article 414 appears to be a 
procedural rather than a substantive rule. It prescribes methods for enforcing 
performance where the debtor does not perform his obligation. This feature 
certainly does not derive from the BGB, which deals with only the substantive 
                                                      
103 Japanese Civil Code of 1890, art 383 tr by Shiori Tamura in ‘Modernization Process in 
Japan (3)’ 39 < http://www.openlegaltextbook.info/LA275/data/uploads/main-
text/23_part2-modernization-obligation.pdf> accessed 17 January 2013. The original French 
texts of art 383 is available at 
http://jalii.law.nagoyau.ac.jp/civil_code/pdf/codeciviljapon1890.expose_01/01.biens/01.b
iens_02/codeciviljapon1890.expose_01_00040.b.01150.01020000_a.10000400.pdf. 
104 Japanese Civil Code of 1898, art 415 in De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 25. 
105 ibid 22. 
106 ibid 25. 
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aspect of specific performance. In fact, the provisions concerning the enforcement of 
performance are contained in the German Civil Procedure Code. Second, Article 414 
recognises the distinction between obligations to give, obligations to do and not to 
do, which is a main characteristic of the French law of obligations. The enforcement 
of performance in Article 414 appears to accord with this distinction. This feature is 
clearly not a main feature of the law of obligations in the BGB. Third, both Articles 
414 and 415 appear to keep a balance between the positions of specific performance 
and damages. The last paragraph of Article 414 with confirmation of Article 415 
states that ‘the provisions of the proceeding three Paragraphs do not affect a 
demand for compensation for damages [sic]’. Without knowledge of Japanese 
jurisprudence, the texts of these two provisions easily leads us to understand that, 
in case of breach of contract, the creditor is always entitled to both remedies, specific 
performance and damages concurrently. Article 415, other than the second part 
concerning impossibility of performance, does not directly impose any condition as 
to the fault element107 or give the debtor a second chance to perform his obligation. 
This feature clearly is not a product of the German concept of specific performance 
and the German principle of fault (Verschuldensprinzip), which is a ‘requirement for 
the availability of contractual remedies’.108 The analysis of these three features point 
to the conclusion that Articles 414 and 415 were not mainly based on the BGB 
provisions as De Becker’s book suggests. 
 On closer examination of De Becker’s links between the Japanese and German 
provisions, from both conceptual and linguistic perspectives, there is hardly a link 
between the Japanese Article 414 and ss 249 and 251 BGB. Ss 249 and 251 BGB 
concern restitution in kind while Article 414 enforcement of performance. Article 
415 appears to deals with two situations, the right to compensation for damage in 
general and the right to compensation for damage in case of impossibility of 
performance owing to a cause attributable to the debtor. These two situations are 
irrelevant to s 250 BGB. One may identify a superficial link between s 286 BGB, 
which concerns the right to damages in case of delay, and s 325, which concerns the 
right to damages in case of impossibility of performance in reciprocal contracts, and 
Article 415 because they all deal with the same topic, the right to damages. However, 
                                                      
107 Akira Kamo, ‘Crystallization, Unification, or Differentiation? The Japanese Civil Code 
(Law of Obligations) Reform Commission and Basic Reform Policy (Draft Proposals)’ (2010) 
24 CJAL 171, 194. 
108 GH Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon 1988) 8. See 
also Arthur von Mehren and James Russell Gordley, The Civil Law System: An Introduction to 
the Comparative Study of Law (2nd edn, Little, Brown 1977) 1106; Basil Markesinis, Hannes 
Unberath, and Angus Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2006) 380–81. 
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one cannot leap to the conclusion that Article 415 was modelled on ss 286 and 325 
BGB as De Becker’s book suggests. This is because while in Japanese law the right to 
damages in Article 415 coexists with the right to specific performance in Article 414 
as equal remedies, in German law, the right to compensation for damage is 
generally a secondary remedy of non-performance, which can be invoked when 
certain requirements are satisfied.109  
 The analysis above is consistent with some Japanese scholars’ latest 
observations; the reassessment of the reception of foreign civil law in Japan has led 
them to reconsider the origins of certain provisions of the Minpō, including Articles 
414 and 415. Kitagawa contended that Articles 414 and 415 were products of the 
Code civil.110 This view is more convincing than the suggestion that the provisions 
were based on the BGB as implied by De Becker’s. Even from a linguistic 
perspective we find some similarities between the texts of Articles 414 and 415 and 


















                                                      
109 Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, ‘The New Approach to Breach of Contract in German Law’ in 
Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (Hart 
Publishing 2005) 140. See also Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations  : Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (OUP 1996) 776; Reinhard Zimmermann, The New German 
Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (OUP 2005) 50. 
110 Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law’ 21–23. See also Kiyoshi Igarashi, Einführung in das 
japanische Recht (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1990) 5. See also Noda, Introduction of 
Japanese Law 51. 
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The French Code civil of 1804 Article 414 of the Minpō of 1898 
Article 1142 Any obligation to do or not to 
do resolves itself into damages, in case of 
non-performance on the part of the debtor.111 
 
Article 1143 Nevertheless, a creditor is 
entitled to request that what has been done 
through breach of the undertaking be 
destroyed; and he may have himself 
authorized to destroy it at the expense of the 
debtor, without prejudice to damages, if 
there is occasion.112 
 
Article 1144 A creditor may also, in case of 
non-performance, be authorized to have the 
obligation performed himself, at the debtor's 
expense.113 
 
Article 1145 Where there is an obligation not 
to do, he who violates it owes damages by 
the mere fact of the violation.114 
 
When a debtor does not voluntarily perform 
the obligation, the creditor may make a 
demand for compulsory performance to the 
Court, unless the nature of the obligation 
does not permit it. 
        When the nature of the obligation does 
not permit of compulsory performance of an 
act for its subject, the creditor may demand 
the Court to cause a third person to do the 
same at the expense of the debtor; but with 
regard to an obligation which has a juristic 
act for its subject, a judgment may be 
substituted for an expression of intention by 
the debtor. 
        With regard to an obligation which has 
a forbearance for its subject the creditor may 
demand the removal of what has been done 
at the expense of the debtor and have proper 
measures adopted for the future. 
        The provisions of the proceeding three 
Paragraphs do not affect a demand for 
compensation for damages. 
 
Table 5 - 3: Comparisons between the texts of the rules concerning specific 
performance in the Code civil of 1804 and Minpō of 1898 
 
 
The Japanese Article 414 conceptually resembles the French Articles 1142 to 1143 at 
least in three aspects. First, the two laws deal with methods for enforcing 
performance: they emphasise the procedural side of specific performance. Second, 
they draw a distinction between obligations to give and obligations to do and not to 
do. Performance is enforced in accordance with this distinction. Third, specific 
performance does not prejudice the creditor’s right to claim compensation for 
damage.  
                                                      
111 Code civil, art 1142 tr by Legifrance 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721&dateTe
xte=20060406> accessed 17 January 2013. 
112 ibid art 1143. 
113 ibid art 1144. 
114 ibid art 1145. 
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The French Code civil of 1804 Article 415 of the Minpō of 1898 
Article 1147 A debtor shall be ordered to pay 
damages, if there is occasion, either by 
reason of the non-performance of the 
obligation, or by reason of delay in 
performing, whenever he does not prove 
that the non-performance comes from an 
external cause which may not be ascribed to 
him, although there is no bad faith on his 
part.115 
 
Article 1148 There is no occasion for any 
damages where a debtor was prevented 
from transferring or from doing that to 
which he was bound, or did what was 
forbidden to him, by reason of force majeure 
or of a fortuitous event.116 
 
When the debtor does not perform the 
obligation in accordance with the true intent 
and purpose of the same, the creditor may 
demand compensation for accruing damage. 
The same applies when performance has 
become impossible owing to a cause 
attributable to the debtor. 
Table 5 - 4: Comparisons between the texts of the rules concerning damages in the 
Code civil of 1804 and Minpō of 1898 
 
 
Despite Article 415’s affirmation of equality between specific performance and 
damages, it is not completely certain that this provision was founded on French 
law.117 One important reason is that Article 415 does not adopt the French principle 
of force majeure but appears to borrow the German term ‘impossibility of 
performance’. This means that force majeure is not a requirement for impossibility of 
performance in Japanese law. Another reason is that while the French Article 1147 
uses the terms ‘non-performance’ and ‘delay’, which are usually associated with the 
principle of fault,118 as causes of compensation for damage, the Japanese Article 415 
appears to require only that ‘the debtor does not performance the obligation’. This 
may lead us to understand that once the debtor fails to perform his obligation 
regardless of any reasonable excuse, for example force majeure, he is always 
responsible for damages. Clearly, this understanding belongs to neither German nor 
French jurisprudence. However, in reality, the German principle of fault was 
                                                      
115 ibid art 1147. 
116 ibid art 1148. 
117 Tamura, ‘Modernization Process in Japan’ 40.  
118 Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1992) 30–31. 
However, none of Code civil provisions expressly recognises the principle of fault. 
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adopted by Japanese lawyers in determining contractual liability.119 The reception of 
German jurisprudence in interpreting the rules of non-performance and remedies 
for non-performance is discussed below. 
2.2 ‘Germanisation’ of the Japanese concept of non-performance and remedies for 
non-non performance 
The historical and theoretical analysis above provides clues as to the origin and 
theoretical foundations of Articles 414 and 415. Despite what the draftsmen said and 
what the wording of both provisions looks like, it does not necessarily follow that 
Japanese lawyers relied on this information in understanding the rules. It is 
therefore necessary to explore how Articles 414 and 415 were actually explained in 
law books. This thesis focuses on two of De Becker’s publications on the Minpō, 
namely Annotated Civil Code of Japan (1909) and The Principles and Practice of the Civil 
Code of Japan: A Complete Theoretical and Practical Exposition of the Motifs of the Japanese 
Civil Code (1921) because they were the main, if not sole sources of Japanese civil 
law on which Thai draftsmen relied. Although De Becker was a native of Great 
Britain, his 1909 book is regarded as ‘the most useful’ translation of the Minpō and 
his 1921 book was an ‘essential’ commentary in English speaking countries.120  
 In Japanese law, the understanding of contractual liability, namely breach of 
contract and contractual remedies, was profoundly influenced by German 
jurisprudence.121 According to Kitagawa, ‘the discussion on contractual liability may 
be seen as a classical example of such reception of German legal theory’.122 Breach of 
contract has been taxonomised in accordance with German jurisprudence, namely 
impossibility of performance, delayed performance and imperfect performance.123 In 
the Minpō, there is no provision dealing with initial impossibility of performance 
while subsequent impossibility is contained in the second part of Article 415, which 
also deals with another type of breach of contract, imperfect performance. Despite 
the fact that initial impossibility is not expressly recognised by the Minpō, according 
to Kitagawa, ‘the draftsmen clearly stated that initial impossibility made a contract 
null and void’.124 Subsequent impossibility, which is a main category of breach of 
                                                      
119 Kamo, ‘Crystallization’ 194. 
120 Richard W Rabinowitz, ‘Materials on Japanese Law in Western Languages’ (1955) 4 AJCL 
97, 99.  
121 Kamo, ‘Crystallization’ 191; Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law’ 21. 
122 Kitagawa, ibid.  
123 Kamo, ‘Crystallization’ 193; Oda, Japanese Law 137–38. 
124 Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law’ 20. See also Oda, ibid 137. 
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contract, is recognised in Article 415. At the meeting of the draft examination, 
Hozumi, who drafted this provision, explained that the Japanese concept of 
impossibility of performance is not confined to force majeure and fortuitous 
accidents.125 This implied that the German concept of impossibility of performance 
was adopted.  
 Delayed performance is dealt with exclusively in Article 412, which states:  
 
        When there is a certain (definite) term for the performance of an 
obligation [,] the debtor is responsible for delay (is in mora) from the time 
when the term arrives. 
        When there is an uncertain (indefinite) term for the performance of an 
obligation, the debtor is responsible for delay (is in mora) from the time he 
knew of the arrival of the term. 
        When there is no fixed term for the performance of the obligation the 
debtor is responsible for delay (is in mora) from the time when he has 
received a demand for performance.126 
 
De Becker explained that ‘this article determines the point of time from which the 
debtor becomes responsible for delay’ and referred it to s 284 BGB.127 An important 
question arises from this reference as to how Article 412 of the Minpō and s 284 BGB 
are related. The two provisions are obviously literally different particularly 
regarding obligations with no fixed time of performance. Article 412(3) clearly states 
that the debtor is responsible for delay when he receives a demand for performance 
from the creditor. This provision resembles the concept of Mahnung in German law. 
However, while s 326 BGB requires the creditor to give the debtor a second chance 
(Nachfrist) before he can seek damages in lieu of performance and rescission, this 
requirement is not incorporated into the Minpō. This means that the creditor can 
demand damages in lieu of performance without giving the debtor an additional 
period of time to discharge his duty.128 Moreover, in the Minpō, there is no 
provision similar to s 285 BGB, which recognises the principle of fault as a crucial 
factor in determining breach of contract caused by delay. With the help of a 
Japanese court the principle of fault was incorporated into Japanese contract law 
though not in a systematic manner. In 1922, the Supreme Tribunal of Japan set a 
                                                      
125 Tamura, ‘Modernization Process in Japan’ 40. 
126 Japanese Civil Code of 1898, art 412 in De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 19. 
127 De Becker, ibid. 
128 ibid 19-20. But if the creditor prefers to rescind the contract the general rule is that he 
must give the debtor a second chance to perform, see Japanese Civil Code of 1898, art 541: ‘If 
one party does not perform his obligation, the other party may fix a reasonable period of 
time and demand performance within such period; and if the contract is not performed 
within that period of time the other party may rescind it. 
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precedent that the debtor’s fault was a prerequisite to the right to claim damages in 
case of delay.129 
 Imperfect performance is the third category of breach of contract which is 
contained in the first part of Article 415. Literally, this provision seems to 
encompass all types of breach of contract as it states ‘when the debtor does not 
perform the obligation in accordance with the true intent and purpose of the same’. 
This interpretation is confirmed by De Becker’s commentary on Article 415, where 
he elaborated on the situations which fell within the scope of this provision. He 
wrote: 
 
The true intent and purpose of an obligation consists in making the 
prestation which agrees with the subject of the obligation on the date and 
at the place fixed for performance. When, therefore, the performance is 
effected behind time or at a different place, or a thing with latent defects 
(kakuretaru kasha aru mono) is delivered, the act is not in accordance with the 
true intent and purpose of the obligation.130 
 
Kitagawa observed that the interpretation of Article 415 in this manner was usual at 
the time of enactment of the Minpō of 1898. As a result, the original understanding 
of Article 415 is that it covered any situation which the debtor failed to completely 
perform his obligation, including delay, impossibility and defects. He explained that 
the concept of impossibility which is contained in the last sentence of the article was 
used as an illustration and therefore not treated as a principal form of breach of 
contract as it was in German civil law.131 
 However, the conceptual and practical understanding of Article 415 
dramatically changed after the ‘germanisation’ of contractual liability in Japanese 
civil law. According to Kitagawa, ‘this is because civil law scholars introduced the 
German default provision’s bipartite structure of delay in performance and 
impossibility of performance and the principle underlying such parallel structure (ie 
initial impossibility theory) into Japan and these concepts became the conceptual 
backbone of Japanese law of obligations’.132 After the concept of positive breach of 
contract had judicially been introduced to German contract law as the third form of 
breach of contract, the Japanese found a way to import it to their private law system. 
They have used and construed their existing Article 415 as a reflection of the 
                                                      
129 Judgement of the Supreme Tribunal (22 November 1922) Minroku 27-1978 cited in Oda, 
Japanese Law 138. 
130 De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 24. 
131 Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law’ 19–20. 
132 ibid 22. See also Kamo, ‘Crystallization’ 193. 
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German concept of positive breach of contract.133 An example can be found in 
Hiroshi Oda’s recent book on Japanese law where on Article 415 he explains that: 
 
[it] is denoted as imperfect performance in that the obligation may have 
been performed, but not in a proper manner. An example is the delivery of 
defective goods in a contract for sale. Another example is where the obligor 
delivered poultry infected with disease, which later spread to the obligee’s 
farm.134 
 
In the footnote to this statement he added that ‘German theory categorises such 
improper performance as positive breaches of obligation (positive 
Vertragsverletzungen)’.135 Having accepted the new judicially-invented concept of 
German law, Japanese civil law with regard to contractual liability has completely 
followed the German-type tripartite structure theory that breach of contract exists in 
three forms, delayed performance, impossibility of performance and positive breach 
of contract.136 
2.3 The primacy of specific performance in the Minpō 
Article 414, the basis of the concept of specific performance in Japanese law, was 
understood differently before it was ‘germanised’. According to Kitagawa,  
 
at the time of enactment of the Minpō of 1898, the term ‘compulsory 
performance’ in Article 414(1) was understood as ‘direct compulsion of 
performance’ which may include even physical restraint of the obligator. 
Accordingly, alternative performance provided in the second paragraph of 
the same article was understood literally to mean an alternative method for 
compulsion of performance that could be used where direct compulsion 
could not be conducted.137  
 
Later, the interpretation of Article 414 was reshaped in accordance with German 
jurisprudence. This is illustrated by De Becker’s commentary on this provision 
where he commented that it determined the right of the creditor where he failed to 
                                                      
133 ibid 22-23. 
134 Oda, Japanese Law 138. 
135 ibid. 
136 Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law’ 22–23. 
137 ibid 23-24. 
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perform his obligation and where he referred this provision to ss 249 and 251 
BGB.138 
 Despite the recognition of specific performance as a contractual remedy and 
despite the attempt to construe it in accordance with German jurisprudence, specific 
performance has never retained its position as the sole primary contractual remedy 
in Japanese civil law from the beginning. This means that Japan’s system of specific 
performance is fundamentally different from Germany’s. There are at least two 
reasons for supporting this conclusion. First, if the concept of imperfect 
performance, which is laid down by Article 415, is interpreted as the source of all 
kinds of breach of contract as De Becker propounded, the right to claim damages is 
also regarded a primary remedy as the provision clearly states. Even if this law is 
only understood to be a form of breach of contract which is comparable to positive 
breach of contract in German law as many Japanese lawyers suggest, the right to 
claim damages is still regarded as a primary right for breach of contract. This is 
because Article 414(4) clearly states that the right to specific performance mentioned 
in the first three paragraphs of Article 414 does not affect the right to claim 
compensation for damage. Both Hozumi, who drafted Article 414, and Ume, the 
chief draftsman, consistently affirmed that both specific performance and damages 
were the primary remedies for non-performance (See 2.1 above).139 This is proof that 
Japanese law accepts the coexistence of two primary remedies, specific performance 
and damages, for breach of contract. The clear wording of Articles 414 and 415 
appears to provide no room for German legal science to intervene in their clear 
literal meaning. To illustrate how early commentators of the Minpō explained the 
relationship between specific performance and damages, it is worth examining De 
Becker’s commentary on Article 414. He wrote: 
 
What should the creditor do if the debtor fails to make voluntary 
performance in accordance with the rules detailed [Article 414] so far? 
There are two alternatives presented to him for his choice, namely (1) to 
enforce performance, or (2) to demand compensation for damages [sic].140 
 
 Second, Article 414 focuses on the procedural aspect of specific performance.  
This is not what s 241 BGB has been thought of. As Kitagawa pointed out that 
                                                      
138 De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 22–23. See also JE De Becker, The Principles 
and Practice of the Civil Code of Japan: A Complete Theoretical and Practical Exposition of 
the Motifs of the Japanese Civil Code (Butterworth 1921) 262–63. 
139 p 164 above. 
140 De Becker, Principles and Practice 262. See also De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan 22–
25. 
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Article 414 was originally understood as direct compulsion of performance, it is not 
surprising that some modern commentators of Japanese civil law interpret this 
article as the source of methods of enforcement of the contract rather the source of 
the right to performance under substantive law. For example, Oda did not 
categorise specific performance a substantive right; instead it was explained under 
the head of ‘Enforcement of obligation’. On the other hand, only the right to claim 
damages is mentioned in the topic ‘Effects of irregularity of performance’ in which 
he explained that the creditor had the right to claim damages in case of breach of 
contract, namely delayed performance, impossibility of performance and imperfect 
performance.141  
 When comparing the concept of specific performance as propounded by De 
Becker in his The Principles and Practice of the Civil Code of Japan with that of Schuster 
in his The Principles of German Civil Law, one finds some apparent differences 
between the two concepts, namely that specific performance is not the only primary 
remedy for non-performance and that not every obligation gives rise to specific 
performance. Plod claimed that the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 used these two 
books as the principal sources of information on the Minpō of 1898 and the BGB 
respectively.142 The question remains as to whether Plod and the Thai draftsmen 
actually consulted the two sources to compare the German and Japanese concepts of 
specific performance before copying the relevant Japanese and German rules. This 
will be investigated in the next chapter.   
CONCLUSION 
Plod’s belief that the Minpō was practically a copy of the BGB of 1900 was a 
misconception. The reception of foreign civil law in Japan was not as simple as Plod 
and Watson thought. For some decades, Japanese scholars have been aware that, in 
terms of the content of the Minpō, German law does not outweigh French law and 
that German jurisprudence came to its predominant position in the Japanese system 
of private law because of the ‘reception theory’ or the ‘germanisation’ of legal 
concepts and institutions of the Code, which occurred after the Code came into 
effect. This is the most convincing reason why in his book Annotated Civil Code of 
Japan of 1909, the BGB of 1900 was the only foreign law which De Becker linked to 
                                                      
141 Oda, Japanese Law 140–41. 
142 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 8–9. 
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the Japanese provisions. This misleading information led Plod into believing that 
the Minpō was a copy of the BGB and the referencing in De Becker’s book was a 
product of the Japanese draftsmen. In this chapter, three important facts have been 
discovered: first the Japanese draftsmen did not simply ‘copy’ the text of foreign 
law as the Thai draftsmen did; second, they did not exclusively rely on the BGB but, 
in fact, consulted a variety of foreign statutes and materials; and third, they did not 
produce an official list of the sources that they consulted: De Becker’s book misled 
Plod into believing they did. The case study of specific performance in the Minpō 
shows that the relevant rules have significant French characteristics and the 
Japanese did not adopt the German principle of the primacy of specific performance 
because Article 414 clearly states that specific performance and damages are 
primary remedies for non-performance and implies that some types of obligations, 
notably obligations to do and not to do, cannot be enforced specifically. Since the 
Thai Code of 1925 was founded on Plod’s misconception about the reception of 
German law in Japan, some important questions arise as to how such misconception 
affected the drafting of individual rules of the Code and how this has affected Thai 












THE DRAFTING OF THE RULES OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THE CIVIL 
AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF 1925 AND THE THAI CONCEPT OF SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE  
INTRODUCTION 
It was shown in Chapter 4 that Ernst Schuster in his The Principles of German Civil 
Law, on which the draftsmen of the Civil and Commercial Code of 1925 (‘Code of 
1925’) heavily relied for understanding the BGB of 1900, expounded the German 
principle of the primacy of specific performance according to mainstream German 
jurisprudence.1 However, Chapter 5 has demonstrated that the rules of specific 
performance in the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 (‘Minpō of 1898’) were of French 
rather than German heritage and that despite the ‘germanisation’ of breach of 
contract in Japan, the Japanese appeared to have treated specific performance and 
damages as remedies for non-performance equally. It has also revealed that Plod 
and other Thai draftsmen were misled by De Becker’s Annotation of Civil Code of 
Japan into believing that the Minpō of 1898 was practically a copy of the BGB of 1900. 
An important question arises as to how the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 adopted 
both German and Japanese provisions which represent different concepts in 
establishing the rules concerning specific performance. But a more important 
question is how the rules drafted based on the misconception of the origin of model 
rules affected Thai lawyers’ conceptual understanding of specific performance. 
 This chapter aims to answer both questions. In the first part, it explores the 
drafting of the rules relating to non-performance and specific performance 
especially to examine how the foreign rules of specific performance were borrowed 
and how the draftsmen’s misconception about the reception of German law in Japan 
influenced the making of the Thai rules. It also ascertains whether the draftsmen 
                                                      
1 See ch 4, ‘2.2 The concept of specific performance in Ernest Schuster’s The Principles of 
German Civil Law’ p 143 above. 
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possessed knowledge of foreign law or were aware of the principles behind the 
rules that they adopted at the time of codification. The second part of this chapter 
concerns a broad examination of Thai literature on specific performance and 
relevant topics to discover how legal borrowing without ‘a systematic knowledge of 
the law’ has affected Thai lawyers’ conceptions of specific performance. 
1. THE DRAFTING OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE PROVISIONS IN THE CODE OF 1925  
1.1 The structures of Book II and the provisions relating to non-performance and 
remedies for non-performance 
After it had reviewed some early provisions of Book I of the Civil and Commercial 
Code of 1923 (‘Code of 1923’) one by one and had drafted new articles to replace the 
old ones, the drafting committee tasked Plod with reorganising the approved 
provisions in accordance with the Minpō of 1898 at the meeting on 25 May 1925.2 
Having had experience with the drafting of Book I, the draftsmen seem to have 
worked on Book II on Obligations more systematically; the outline of it was made 
before the drafting of its provisions began. Once more, Plod and his brother, Chitr, 
were responsible for the structuring of Book II. On 17 August, they informed the 
meeting that the arrangement of Book II they had prepared was ‘a product of a 
comparative study of the BGB, the Minpō, the Brazilian Civil Code and the Swiss 
Federal Code of Obligations’ [my translation].3 On closer examination, the Thai 
structure bears closest similarity to the Japanese one, which appears to be a 






                                                      
2 National Archive of Thailand, Office of the Council of State Doc No 3, Book 
4(2),‘รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมายตั้งแตวันที่ 1 กันยายน ถึง 27 มีนาคม พ.ศ. 2467 (Minutes of the Meetings of 
the Committee of Legislation)’ (1 September 1924 - 27 March 1925); ibid Doc No 3, Book 
5(1),‘รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมายตั้งแตวันที ่1 สิงหาคม ถึง 27 ตุลาคม พ.ศ. 2468 (Minutes of the Meetings of 
the Committee of Legislation)’ (1 August - 27 October 1925). 
3 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (27 August 1925) 3. It is not clear which English translation of the 
Brazilian Civil Code the draftsmen used but it is highly possible that it was The Civil Code of 
Brazil translated by Joseph Wheless and published by Thomas Law Book Co in 1920. 
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Book II of the BGB of 1900 
(Wang)4 
Book III of the Minpō of 
1898 (De Becker)5 
 
Book II of the Code of 1925 
(Book of the Revised 
Drafts)6 
Law of Obligations 
First Section Scope of  
Obligations 
   First Title  Obligation of  
   Performance 
   Second Tile Default of the 
   Creditor 
Second Section Obligation Ex 
Contractu 
   First Title Creation of an 
   Obligation – Scope of a 
   Contract 
   Second Title Mutual contract 
   Third Title Promise of  
   Performance in favour of a 
   Third Party 
   Fourth Title Earnest -  
   Stipulated Penalty 
   Fifth Title Rescission 
Third Section  Extinction of 
Obligations 
   First Title Fulfilment  
   Second Title Lodgment 
   Third Title Set-off 
   Fourth Title Release 
 
Obligations (Obligatio) 
  Chapter I   General provisions 
     Section 1 Of the Subjects of  
     Obligations 
     Section 2 Of the Effect of  
     Obligations 
     Section 3 Obligations with a 
     Plurality of Parties 
        Sub-Section 1 General 
        Provisions 
        Sub-Section 2 Indivisible 
        Obligations 
        Sub-Section 3 Joint 
        Obligations 
        Sub-Section 4 Suretyship 
     Section 4 Assignment of 
     Obligations 
     Section 5 Of the Extinction 
     of Obligations 
         Sub-Section 1 Of  
         Performance 
         Sub-Section 2 Of Set-off  
         (Compensatio) 
         Sub-Section 3 Of  
         Novation 
         (Novatio) 
         Sub-Section 4 Of   
         Remission (Release) 
         Sub-Section 5 Of  
         Confusion (Confusio) 
Chapter II Of contracts 
 
Obligations 
Title I General Provisions 
   Chapter I Subject of  
   Obligations 
   Chapter II Effect of  
   Obligations 
      Part I   Non-performance 
      Part II  Subrogation 
      Part III Exercising debtor’s 
      Claims 
      Part IV Cancellation of 
      fraudulent acts 
      Part V  Right of retention 
      Part VI Preferential rights 
   Chapter III Plurality of  
   debtors and creditors 
   Chapter IV Transfer of  
   Claims 
   Chapter V  Extinction of 
   Obligations 
      Part I  Performance 
      Part II Release 
      Part III Set off 
      Part IV Novation 
      Part V Merger 
Title II Contract 
      
  
Table 6 - 1: Comparison between the structures of Book II of the BGB of 1900, Book III 
of the Minpō of 1898 and Book II of the Code of 1925 
 
 
Based on the structure of Book III of Obligations of the Minpō in De Becker’s 
Annotated Civil Code of Japan, the provisions of Book II of the Code of 1925 
concerning non-performance and remedies for non-performance are subsumed 
under Chapter II entitled ‘Effect of Obligations’. However, while there is no further 
division under the Japanese heading of Effect of Obligations, the Thai draftsmen 
divided the chapter of the same name into six parts and put the provisions 
concerning non-performance and remedies for non-performance in the first part of 
the chapter entitled ‘Non-performance’.  
 
 
                                                      
4 Chung Hui Wang, The German Civil Code: Translated and Annotated (Stevens and Sons 1907) 
x. 
5 JE de Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2 (Butterworth 1909) Contents. 
6 Office of the Council of State, Doc No 79, ‘การตรวจแกรางประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 1 และ บรรพ 2 
(The Book of the Revised Drafts)’ (1925) 11. 
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Heading Article  Contents 
Chapter I 
Subject of Obligations 
194 The nature of obligatory 
rights and duties / the right 
to specific performance 
 
Chapter II Part I 203, 204 and 206 Debtor’s delay (mora 
solvendi) 
 
205 Debtor’s excuse for delay – 
the principle of fault 
 
207-210  Creditor’s delay (mora 
accipiendi) 
 
211-212 Creditor’s excuse for delay 
 
213 Compulsory performance / 
the creditor’s right to specific 
performance / the creditor’s 
right to compensation for 
damage 
 
215 Imperfect performance / the 
creditor’s right to 
compensation for damage 
 
216 and 217 The effects of delayed 
performance 
 
218 Impossibility of performance 
(debtor’s fault) / the 
principle of fault 
 
219  Impossibility of performance 
(without debtor’s fault) / the 
principle of fault 
 
222-225 Compensation for damage 
 
Table 6 - 2: Structure of Code of 1925 provisions relating to non-performance and 
remedies for non-performance 
 
1.2 The making of specific performance rules and relevant provisions 
Since all of Books I and II were drafted by copying, there can be no doubt that the 
provisions relating to non-performance and remedies for non-performance were 
borrowed from foreign law. Despite the fact that the drafting committee set up the 
outline of Book II before starting drafting its provisions, the non-performance 
provisions were not considered collectively and systematically but rather 
individually. The draftsmen reviewed the relevant provisions of the Code of 1923 
article by article in accordance with the framework. Almost all of them were 
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abandoned and replaced by newly drafted provisions, most of which were copied 
from the BGB and some of which from the Minpō as shown in following table. 
Inspired by De Becker’s method which was misinterpreted by Plod as a method 
used by the Japanese draftsmen,7 in each draft provision, the draftsmen made 
reference to foreign provisions (see the list of abbreviations of foreign law, statutes 
and texts in ch 3 above)8 
 
English drafts of the Code of 1925 Foreign models 
Article 194  By virtue of an obligation the 
creditor is entitled to claim performance 
from the debtor. The performance may 
consist in a forbearance. 
(G.241)9 
 
BGB (1900) s 241  By virtue of an obligation 
the creditor is entitled to claim performance 
from the debtor. The performance may 
consist in a forbearance.10  
Article 203  If a time for performance is 
neither fixed nor to be inferred from the 
circumstances, the creditor may demand the 
performance forthwith, and the debtor may 
perform this part forthwith. 
        If a time is fixed it is to be presumed, in 
case of doubt, that the creditor may not 
demand the performance before that time; 
the debtor, however, may perform earlier.  
(G. 271)11 
 
BGB (1900) s 271  If a time for performance is 
neither fixed nor to be inferred from the 
circumstances, the creditor may demand the 
performance forthwith, and the debtor may 
performance his part forthwith.  
        If a time is fixed it is to be presumed, in 
case of doubt, that the creditor may not 
demand performance before that time; the 
debtor, however, may perform earlier.12 
Article 204  If the debtor does not perform 
after warning given by the creditor after 
maturity, he is in default through the 
warning. 
        If a time by the calendar is fixed for the 
performance, the debtor is in default without 
warning if the does not perform at the fixed 
time. The same rule applies if a notice is 
required to precede the performance, and 
the time is fixed in such manner that it may 
be reckoned by the calendar from the time of 
notice. 
(C/P G.284; S.O. 102)13 
BGB (1900) s 284  If the debtor does not 
perform after warning given by the creditor 
after maturity, he is in default through the 
warning. Bringing and action for the 
performance and the service of an order for 
payment in hortatory process are equivalent 
to warning. 
        If the time by the calendar is fixed for 
the performance, the debtor is in default 
without warning if he does not perform at 
the fixed time. The same rule applies if a 
notice is required to precede the 
performance, and the time is fixed in such 
manner that it may be reckoned by the 
calendar from the time of notice.14 
 
Article 205  The debtor is not in default so BGB (1900) s 285  The debtor is not in default 
                                                      
7 Phraya Manavarajasevi, บันทึกคําสัมภาษณพระยามานวราชเสว ี(Transcript of the Interviews with Phraya 
Manavarajasevi) (Thammasat University 1982) 9. The original texts states: 
‘แลวญี่ปุนนี่นะมันไมปดหรอก เขากอปปมาจากไหนก็บอกเอาไว’. 
8 p 112 above. 
9 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 103. 
10 Wang, German Civil Code 55. 
11 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 106. 
12 Wang, German Civil Code 61. 
13 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 106. 
14 Wang, German Civil Code 64–65. 
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English drafts of the Code of 1925 Foreign models 
long as the performance is not effected in 
consequence of a circumstance for which he 
is not responsible. 
(G.285)15 
 
so long as the performance is not effected in 
consequence of a circumstance for which is 
not responsible.16 
 
Article 213  If the debtor fails to perform his 
obligation, the creditor may make a demand 
to the Court for compulsory performance; 
except where the nature of the obligation 
does not permit it. 
        When the nature of an obligation does 
not permit of compulsory performance, if the 
subject of the obligation is the doing of an 
act, the creditor may apply to the Court to 
have it done by a third person at the debtor’s 
expense but if the subject of the obligation is 
the doing of a juristic act, a judgment may be 
substituted for a declaration of intention by 
the debtor. 
        As to an obligation whose subject is the 
forbearance from an act, the creditor may 
demand the removal of what has been done 
at the expense of the debtor and have proper 
measures adopted for the future. 
        The provisions of the foregoing 
paragraphs do not affect the right to claim 
damages. 
(C/P old text 331-334; C/P J.414; Restitution 
in kind G.249-251 included in this section).17 
 
Minpō, Article 414  When a debtor does not 
voluntarily perform the obligation, the 
creditor may make a demand for 
compulsory performance to the Court, 
unless the nature of the obligation does not 
permit it. 
        When the nature of the obligation does 
not permit of compulsory performance, if the 
obligation has the performance of an act for 
its subject, the creditor may demand the 
Court to cause at a third person to do the 
same at the expense of the debtor; but with 
regard to an obligation which has a juristic 
act for its subject, a judgment may be 
substituted for an expression of intention by 
the debtor. 
        With regard to an obligation which has 
a forbearance for its subject the creditor may 
demand the removal of what has been done 
at the expense of the debtor and have proper 
measures adopted for the future. 
        The provisions of the preceding three 
Paragraphs do not affect a demand for 
compensation for damages [sic]. 
(In reference vide Art. 415 and the Code of 
Civil Procedure Art. 73-76; Also Arts. 249 
and 251 of the German Civil Code.)18  
 
Article 215  When the debtor does not 
perform the obligation in accordance with 
the true intent and purpose of the same, the 
creditor may claim compensation for any 
damage caused there by. 
(C/P J.415)19 
 
Minpō, Article 415  When the debtor does 
not perform the obligation in accordance 
with the true intent and purpose of the same 
(in forma specifica), the creditor may demand 
compensation for accruing damage. The 
same applies when performance has become 
impossible owing to a cause attributable to 
the debtor. 
(In reference vide Art. 414; also Arts. 250, 286 
and 325 of the German Civil Code.)20 
 
Article 218  When the performance becomes 
impossible in consequence of a circumstance 
for which the debtor is responsible, the 
debtor shall compensate the creditor for any 
damage arising from the non-performance. 
        In case of a partial impossibility the 
BGB (1900) s 280  Where the performance 
becomes impossible in consequence of a 
circumstance for which the debtor is 
responsible, the debtor shall compensate the 
creditor for any damage arising from the 
non-performance. 
                                                      
15 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 107. 
16 Wang, German Civil Code 65. 
17 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 109. 
18 De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 22. 
19 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 109. 
20 De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 25. 
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English drafts of the Code of 1925 Foreign models 
creditor may, by declining the still possible 
part of the performance, demand 
compensation for non-performance of the 
entire obligation, if the still possible part of 
performance is useless to him. 
(G.280)21 
 
        In case of partial impossibility the 
creditor may, by declining the still possible 
part of performance, demand compensation 
for non-performance of the entire obligation, 
if he has no interest in the partial 
performance. The provisions of 346 to 356 
applicable to the contractual right of 
rescission apply mutatis mutandis (f).22  
 
Article 219  The debtor is relieved from his 
obligation to perform if the performance 
becomes impossible in consequence of a 
circumstance for which he is not responsible 
occurring after the creation of the obligation. 
        If the debtor, after the creation of the 
obligation, becomes unable to perform, it is 




BGB (1900) s 275  The debtor is relieved from 
this obligation to perform if the performance 
becomes impossible in consequence of a 
circumstance for which he is not responsible 
(z) occurring after the creation of the 
obligation (a). 
        If the debtor, after the creation of the 
obligation, becomes unable to perform, it is 
equivalent to a circumstance rendering the 
performance impossible (b).24 
Table 6 - 3: Comparisons between Code of 1925 provisions relating to non-
performance and remedies for non-performance and their model rules 
 
 
The table above shows that most of the draft provisions were simply copies of their 
model rules. There are some linguistic alterations in Article 213, a copy of De 
Becker’s translation of Article 415 of the Minpō, concerning compulsory 
performance, which does not change the literal meaning of the model provision 
while Article 215 is a partial copy of De Becker’s translation of Article 415. The 
second part of Article 415 relating to impossibility of performance was ignored since 
it was contained in separate provisions, namely Articles 218 and 219, modelled on 
the BGB. The draftsmen’s discussion of the provisions in the table above reflects 
their general method for drafting the Code: they focused more on the wordings of 
the model rules than their conceptual foundations. According to the meeting 
minutes, some typical words and phrases, for example ‘lengthy wording’ and 
‘articulate wording’, were used to show the draftsmen’s judgement about the 
discussed model rules.25 This illustrates the draftsmen’s emphasis on the linguistic 
aspect of the model rules. 
At first glance, the outline of Part I of Chapter II of Code of 1925 Book II 
consisting of delayed performance, imperfect performance, impossibility of 
                                                      
21 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 110. 
22 Wang, German Civil Code 63–64. 
23 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 111. 
24 Wang, German Civil Code 62. 
25 See eg ‘Meeting Minutes’ (18 August 1925) 2-3. 
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performance, the right to specific performance and the right to damages seems to 
represent a well-organised system of non-performance following Japanese and 
German law. However, a detailed examination of the relevant meeting minutes 
proves that there was neither discussion about the underlying principles of the 
system of non-performance nor discussion about how each type of non-performance 
was conceptually connected and how it led to the remedies for non-performance. 
The draftsmen did not consult the meeting minutes of the drafting committee of the 
BGB and Minpō; they paid attention to the end products of Germany and Japan’s 
codifications. This leaves no doubt that they did not discuss the Roman foundations 
of the modern concepts of non-performance and remedies for non-performance. 
 The draftsmen’s adherence to the linguistic aspect of the rules is well 
illustrated by the drafting of the provision relating to the rights to specific 
performance and compensation for damage. On 24 August, the meeting reviewed 
Articles 331 to 334 of the Code of 1923,26 which concern specific performance, in 
comparison with Article 414 of the Minpō, Articles 956 and 957 of the Brazilian Civil 
Code and ss 249 and 251 BGB. Chitr proposed that Article 414 of the Minpō should 
be adopted since it was similar to the old Thai provisions (Articles 331 to 334 of the 
Code of 1923) but that the word ‘wilfully’27 in the Japanese model seemed 
unnecessary and should be removed.28 Cazeau suggested that the phrase ‘under the 
expense of the debtor’ should be added to the draft of the new provision to clarify 
the wording. The meeting approved Chitr and Cazeau’s proposals to draft a 
provision (present Article 213) relating to specific performance modelled on Article 
414 of the Minpō with a few alterations and agreed to drop Articles 331 to 334 of the 
Code of 1923.29 Other than Chitr and Cazeau’s proposals, there was no record of 
further discussion of the drafting of Article 213 on 24 August. However, at the 
meeting on 27 August, Plod, after reviewing the wording of the draft of Article 213 
of 24 August, suggested that the drafting committee should reconsider it. He 
                                                      
26 Code of 1923, art 331: ‘Where specific performance is possible and desirable the Court may 
at its discretion sanction the creditor’s demand for specific performance. 
Art 332:  ‘If the subject of the obligation is the doing of an act, the creditor may apply to the 
Court to have it done by a third person at the debtor’s expense’. [My translation] 
Code of 1923, art 333: ‘If the subject of the obligation is to do a juristic act or give a consent, 
the Court may appoint a third person to act on behalf of the debtor or a judgment may be 
substituted for a declaration of intention by the debtor’. [My translation] 
Code of 1923, art 334: ‘If the subject of the obligation is the forbearance from an act, the 
Court may order that what has been done be removed at the expense of the debtor and 
impose proper measures adopted for the future’. [My translation] 
27 This word does not exist in De Becker’s translation of art 414. In fact, De Becker used the 
term ‘voluntarily’. It is more likely that the recorder of the meeting wrote down the wrong 
word or otherwise Chitr made a mistake in saying the wrong word. 
28 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (24 August 1925) 2. 
29 ibid, 2-3. 
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proposed that, since in English law the term ‘specific performance’ used in the draft 
of 24 August had a narrow meaning, to cover the cases of restitution in kind as 
stated in ss 249 and 251 BGB, it should be replaced by the term ‘compulsory 
performance’ as used by De Becker in his translation of Article 414. He said: 
 
As I have examined the draft of Article 20 [present Article 213], I think that 
the term ‘specific performance’ according to English law has a too narrow 
meaning, and I therefore propose that we change it to ‘compulsory 
performance’ to accord with Article 414 of the Japanese Civil Code. Based 
on Sections 249 and 251 of the German Civil Code, this Japanese provision 
includes ‘restitution in kind’.30 [My translation] 
 
The meeting approved Plod’s proposal. (See the comparison between Article 213 of 
the Code of 1925 and Article 414 of the Minpō above.) This proposal shows that 
Plod relied on De Becker’s sources of Article 414 of the Minpō which referred to ss 
249 and 251 BGB. As the origin of Article 414 of the Minpō was discussed in Chapter 
5 above, it can now be shown that this reference is misleading: Article 414 in fact 
reflects French law. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5 above, ss 249 and 251 
BGB were not actually incorporated into the draft of Article 414 by Hozumi because 
Article 414 apparently deals with the enforcement of performance, not restitution in 
kind. (See Chapter 5, 2.1 ‘An anatomy of Articles 414 and 415 of the Minpō of 
1898’.)31 
 The draftsmen of the Code of 1925 not only borrowed the Japanese rule of 
specific performance (Article 414) they also copied the German provision, which 
lays the foundation of the concept of specific performance, s 241 BGB, word for 
word (see the comparison in the following table). This German provision was not 
adopted by the Japanese draftsmen who instead borrowed French law to establish 
the rule of specific performance in Article 414 of the Minpō. A question arises as to 
how the Thai draftsmen kept two conflicting foreign model rules of specific 








                                                      
30 ibid (27 August 1925) 3.  
31 p 163 above. 
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English draft of Article 194 of the Code of 
1925 
Wang’s translation of s 241 BGB (1900) 
(Model) 
By virtue of an obligation the creditor is 
entitled to claim performance from the 




By virtue of an obligation the creditor is 
entitled to claim performance from the 
debtor. The performance may consist in a 
forbearance.33 
Table 6 - 4: Comparison between the English draft of Article 194 of the Code of 1925 
and its model 
 
 
The meeting minutes of 18 August show that Chitr proposed that the first article of 
Book II on obligations should be copied from s 241 BGB. Unfortunately, there was 
no record of discussion as to why he chose this German provision. There was, 
however, a debate over the choosing of a model. Cazeau argued against copying s 
241 BGB and suggested that the first article of the Thai obligations chapter should be 
better based on Article 399 of the Minpō,34 which is the first provision of its Book III 
on obligations. The majority of the draftsmen voted in favour of Chitr’s proposal.35 
The reason for adopting s 241 BGB may be that the Thai draftsmen needed a 
provision to define the term ‘obligation’, and this German provision seemed to meet 
the need. Unfortunately, the method of drafting deprived the draftsmen of the 
opportunity to explore the principles behind s 241 BGB as well as its implications on 
the concept of specific performance in German law. For this reason, we can guess 
the answer of the question above that the draftsmen intended to use s 241 BGB 
simply as the definition of the term ‘obligations’ in the Code of 1925 and therefore 
the draftsmen never saw any problem in having both conflicting rules of specific 
performance (s 241 BGB and Article 414 of the Minpō) in the same place. Without a 
systematic knowledge of this German provision, it is impossible to understand its 
true meaning hidden behind the letter of the law. 
 The drafting of Article 215 of the Code of 1925, the rule which established the 
right to compensation for damage, was even more mysterious than the drafting of 
Articles 194 and 213 of the same Code. On 24 August, upon the completion of the 
drafting of Article 213, the drafting committee began to discuss the formation of the 
next article, the present Article 215. The meeting minutes only contain one small 
paragraph of the discussion: ‘the meeting had examined Section 286 of the German 
                                                      
32 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 103. 
33 Wang, German Civil Code 55. 
34 Japanese Civil Code of 1898, art 399:  ‘Even a thing which cannot be valued (estimated) in 
money may be made the subject of an obligation’ in De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, 
vol 2, 6. 
35 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (18 August 1925) 2.  
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Civil Code36 and Article 956 of the Brazilian Civil Code37 and agreed that both rules 
reflected the same principle. It therefore decided to draft the Thai provision based 
on them’.38 [My translation]  However, the draft of the provision attached to the 
meeting minutes of 24 August shows that the newly drafted rule was nearly a copy 
of s 286 BGB rather a combination of both foreign models. 
 
21. The debtor shall compensate the creditor for any damage arising from 
his default. 
       If by reason of default the performance becomes useless to the creditor, 
he may refuse to accept it and claim compensation for non-performance. 
(c/p. G.286; c/p. Br. 956.)39   
 
This original draft was later replaced by another draft. There is no record of when 
and how this change took place, but according to the Book of the Revised Drafts, the 
draft of Articles 194 to 225 submitted to the High Revising Committee on 8 
September does not contain the original draft of provisional Article 21. In fact, the 
first paragraph of the draft provision was removed while the second paragraph was 
maintained and given the article number 216. A new provision appeared dealing 
with the right to damages arising from the debtor’s default under the article number 
215. On closer scrutiny, this new provision is almost a copy of De Becker’s 
translation of the first part of Article 415. There are only a few linguistic alterations 








                                                      
36 BGB (1900), s 286:  ‘The debtor shall compensate the creditor for any damage arising from 
his default.  
          If the creditor has no interest in the performance in consequence of the default, he may, 
by refusing the performance, demand compensation for performance. The provisions of 346 
to 356 applicable to the contractual right of rescission apply mutatis mutandis’ in Wang, 
German Civil Code 65. 
37 Brazilian Civil Code, art 956: ‘The debtor responds for the damages which his default may 
cause (art 1058) 
          Single Paragraph. If the prestation by reason of the default, becomes useless to the 
creditor, he may refuse to accept it (engeital-a) and require satisfaction of the losses and 
damage’ in Joseph Wheless, The Civil Code of Brazil (Thomas Law Book Co 1920) 203. 
38 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (24 August 1925) 3. 
39 ibid 6.  
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Original English draft 
attached to the meeting 
minutes of 24 August 1925 
 
Revised English draft in the 
Books of the Revised Drafts 
(as of 8 September 1925) 
Model rules 
21. The debtor shall 
compensate the creditor for 
any damage arising from his 
default. 
       If by reason of default 
the performance becomes 
useless to the creditor, he 
may refuse to accept it and 
claim compensation for non-
performance.  
(c/p. G.286; c/p. Br. 956.)40 
Article 215  When the debtor 
does not perform the 
obligation in accordance 
with the true intent and 
purpose of the same, the 
creditor may claim 
compensation for any 
damage caused there by. 
(c/p J.415)41 
 
Article 216 If by reason of 
default, the performance 
becomes useless to the 
creditor, he may refuse to 
accept it and claim 
compensation for non-
performance.  
(c/p. G.286; c/p. Br. 956)42 
Minpō (1898), Article 415 
When the debtor does not 
perform the obligation in 
accordance with the true 
intent and purpose of the 
same (in forma specifica), the 
creditor may demand 
compensation for accruing 
damage. The same applies 
when performance has 
become impossible owing to 
a cause attributable to the 
debtor. 
(In reference vide Art. 414; 
also Arts. 250, 286 and 325 of 
the German Civil Code.)43   
[De Becker tr] 
 
BGB (1900), s 286 The debtor 
shall compensate the 
creditor for any damage 
arising from his default.  
        If the creditor has no 
interest in the performance 
in consequence of the 
default, he may, by refusing 
the performance, demand 
compensation for 
performance. The provisions 
of 346 to 356 applicable to 
the contractual right of 
rescission apply mutatis 
mutandis.44   
[Wang tr] 
 
Table 6 - 5: Comparison between the English draft of provisional art 21, the English 
drafts of arts 215 and 216 and their foreign model rules 
 
 
 In addition to the questions about when and why Article 215 was adopted, 
another important question is who replaced the original draft with the draft of 
Article 215. There are two possible answers. It may have been Guyon because it was 
normal practice for the original drafts of the Code of 1925 discussed by the 
draftsmen to be sent to him for comment before being submitted to the High 
                                                      
40 ibid.  
41 ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 109. 
42 ibid.  
43 De Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2, 25. 
44 Wang, German Civil Code 65. 
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Revising Committee. However, it was also usual that Guyon’s comments on the 
drafts would ultimately be discussed and approved by the drafting committee. 
Furthermore, the discussions as to his feedback were normally recorded in the 
minutes of the meetings. There is, however, no record of Guyon’s comments on the 
adoption of Article 415 of the Minpō in the minutes of the meetings that took place 
between 24 August and 8 September. This suggests that he was not the person who 
introduced this Japanese article to the Code of 1925. It is more likely that Plod 
added Article 215 modelled on the Japanese Article 415 since he was responsible for 
the preparation of the final drafts approved by the drafting committee to be 
submitted to the High Revising Committee. The absence of an explanation for the 
adoption of the Japanese Article 415 meant the absence of an explanation of how 
Article 215 coexists with Article 213. 
 In examining the meeting minutes, some interesting facts have been 
discovered. First, the rules concerning breach of contract in the Code of 1925 were 
mostly copied from the BGB, but the rules which established the right to 
performance (Article 213) and the right to compensation for damage (Article 215) 
were copied form Articles 414 and 415 of the Minpō respectively. Second, the 
draftsmen adopted s 241 BGB, the base of the German concept of specific 
performance, to establish Article 194. Third, the manner in which the foreign rules 
were copied and the discussion about the drafting of Article 413 prove that the 
draftsmen did not have knowledge of the German concept of non-performance, 
especially the principle of the primacy of performance nor the difference between 
the French and German concepts of specific performance. This is clearly illustrated 
by the adoption of s 241 BGB without discussing the principle behind it. Plod’s 
reliance on De Becker’s information about the source of Article 414 adds more proof 
that he was not aware of the difference between specific performance and 
restitution in kind in German law despite the fact that Schuster’s The Principles of 
German Civil Law, which he claimed to consult, clearly states this difference. He also 
seemed to have been unfamiliar with the German concept of specific performance. 
All these facts lead to one conclusion, that the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 
uncritically copied foreign provisions to establish the rules concerning specific 
performance without a systematic knowledge of the rules that they adopted. The 
most important problem of the adoption of these provisions is that other than 
linguistic reasons the draftsmen of the Code of 1925, unlike the Japanese draftsmen, 
did not explain why the model rules were chosen and how they were conceptually 
linked to each other within the system of remedies for non-performance. This raises 
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a question of whether, as a result of legal borrowing, this drafting method affected 
Thai lawyers’ understanding of specific performance. 
2. CONCEPTIONS OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THAI LAW  
The review of the drafting process of the Code of 1925 shows how the foreign rules 
of specific performance were imported to the Thai legal system. However, 
codification alone does not provide the full picture of the reception process. To 
obtain a full understanding of how this foreign law has been assimilated into the 
Thai legal system, it is also necessary to examine Thai lawyers’ theoretical and 
practical understanding of it through their publications and their judicial decisions. 
The assimilation of foreign legal rules is part of the reception process which Zentarō 
Kitagawa calls ‘theory reception’.45 It also illustrates the consequence of the 
codification or a result of legal borrowing. Although the focus of this research is on 
conceptual understanding of specific performance, it cannot completely ignore 
practical understanding, mainly judicial decisions. Practical understanding is also a 
main object of comparative law or in Rodolfo Sacco’s terms a ‘legal formant’ of a 
comparative study.46  
2.1 Practical understanding 
If one looks at the practical understanding of the concept of specific performance in 
general, one may find Hendrik Lando and Caspar Rose’s observation convincing. 
Referring to the opinions of Ernst Rabel47 and Korad Zweigert and Hein Kötz,48 
Lando and Rose suggested that the difference between the concepts of specific 
performance in the civil and common law systems or in German and French law is 
small in practice. The plaintiff usually seeks compensation for damage instead of 
performance.49 For this reason, a comparative study of the practical application of 
                                                      
45 Kitagawa, ‘Japanese Civil Law’ 32–36. 
46 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I 
of II)’ (1991) 39 AJCL 1, 21–23. 
47 Ernst Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs: eine rechtsvergleichende Darstellung, vol 1 (W de 
Gruyter 1936) 375. 
48 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, 
Clarendon Press 1998) 484. 
49 Hendrik Lando and Caspar Rose, ‘On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil 
Law Countries’ (2004) 24 IRLE 437, 477–79. 
 193 
specific performance in different systems may not produce a significant result in 
terms of differences. However, this is not a reason to ignore the practical 
understanding of this concept to see how it has been incorporated in Thai law. 
 As discussed in Chapter 3 above, the dominance of English law in Thailand, 
particularly at the Law School of the Ministry of Justice, during the transition period 
had a profound impact on the early development of Thai law. Most professional 
judges and lawyers educated at the Law School were students of English law and 
some of them continued to apply common law principles at Thai courts even after 
the Code of 1925 came into effect. According to Guenter Treitel, in English law, ‘the 
normal remedies for breach of contract are the action for an agreed sum, where the 
breach consists of failure to pay such a sum, and the action for damages, where the 
breach consists of failure to perform some other obligations’.50 Since specific 
performance was developed in the Court of Chancery, specific performance is an 
equitable remedy. It is a general rule that ‘equitable remedies are not available as of 
right but at the discretion of the court’.51 It has been suspected that in some cases the 
Thai court applied this English principle.52 In a case of a purchase of land, the 
Supreme Court in 1926 rejected the plaintiff’s claim to specific performance on the 
ground that it was inconvenient and difficult [for the Court] to determine the 
property boundaries. The court therefore awarded the plaintiff damages instead of 
performance.53 This decision clearly contradicts the law which does not allow the 
court to exercise its discretion. Under Article 213, the court may award the plaintiff 
damages instead of enforcing performance if the nature of the obligation does not 
permit specific performance. However, in this case, the Court did not establish that 
to enforce performance was impossible or contrary to the nature of the obligation: it 
only perceived that the determination of the property boundaries was difficult. In 
another case in 1943, the defender agreed to supply gunnysacks to the plaintiff. The 
defender stopped delivering the goods as agreed. The plaintiff claimed for 
performance. The defender used the Second World War as his excuse: this was 
rejected by the Supreme Court on the grounds that the contract did not specify that 
the goods must be imported from foreign countries. However, the Court only 
awarded the plaintiff damages on the grounds that the plaintiff had received 
                                                      
50 GH Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon 1988) 63. 
51 ibid. 
52 Seni Pramoj, ประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยวาดวยนิติกรรมและหนี้ (Juristic Acts and Obligations in the 
Civil and Commercial Code), vol 2 (Aksornsarn 1966) 630. 
53 Supreme Court Decision No 506/2469. See also the Supreme Court Decision Nos 226/118 
(2430 BE), 514/2469, 714/2469 and 632-33/2469; ibid 630-31.  
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gunnysacks from a third person since the defender breached the contract.54 Again, 
the Supreme Court arbitrarily exercised its discretion to determine the remedy for 
non-performance despite the fact that the enforcement of performance was still 
possible.  
 Other than those unusual cases discussed above, the application and 
interpretation of the concept of specific performance in Thailand has generally been 
in line with the wording of Article 213. The Thai courts tend to follow the clear text 
of Article 213 para 4 that the enforcement of performance does not prejudice the 
creditor’s right to damages and incline towards the mainstream theory55 in Thailand 
that the creditor has the right to choose between specific performance and damages 
in lieu of performance, as implied in a number of Supreme Court Decisions, ie 
Supreme Court Decision No 1035/2475 BE (1932 AD) where the Court decided that 
in case of non-performance the plaintiff could seek both performance and 
damages.56 The debtor can also choose between the enforcement of performance and 
termination of contract as stated in Supreme Court Decision No 331/2528 BE (1985 
AD). But the Supreme Court in 2002 held that the plaintiff must choose between 
performance and rescission: if he chose the latter he could not resort to the former 
because there was no longer the contract as the basis of performance.57  
 The aggrieved party’s right to choose remedies for non-performance was 
however impeded by the Supreme Court in Case No 2625/2551 in 2008. This case 
provided the Court with an opportunity to clarify the relationship between 
remedies for non-performance, especially specific performance and damages. This is 
the first time that the Supreme Court has implicitly reviewed the aggrieved party’s 
right to choose contractual remedies and therefore implied the principle of the 
primacy of specific performance. In this case, the Post and Telegraph Department 
lent a communication device to a company which agreed to pay the rent over the 
period it used it. The company breached the contract but sent a letter to the 
Department to terminate the contract.  The Department agreed with the termination 
of contract and demanded that the company return the device. This was ignored. 
The Department then filed a complaint claiming either performance or the value of 
the price of the device (damages in lieu of performance). The Supreme Court judges 
held that as long as the performance was possible the plaintiff had no right to claim 
                                                      
54 Supreme Court Decision No 815/2486. 
55 See 2.2 Conceptual understanding, below. 
56 Supreme Court Decision Nos 1035/2475. See also Supreme Court Decision Nos 2116/2553 
and 2116/2553 
57 Supreme Court Decision No 510/2545.  
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damages instead of performance.  Referring to Article 225 of the Code of 1925,58 the 
judges ordered the defender to pay only the interest on the value of the devices 
from the default date.59 Although it did not expound the principle of the primacy of 
performance, the Court attempted, to a certain degree, to clarify the ambiguous 
relationship between specific performance and damages under articles 213 and 215. 
Unfortunately, the judges in this case seem to have overlooked the fact that the 
contract had been rescinded before the case was brought before them. The effect of 
the termination of the contract should invalidate the claim for performance since 
there was no basis for contractual obligations (See Supreme Court Decision No 
510/2545 above). Despite this flaw, this judgement is still interesting in the sense 
that the court seemingly upheld the primacy of specific performance. The Supreme 
Court in Case No 2625/2551 may have understood that it was safeguarding the 
principle of the primacy of specific performance which has been long expounded by 
Thai academics and that by rejecting damages in lieu of performance this principle 
was defended.  
 It is uncertain whether the decision will be followed by subsequent cases60 and 
how much significance it has had on the study of specific performance since Thai 
writers do not usually raise issues of the relationship between specific performance 
and damages. The ambiguity in determining the right remedy for each case of non-
performance and the scope of the right to compensation for damage in case of non-
performance resulted from the blind copying of the Japanese Articles 414 and 415. 
Article 413 para 4 appears to confirm the equality between specific performance and 
damages. Article 415 only set up the general principle that the creditor has the right 
                                                      
58 Code of 1925, art 225: ‘If the debtor is bound to make compensation for the value of an 
object which has perished during the default, or which cannot be delivered for a reason 
which has arisen during the default, the creditor may demand interest, on the amount to be 
paid as the basis for the estimate of the value. The same rule applies if the debtor is bound to 
make compensation for the diminution in value of an object which has deteriorated during 
the default’. ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 113. This provision was a copy of the English 
translation of s 290 BGB (1900) by Chung Hui Wang in, German Civil Code 65–66. 
59 Supreme Court Decision No 2625/2551. 
60 Since the Thai legal system belongs to the civil law family, the principle of precedent does 
not exist and a court decision is not regarded as a source of law. It can only be an example of 
the application of a law, but it is a normal practice in the courts that a quality Supreme Court 
decision is followed by subsequent cases which have similar facts. Article 4 of the Code of 
1925 establishes the sources of law in Thai civil law. It states that: 
         ‘the law must be applied in all cases which come within the letter or the spirit of any its 
provisions. 
         Where no provision is applicable the case shall be decided according to the local 
custom. 
         If there is no such custom, the case shall be decided by analogy to the provision most 
nearly applicable, and, in default of such provision, by the general principles of law’. This 
provision was drafted based on Section 1 of the Swiss Civil Code. See ‘Book of the Revised 
Drafts’, 14-15. 
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to claim compensation for damage on the condition that the debtor does not effect 
his performance. But it does not distinguish between damages in lieu of 
performance and damages in addition to performance. 
 Despite Supreme Court Decision No 2625/2551 BE, the creditor’s right to 
choose between remedies as stated in Article 213 para 4, it is not convincing that the 
principle of the primacy of specific performance has been firmly established. 
Whenever they write a text on the law of obligations and attempt to conceptualise 
specific performance based on the principle of the primacy of performance, judges 
tend to produce contradictory statements as we will see below. This is because in 
cases of non-performance Article 213 para 4 clearly grants the creditor both rights to 
specific performance and damages concurrently and Article 415 gives the creditor 
the right to compensation for damage once the debtor fails to perform his 
obligations. The recognition of specific performance as the primary remedy of 
breach of contract therefore appears to contradict this provision. Pairoj Vayubhap,61 
then Vice-President of the Supreme Court and Editor of the Thai Bar’s Collection of 
Supreme Court Decisions of 2551, argued against Supreme Court Decision No 
2625/2551. Pairoj neither raised the issue of the termination of the contract to reject 
the claim for performance nor maintained that specific performance was not 
available. He was in favour of damages but did not clearly explain why the creditor 
deserved the right to damages instead of the right to performance. To justify the 
claim for damages, Pairoj only commented on the judgement that ‘under Article 215 
the plaintiff had the right to claim compensation for damage, including the value of 
the price of the device, in case of non-performance’.62 This opinion implies that he 
views that the creditor has the right to choose between specific performance and 
damages and that Article 215 was the source of both the rights to damages in lieu of 
performance and damages in addition to performance. However, in his book on the 
law of obligations, Pairoj seemed to say otherwise. He interpreted the right to 
damages as stated in Article 213 para 4 as ‘a supplementary remedy (มาตรการเสริม)’ of 
the enforcement of performance.63 Piroj saw the right to damages as a separate 
obligation; it was a right arising from breach of contract, not part of the content of 
the original obligation. On the surface, this appears to be consistent with German 
                                                      
61 Pairoj Vayubhap (born 1950) is currently the President of the Supreme Court of Thailand. 
He was briefly a full-time lecturer of law at Thammasat University. Pairoj holds a LLB and 
LLD (Hon) from Thammasat and has taught at the Institute of Legal Education of the Thai 
Bar and Thammasat where he is a professor extraordinarious. 
62 Pairoj Vayubhap (ed), คําพิพากษาฎีกา (Collection of Supreme Court Decisions of 2551), vol 6 
(Thai Bar 2008) 1080–81. 
63 Pairoj Vayubhap, คําอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยวาดวยหนี ้(Commentary on the Law of 
Obligations) (Institute of Legal Education of the Thai Bar 2011) 183. 
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jurisprudence where specific performance is regarded as the primary right 
(Primäranspruch) and damages as the secondary right (Sekundäranspruch).64  
However, Piroj’s explanation for the supplementary nature of damages in fact came 
from his observation on the wording of Article 213 rather than the German concept 
of non-performance; he observed that the right to damages was mentioned in the 
last paragraph preceded by three paragraphs which concern the enforcement of 
performance.65 Unfortunately, Pairoj did not discuss the principle of the primacy of 
specific performance and the relationship between the two remedies, ie when 
damages in lieu of performance were available and how specific performance was 
supplemented by damages, in detail. This is a clear illustration of the problem of the 
interpretation of Articles 213 and 215 which seem to lack clear underlying principles. 
 In summary, in applying the rules relating to the concepts of specific 
performance and damages Thai courts did not clarify these concepts or their 
relationship other than deciding legal issues concerning Articles 213 and 215 raised 
by the parties. The development of the concept of specific performance and the 
clarification of these issues is the work of academics.   
2.2 Conceptual understanding 
There have been a number of academic works on the law of obligations since the 
promulgation of the Code of 1925. Compared to the number of publications of the 
same genre in Germany and Japan, there are far fewer books on this area of law in 
Thailand and only a small number of them have regularly been used in the teaching 
and studying of law in universities. This part of this chapter reviews a number of 
books published since the enforcement of the Code of 1925 to observe how the 
authors, most of whom held both academic and professional positions, understood 
the Code of 1925 provisions relating to specific performance and damages, 
especially Articles 194, 213, and 215. It focuses on the conceptualisation of specific 
performance and damages, and how these two remedies coexist as competing 
remedies for non-performance. The review of the publications is arranged mainly 
according to the educational background of their authors since this may provide 
clues as to whether in explaining Thai law they adopted the mainstream view from 
                                                      
64 Basil Markesinis, Hannes Unberath, and Angus Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006) 398. See also Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, 
‘The New Approach to Breach of Contract in German Law’ in Nili Cohen and Ewan 
McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (Hart Publishing 2005) 140. 
65 Vayubhap, Commentary 183. 
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the country where they were educated. Unfortunately, there have been no texts on 
the general principles of the Thai law of obligations published by those who were 
educated in Germany or in line with German jurisprudence. 
2.2.1 The works of members of the drafting committee of the Code of 1925 
There is no official commentary on Books I and II of the Code of 1925 produced by 
the drafting committee. However, Abhai Raja, then Minister of Justice and President 
of the Committee of Legislation, assigned Guyon, de Planterose and Cazeau to 
produce examples of each provision of the Code of 1925 in English language and 
Phra Pinijpojanat66 to translate their work into Thai.67 
 The only commentary on the Code of 1925 produced by a member of the 
drafting committee is Commentary on Articles 1 to 240 of Books I and II of the Civil and 
Commercial Code written by Boonchoi and published by the Bar Council of Thailand 
in 1933. It was last reprinted in 1960. Interest in this work revived after Thammasat 
University faculty of law assigned some of its academics to edit it and the new 
edition was eventually published in 2012. One interesting feature of this 
commentary is its comparative notes: in addition to commentary on each article, 
Boonchoi, for comparative purposes, provided a list of foreign provisions which 
were either conceptually or linguistically similar to the Thai rule in question. He did 
not claim that they were used by the draftsmen as the models for the Code of 1925 
provision.68 However, his referencing suggests that he consulted the Book of the 
Revised Drafts of the Code of 1925, which clearly specifies the source of each 
provision, because each of his foreign law references mostly matches with the 
drafting committee’s references despite the fact that his often extended to other 
relevant foreign provisions. 
 Boonchoi explained that Article 194 of the Code of 1925, a copy of s 241 BGB, 
was implicitly the definition of the term ‘obligation’ and described the creditor’s 
right to claim performance arising from both contractual and delictual obligations. 
                                                      
66 An official of the Department of Legislative Redaction and the Committee of Legislation, 
who on Plod’s instructions translated some English drafts of the Code of 1925 into Thai 
before they were submitted to the High Revising Committee. 
67 See Phraya Manavarajasevi, อุทาหรณสําหรับประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยบรรพ 1-2 ฉบับกรมรางกฎหมาย 
และที่มาของกฎหมายในประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 1-5 (Department of Legislative Drafting’s 
Instances of Books I and II of the Civil and Commercial Code and Sources of the Provisions 
of Books I, II, II, IV, and V of the Civil and Commercial Code) (Bangkok University 1990). 
68 Phraya Debvitoon Pahoolsarutabordi, คําอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 1-2 มาตรา 1 ถึง 240 
(Commentary on Articles 1 to 240 of Books I and II of the Civil and Commercial Code) (Bar 
Council of Thailand 1933) ฆ. 
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He referred this provision to s 241 BGB.69 On Article 213, which concerns the 
creditor’s right to compulsory performance, Boonchoi explained that it was the first 
provision concerning a remedy for non-performance. On the first paragraph of the 
provision, which states: ‘if the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor 
may make a demand to the Court for compulsory performance; except where the 
nature of the obligation does not permit it’, he commented that an essential aim of 
the law of obligations was to help enforce performance according to the nature of 
the obligation and ‘[t]herefore, the first and normal remedy for non-performance is 
specific performance.’ [My translation] He related this provision to Article 194 of the 
same code.70 However, on Article 213 para 4, which read: ‘the provisions of the 
foregoing paragraphs do not affect the right to claim damages’, he explained that 
the creditor’s right to specific performance did not prejudice his right to claim 
damages. Boonchoi provided three possible situations where the right to claim 
damages is available. The first situation is where it is not possible to enforce 
performance or where the enforcement of performance is fruitless. The second 
situation is where, despite the possibility of the enforcement of performance, the 
creditor wishes to claim damages instead of performance. The last situation is where 
the creditor claims damages in addition to the enforcement of performance since the 
performance alone is not sufficient to cover the creditor’s loss.71 It is worth noting 
that all three situations seem to be peculiar to breach of contract and Boonchoi did 
not give any illustration of how a delict or restitution in kind could be included in 
the given situations. In his comparative note on Article 213, he links this provision 
to Article 414 of Minpō, Articles 1143 and 1144 of the French Code civil and Section 
98 of the Swiss Code of Obligations.72 
 On Article 415, Boonchoi commented that this provision constituted the 
creditor’s right to demand either ‘compensation’ or ‘damages’ [my translation] in 
case of non-performance. There is, however, no clear explanation as to the 
distinction between these two terms. He explained that Article 215, which is 
consistent with the last paragraph of Article 213, concerned the cases where the 
debtor did not perform his duty, and extended to the cases where the debtor’s 
performance is imperfect, including a delivery of defective goods, delayed 
performance, a delivery of the good to the wrong place. Boonchoi linked Article 215 
                                                      
69 ibid 703–04. 
70 ibid 766-67. 
71 ibid 771-73. 
72 ibid 773. 
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to Article 415 of the Minpō, Article 1142 of the French Code civil and Article 97 of the 
Swiss Code of Obligations.73 
 Having considered Boonchoi’s commentary on Articles 213, it is interesting to 
observe that he did not connect this article to any provision of the BGB as did the 
Book of the Revised Drafts of the Code of 1925 to which ss 249 and 251 BGB were 
referred. Other than Japanese law, he referred to Articles 1143 and 1144 of the Code 
civil and s 98 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. This is interesting because there was 
no discussion as to French and Swiss law models in the drafting of Thai Article 213. 
The Thai draftsmen simply copied most of the texts of De Becker’s translation of 
Article 414 of the Minpō. The question arises why Boonchoi did not rely on the 
information in the drafting minutes and the Book of the Revised Drafts, products of 
his own labours, to count the two German provisions as the model of Article 213. As 
discussed in Chapter 5 above, it was later discovered that the Japanese Article 414 
was product of French and, not German law. Futhermore, it must be asked when 
and how Boonchoi discovered this given that he never raised this suspicion nor 
challenged the reference to the BGB provisions during the codification process. The 
explanation might be that after conducting a comparative study of Thai, Japanese, 
German and French law, perhaps some years later, Boonchoi found no connection 
between Article 213 of the Code of 1925 and ss 249 and 251 BGB either linguistically 
or conceptually but instead discovered the similarity between the Thai and French 
provisions. If this is the case, then one can see the weakness of uncritically copying 
of foreign law. Instead of thoroughly studying the foreign rules before borrowing 
them, the draftsman had to conduct research himself on the rules that he had 
already adopted. Whether Boonchoi was aware that he had discovered the genuine 
sources of Article 213 later is not known. He never publicly raised doubts about De 
Becker’s references to the BGB or the reference notes of the English drafts of the 
Code of 1925 many of which were copied from De Becker’s references.  
 Another interesting point is that Boonchoi did not give an example of how 
Article 213 was applicable to delicts despite the fact that the draft of Article 213 in 
the Book of Revised Drafts clearly states that the provision includes restitution in 
kind and is connected to BGB ss 249 and 25174 and that Plod’s proposal to change 
the term from ‘specific performance’ to ‘compulsory performance’ in the draft of 
Article 213 aimed to include the case of restitution in kind.75 In fact, his instances of 
Article 213 only concern breach of contract. 
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 Boonchoi’s commentary on Articles 213 and 215, especially with regard to 
primary remedies for non-performance, are mostly in line with De Becker’s 
commentaries on Articles 414 and 415 of the Minpō. However, while De Becker 
clearly submitted that in the case of non-performance, there were two remedies 
available to the creditor, namely to enforce performance and to demand 
compensation for damage, Boonchoi commented on the first paragraph of Article 
213 that it reflected the creditor’s ‘first and normal remedy’ for non-performance, 
the right to enforce performance. This proposition appears to contradict his own 
subsequent commentary of the last paragraph of the same provision, in which he 
provided three possible cases of the availability of the creditor’s right to demand 
damages. One of them is where the debtor can choose to demand damages despite 
the fact that performance is still possible to be enforced. This casts doubt on his 
view on the relationship between specific performance and damages. The question 
is how specific performance can be regarded as the creditor’s ‘first and normal 
remedy’ for non-performance where, concurrently, the law gives him an alternative 
remedy, to demand damages, despite the feasibility of the former. 
2.2.2 The works of French-educated Thai academics 
In Thailand, a number of authoritative books on the law of obligations were written 
by Thai academics who were educated in France. Padoux’s proposal for a reform of 
legal education of Ministry of Justice’s Law School to facilitate codification and the 
emerging code system in Thailand and the French Government’s request for 
appointing Frenchmen to Law School to take charge of the curriculum reform and 
legal education in 1925 received a positive response from the Siamese government. 
This led to the emergence of French jurisprudence as English law’s equal rival at 
Siam’s only law school and the end of Britain’s monopoly of the Thai’s overseas 
legal education. The Ministry of Justice began to send Thai law students to be 
educated in France, for example Pridi Banomyong in 1920 and Sahad Suthan in 
1923.76 Pridi, the civilian leader of the 1932 Revolution, founded Thammasat 
University in 1934. It was the only university which offered law degrees in Thailand 
until 1971. As its first president (1934-52), Pridi set up the university law curriculum 
modelled on European legal education and employed several French-educated Thai 
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as well as some French professors to teach at the University.77 The establishment of 
Thammasat University marked the end of the dominance of English law in Thailand 
and saw French law’s increasing popularity. (See Chapter 2, 3.2 ‘Legal Education’)78 
 Pridi, though renowned as the father of public law in Thailand, was doctorat en 
droit from Paris and wrote his doctoral thesis on private law. He wrote several law 
books, including a commentary on Book II of the Code of 1925 published in 1929.  
On the first provision of Book II, a copy of s 241 BGB, he commented that by virtue 
of Article 194 the creditor had rights to have the obligation fulfilled by the debtor. 
However, he explained that the kinds of rights the creditor was entitled to were 
specified in Part I of Non-Performance. Pridi saw the second sentence as a separate 
part of the provision which he explained concerned the three types of obligations 
classified by the nature of the object of obligations, namely obligations to do and not 
to do something and obligations to transfer properties, including money.79 
 Pridi’s brief comments on Article 213 are associated with the nature of the 
object of obligations. He submitted that there was only one type of obligation, 
namely the obligation to transfer property including pecuniary obligations, whose 
nature permits compulsory performance. Pridi explained that the nature of 
obligations to do and not to do something did not allow the creditor to demand 
performance from the debtor without his consent. The creditor therefore needed to 
seek alternative methods to have the obligation fulfilled as provided by the 
subsequent paragraphs of Article 213. He added that under the last paragraph (para 
4) of the same provision the creditor also had the right to claim damages in addition 
to the remedies mentioned earlier.80 However, Pridi neither provided a commentary 
on Article 215 nor clarified how it is linked to Article 213 para 4 concerning the 
creditor’s right to damages. He only gave one example which illustrates the 
creditor’s right to demand compensation for damage. His example concerns the 
situation where the debtor delivers a white car instead of a yellow car as specified in 
the contract to the creditor. Pridi concluded that the debtor did not perform his 
obligation in accordance with the true intent and purpose of the obligation.81 
                                                      
77 Charnvit Kasetsiri, ‘ปรีด ีพนมยงคกับมหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตรและการเมือง (Pridi Banomyong and the 
University of Moral and Political Sciences)’ in Thamrongsak Petchlertanan (ed) ‘ปรีด ีปวย 
กับธรรมศาสตรและการเมือง (Pridi and Puey and the University of Moral and Political 
Sciences‘ (Thammasat University Archive 2006) 10-30. 
78 p 77 above. 
79 Pridi Banomyong, ประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 2 (Commentary on Book II of the Civil and 
Commercial Code), vol 1 (Nitisan 1929) 24–25. 
80 ibid 63-65. 
81 ibid 67. 
 203 
 Pridi’s commentary on and examples of the Thai provisions regarding the 
right to specific performance and compensation for damage obviously reflects 
French jurisprudence in which there is a distinction between obligations according 
to both their nature and the remedies for non-performance are explained according 
to this division. It is not clear whether Pridi recognised specific performance as the 
primary remedy for non-performance. However, his commentary on Article 194 can 
lead one to suspect that he did not consider specific performance as the first and 
normal remedy for non-performance due to his view that the creditor’s rights to 
have the obligation fulfilled under Article 194 are determined by the non-
performance provisions.82 This implies that the creditor may have the obligation 
fulfilled by demanding either specific performance or compensation for damage as 
prescribed by Article 213.  
 Pridi’s view on Article 194 was shared by another prominent professor, 
another doctor of law from Paris, Serm Vinijchaikul,83 who wrote a comprehensive 
book on the law of contract and obligations. Serm submitted that Article 194 lays the 
foundations for three main rights of the creditor, namely the right to enforce specific 
performance either in case of obligations to do or not to do something, the right to 
demand compensation for damage in case of non-performance and delayed 
performance, and the right to take measures to protect the debtor’s properties for 
the creditor’s own security.84 Article 194, a copy of s 241 BGB, was interpreted 
widely to include even compensation for damage. Serm defined non-performance 
narrowly as the situations where the debtor did not perform his duty ‘at all’ and 
where the performance was imperfect. He contended that for the former situations 
whether the creditor was able to seek compensation for damage was determined by 
the nature of the obligation. If the nature of the obligation permitted specific 
enforcement, then the creditor needed to follow the methods prescribed by Article 
213. In case of pecuniary obligations, the creditor needed a court order to enforce 
the creditor’s assets while in case of obligations to do something which did not 
require exclusively the debtor’s performance, the creditor may apply to the court to 
have the obligation fulfilled by a third party at the debtor’s expense. Serm explained 
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that only situations where the creditor did not benefit from the remedies prescribed 
by Article 213 could lead to compensation for damage. These situations were always 
related to obligations whose true intent and purpose required the debtor to perform 
his duty exclusively.85 By contrast, delayed performance could always lead to 
compensation for damage as long as three requirements were met, namely the 
default of the debtor, damage caused by delayed performance and the debtor’s 
responsibility for it.86 
 Among the books on the law of obligations written by Thai scholars educated 
in France, the most popular and arguably most authoritative is that of Jeed 
Setthabutr,87 The Principles of the Law of Obligations (หลักกฎหมายแพงลักษณะหนี้),88 which was 
published in 1969 and is now in its twentieth edition. In this academically well-
respected study, Jeed explained that Article 194 confirmed the right and the duty of 
the creditor and that it proved that an obligation in the legal sense was 
distinguished from a moral obligation.89 However, referring to the Roman legal 
principle impossibilium nulla obligatio est, he added that the debtor was exempted 
from performing his duty in case of impossibility of performance. Apparently 
influenced by another principle of Roman law, Jeed considered natural obligations 
(obligationes naturales), for example gambling and extinctive prescription, as another 
exemption of Article 194.90  
 Jeed put Article 213 under the head of the enforcement of performance and 
contended that in order for the creditor to enforce performance two requirements 
must be fulfilled, first his claim being due and, second, the debtor failing to perform 
his duty where he is not benefited from impossibility of performance.91 It follows 
that the debtor had the right to specific performance except where the nature of the 
obligation does not permit it. As several French-educated authors did, he clarified 
that the enforcement of performance was determined by the nature of the object of 
obligations, namely obligations to do and not do so something and obligations to 
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give something.92 This explanation apparently reflects French jurisprudence. 
Regarding the right to damages, Jeed explained that by virtue of Article 213 para 4 
the creditor had the right to claim damages where there was a breach of contract. He 
divided non-performance into three situations, namely where the debtor does not 
perform his duty at all, where the performance does not accord with the true intent 
and purpose, and where the performance is delayed. Jeed was the first author to 
explain expressly that the creditor’s right to damages under the last paragraph of 
Article 213 was limited to contractual obligations. He reasoned that the remedies for 
delicts were specifically dealt with in the separate part of the Code.93 Another 
reason may be related to difference in the uses of the terms in Article 213 and its 
relevant provisions. While the term ‘the right to claim damages’ (คาเสียหาย) is used in 
Article 213 para 4, the other relevant provisions, for example Article 215, as well as 
the provisions relating to delicts used ‘compensation for damages’ (คาสินไหมทดแทน). 
Both terms were also translated into the Thai language differently. It is possible that 
Jeed interpreted the former as ‘pecuniary damages’, whose meaning is not broad 
enough to include all remedies available for delicts. It should be noted that in De 
Becker’s translations of the Japanese Articles 414 and 415, which were adopted as 
the model of Thai Articles 213 and 215 respectively, the same term ‘compensation 
for damages’ were used, but the Thai draftsmen slightly changed De Becker’s terms: 
in the English draft of Article 213 they used the term ‘the right to claim damages’ 
while in the English draft of Article 215 the term ‘claim compensation for any 
damage’ (See Table 6-3 above).94 The translators may have thought that because of 
their slight linguistic difference these two terms represented different principles and 
therefore translated them into Thai differently. This illustrates problems with legal 
borrowing and translation  
 In his commentary, Jeed did not clarify how the creditor’s right to specific 
performance coexisted with the right to compensation for damage, particularly 
whether the creditor’s right to damages or compensation for damage is an 
alternative to specific performance or a supplementary measure of it. He also did 
not explain how Article 215, which gives the creditor the right to claim 
compensation for damage where the performance is not in accordance with the true 
intent and purpose of the obligation, was applied and interpreted and how it was 
connected to the right to damages under Article 213 para 4. 
                                                      
92 ibid 59-60. 
93 ibid 65. 
94 pp 183-85 above. 
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 Daraporn Tirawat,95 the most recent and longest-serving editor of Jeed’s book, 
clarified the interpretation and application of Article 215 in her own book on the law 
of obligations published in 2011. Daraporn did this by relating it to the German 
concept of positive breach of contract. She puts Article 215 under the head of the 
debtor’s liability for non-performance, which is divided into two sub-topics, general 
liability and specific liability. Daraporn saw Article 215 as the reflection of the 
general liability and submitted that this provision laid down the concept which is 
comparable to the concept of positive breach of contract. However, Daraporn 
extended it to encompass all kinds of non-performance, including defective 
performance, delayed performance and misplaced performance.96 According to 
Daraporn, specific liability was certain kinds of extraordinary liability which 
resulted from delayed performance. For example, the debtor is liable for the 
impossibility of performance caused by an accident during his default (Article 
217).97 
 Daraporn’s reference to the German concept of positive breach of contract is 
relatively unusual given her French educational background and her book’s general 
adherence to French jurisprudence. However, it is worth repeating that while the 
authors of German and Japanese law of obligations usually considered positive 
breach of contract as the third category of non-performance in addition to 
impossibility of performance and delayed performance, Daraporn included all 
kinds of non-performance within the purview of Article 215, her analogous concept 
of positive breach of contract. 
 Daraporn dealt with the relationship between the creditor’s right to specific 
performance and right to compensation for damage, under the heading of the 
enforcement of obligations. She proposed that in case of non-performance, the 
creditor can, through the court, enforce performance or demand for compensation 
for damage. According to Daraporn, the enforcement of performance depended on 
the types of obligations and this varies according to their nature, namely obligation 
to do or not to do and obligation to give. She explained that in addition to the 
enforcement of performance the creditor was entitled to claim compensation for 
                                                      
95 Daraporn Tirawat is a professor at Thammasat University Faculty of Law and a lecturer at 
the Institute of Legal Education of the Thai Bar teaching mainly contract law and the law of 
obligations. She holds a LLB from Thammasat and a doctor of law degree from Aix Marseille. 
96 Daraporn Thirawat, กฎหมายหนี:้ หลักทั่วไป (The Law of Obligations: General Principles) 
(Thammasat University Faculty of Law 2011) 60–61. 
97 ibid 63. 
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damage.98 However, she did not clarify whether the creditor could choose the latter 
without exhausting the former. 
2.2.3 The works of English-educated Thai academics 
The earliest comprehensive commentaries on Book II produced by a Thai academic 
educated in the English common law system is Boonchoi’s work published in 1933 
and discussed at 2.2.1 above. There is another important work published a few 
years later by Seni Pramoj.99 While Boonchoi’s publication deals with partial Book II 
article by article, Seni’s colossal two-volume work ‘The Civil and Commercial Code 
concerning Juristic Acts and Obligations’ (ประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยวาดวยนิติกรรมและหนี้) 
systematised the entire law of obligations, including the law of contracts.100 His 
work is the most elaborate commentary on the Thai law of obligations. 
Unfortunately, it has not been updated or reprinted for decades. 
 Despite being educated in England, Seni generally explained the law of 
obligations in accordance with French jurisprudence. He treated Article 194 as the 
definition of the term ‘obligation’.101 He contended that although this provision does 
not separate obligations into deferent types, the distinction between obligations to 
give, obligations to do and not to do is recognised in other provisions, notably 
Article 213.102 Seni explained Article 213 as a rule which reflected the French legal 
principle L’ exécution en nature as opposed to the principle L’ exécution par equivalent. 
He explained: 
 
The general principle of the law of obligations is that the debtor must 
perform exactly what he promised. He cannot simply choose to pay 
damages instead of performing his duty…The creditor’s right to specific 
performance…is therefore a normal execution while his right to 
compensation for damage is an abnormal execution which can be resorted 
to only when the enforcement of performance is impossible or when the 
creditor does not wish to enforce the performance.103 [My translation] 
 
                                                      
98 ibid 73-75. 
99 Seni Pramoj (1905-97) was Thai Prime Minister (1945-46 and 1975-76), judge (1929-40), Thai 
ambassador to the USA during the Second World War and professor extraordinarius at 
Thammasat University from its foundation. In 1962, he led the advocates representing 
Thailand in the ICJ case Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand). Seni held a BA 
(honours) from Oxford and was called to the Bar at Grey’s Inn ranked first in his class.   
100 This has around two thousand pages.  
101 Seni Pramoj, ประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยวาดวยนิติกรรมและหนี้ (Juristic Acts and Obligations in the 
Civil and Commercial Code), vol 1 (Aksornsarn 1966) 359. 
102 ibid 378. 
103 Seni Pramoj, Juristic Acts and Obligations, vol 2, 627. 
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Seni noted that the Code of 1925 dealt with specific performance and damages on 
substantive level while their procedural sides were dealt with in the Code of Civil 
Procedure.104 This comment does not agree with the noticeably procedural 
orientation of Article 213. It also contradicts with Seni’s own terms, ‘normal 
execution’ and ‘abnormal execution’. 
 Seni gave a contradictory commentary on Article 215 in saying that: 
 
Although specific performance is still possible, either because the creditor 
no longer wishes it or he cannot enforce the performance because of his 
own fault, he can claim compensation for damage for non-performance. 
There is no provision in the Code forcing the creditor to exhaust specific 
performance. In case of non-performance, the creditor can choose damages 
over specific performance. The word ‘may’ (ก็ได) used in Article 213 [the 
creditor ‘may’ make a demand to the Court for compulsory performance] 
clearly denotes the creditor’s right to choose.105 [My translation] 
 
In interpreting this text, Seni focused on its literal meaning rather the principle 
behind the rule or its historical development. More importantly, this explanation 
contradicts his earlier comments on Article 213 that specific performance is ‘normal 
execution’ while damages ‘abnormal execution’. If the creditor has the right to 
choose between specific performance and damages, a question arises as to how 
specific performance can still be regarded as normal execution. Seni’s adherence to 
the letter of the law, can also be illustrated by his attempt to make a distinction 
between Articles 213 and 215 by making an issue out of two different phrases ‘fail to 
perform’ used in Article 213 and ‘does not perform’ used in Article 215. Instead of 
investigating the origins of these two provisions, he interpreted them based on their 
linguistic difference.106  
 A book published by an English-educated jurist on the law of obligations 
whose popularity and authority is comparable to that of Jeed is that of Sophon 
Rattanakorn,107 an eminent Thai judge and academic. While Jeed conceptualised the 
law of obligations mainly in accordance with French jurisprudence without 
justification for doing so, Sophon was the first and only author in the same field 
who seriously employed a comparative method in writing his book. In 
                                                      
104 ibid. 
105 ibid 634. 
106 ibid 636-37. 
107 Sophon Ratanakorn is former President of the Supreme Court of Thailand between 1990 
and 1991 and currently Advisor to the Supreme Court. He was a professional judge who 
spent almost four decades at Thai courts. He also taught at the Institute of Legal Education 
of the Thai Bar and Thammasat University, where he was appointed as a professor 
extraordinarious. Sophon holds his first LLB from Thammasat and second LLB from the 
University of London. He was called to the bar at Gray’s Inn. 
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propounding each concept of the law of obligations under the Code of 1925, he 
compared between German, French and English law and sometimes their Roman 
origin informing the reader of the position of the Thai law. Although Sophon did 
not usually bring up the discussion of the drafting committee when explaining a 
concept of obligation, he sometimes referred to the model rules of some Thai 
provisions and some publications that the Thai draftsmen consulted in the drafting 
process, for example Schuster’s The Principle of German Civil Law, De Becker’s 
Annotated Civil Code of Japan and Planiol’s Treatise on the Civil Law.108 His book 
suggests that Sophon reviewed the drafting process of the relevant provisions to a 
certain degree but did not trace them back through the historical development of 
their model rules. 
 Sophon saw the types of obligations, which he called ‘the object of 
obligation’109 (obligations to give and obligations to do and not to do) as one of the 
three essential elements of obligations, namely the subjects of obligation (the 
creditor and debtor), the object of obligation and legal bindingness.110 He dedicated 
a chapter to discussion of this topic as other Thai authors usually did. Sophon 
clearly explained that the distinctions between obligations had been discussed since 
Roman times and later written down in the French Code civil and why this subject is 
important for the study of the Thai law of obligations.111 Despite the draftsmen’s use 
of the heading ‘the subject of obligation’ (or in Sophon’s terms ‘the object of 
obligation’), the Code of 1925 did not explicitly adopt French law’s division of 
obligations. As Seni pointed out, Article 194, a copy of s 241 BGB, mentions 
obligations not to do something not for the purpose of taxonomy but for emphasis 
on the scope of the creditor’s right.112 However, the existence of Article 213 means 
that the division of obligations may make it easier for the Thai scholars to identify 
the situations where the nature of an obligation does not permit compulsory 
performance.113 
 Under the heading of the effect of obligations, Sophon considered Article 194 
as the source of the creditor’s right to claim performance and on the other hand the 
source of the debtor’s duty to effect the performance. He contended that as the 
                                                      
108 Sophon Rattanakorn, คําอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยวาดวยหนี:้ บทเบ็ดเสร็จทั่วไป (Commentary on 
the Law of Obligations of the Civil and Commercial Code: General Provisions) (10th edn, 
Nitibannakarn 2010) 22–23. 
109 Seni used the English term ‘the subject of obligation’. See Seni, Juristic Acts and Obligations, 
vol 2, 380. 
110 Rattanakorn, Law of Obligations 42–43. 
111 ibid 61-65. 
112 Pramoj, Juristic Acts and Obligations, vol 2, 378–79. 
113 ibid; Rattanakorn, Law of Obligations 65. 
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creditor had the right to claim performance, there were three considerations as to 
the debtor’s duty. First, the debtor must perform his duty in accordance with the 
object of obligation. Second, the debtor must offer performance which is actually 
tendered to the creditor in the manner in which it is to be effected (Article 208 para 
1).114 Lastly, as stipulated by Article 215, the debtor must perform his duty in 
accordance with the true intent and purpose of the obligation otherwise he must 
pay damages.115 It is worth observing that Sophon fused Article 194, whose model 
rule, s 241 BGB, has been understood as the source of specific performance in 
German law, with Article 215, the source of the competing remedy. However, this is 
hardly surprising since some other Thai authors held the same view.116 
 Sophon’s most interesting view on the concept of specific performance is 
contained in his fourth and fifth chapters where he extensively discussed the 
creditor’s rights to claim performance and to demand compensation for damage 
respectively. In his Chapter 4, he submitted that there were two issues about when 
the creditor could demand performance and how he could enforce performance. 
The first issue concerns time of performance while the second mainly Article 213. 
The latter is subdivided into three topics, the creditor’s right to demand 
performance in general, the methods for enforcing performance and the court’s 
power to enforce performance.117 Only the first two topics deserve attention here. As 
to the first sub-topic, Sophon briefly discussed the creditor’s right to demand 
performance in general in three foreign legal systems, English law, French law and 
German law before providing a short analysis of the Thai system. He wrote: 
 
Our Article 213 originated from [Article 414 of] the Civil Code of Japan, 
which refers to Sections 249 and 251 of the German Civil Code. 
Nevertheless, the wording of the third paragraph of it is close to Article 
1143 of the French Civil Code. We can say that our system generally 
follows German law. [My emphasis] By virtue of Articles 194, 208, 213 and 
320 of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code, the debtor is entitled to claim 
specific performance except where the nature of the obligation does not 
permit it. It follows that the creditor must seek damages instead.118 [My 
translation] 
 
Sophon’s understanding of the origin of Article 213 most likely came from the list of 
sources written in the English draft of the provision (known as Plod’s List of 
                                                      
114 Article 208 para 1 is a copy of s 294 BGB (1900). It states: ‘the performance must be 
actually tendered to the creditor in the manner in which it is to be effected’. 
115 Rattanakorn, Law of Obligations 99. 
116 See eg Vinijchaikul, Commentary on Juristic Acts and Obligations 144. 
117 Rattanakorn, Law of Obligations 127–32. 
118 ibid 135. 
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References). As discussed in Chapter 5 above, this list was inspired by De Becker’s 
reference of Article 414 of the Minpō where he referred the Japanese provision to ss 
249 and 251 BGB. This reference has been proved to be misleading. (See Chapter 5, 
1.2.3 ‘The tracting of De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan’)119 
 Despite claiming that the Thai system of specific performance belongs to the 
German family, Sophon admitted that in effect the creditor instead of claiming 
performance may demand damages.120 His comments on the creditor’s right to 
demand compensation for damage in his Chapter 5 clearly justify this practice.  
 
Generally speaking, the creditor is entitled to demand compensation for 
damage when the debtor fails to effect the performance…Despite the fact 
that the debtor has fulfilled his duty, the creditor may claim compensation 
for damage in addition to the performance if it is imperfect, incomplete or 
delayed causing damage to the creditor. In other words, to demand 
compensation for damage is either an alterative or supplement to the 
enforcement of performance.121 [My translation] 
 
If compensation for damage as a remedy for non-performance is an alternative to 
specific performance in Thai law as Sophon suggested, can we still consider the 
latter to be the primary remedy for non-performance and that the Thai concept of 
specific performance follows the German system? Sophon did not discuss when and 
how the right to damages could substitute the right to performance in detail. Other 
than referring to Article 213, he did not provide any further explanation for why the 
Thai concept of specific performance belonged to the German family. This question 
has remained unanswered.  
CONCLUSION 
The examination of the drafting of the rules of specific performance and their 
relevant provisions confirms the findings of Chapter 3, namely that the draftsmen 
uncritically copied foreign provisions without a systematic knowledge of the rules 
they copied. They adopted three main provisions, s 241 BGB and Articles 414 and 
415 of the Minpō, and used these to create Articles 194, 213, and 215 respectively 
without investigating their origins or underlying principles. This led to conceptual 
conflicts between rules and their interpretations. While most of Thai jurists have 
                                                      
119 p 159 above. 
120 Rattanakorn, Law of Obligations 135. 
121 ibid 150. 
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recognised specific performance as the first and normal remedy for non-
performance, most of them have simultaneously observed the text of Article 213 
para 4 that the right to performance does not prejudice the right to damages. 
Unfortunately, most commentators on the Code of 1925 did not seem to be 
interested in tracing the origins of the Thai provisions and their foreign model rules. 
In interpreting the rules of specific performance, they either relied on Plod’s List of 
References to the foreign sources of the Code of 1925 or their familiar foreign 
jurisprudence. It seems in analysing the drafting of the Code of 1925 from 
interpreting its rules, comparative law and legal history have not yet been fully 
used. This case study of specific performance has provided a chance to observe that 
legal borrowing without a systematic knowledge of the rules borrowed has some 
important implications for the development of the rules borrowed. Because Articles 
194, 213 and 215 are not logically in harmony with the other non-performance 
provisions which were mostly modelled on the BGB, Thai judges and academics 
have found it difficult to justify the principle of the primacy of specific performance. 
Despite accepting this principle, the wording of Articles 213 and 215 has forced 
them to arrive at the conclusion that in case of non-performance the creditor has the 
right to choose between performance and damages. In doing so, they are at a loss to 
explain how the primacy of specific performance can be upheld when the creditor is 




















1. THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF 1925 AND THE RULES 
CONCERNING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE  
This thesis has discovered that there were flaws in the drafting of the Civil and 
Commercial Code of 1925 (‘Code of 1925’). These flaws concerned the method the 
draftsmen adopted and sources they consulted. Most fundamental was Plod’s belief 
that the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 (‘Minpō of 1898) was a copy of the BGB of 1900. 
This misconception and its consequences were illustrated by the case study of 
specific performance.  
The Japanese method: a fundamental flaw 
There is no definite proof of the Thai government’s policy change to adopt the BGB 
of 1900 in drafting the new code in 1925. However, Plod’s interviews between 1980 
and 1981 referred to the Pandectist system as both his and the King of Siam’s 
favoured choice to replace the French system1 as well as to René Guyon’s letter to 
Siam’s Minister of Justice in 1925 opposing the adoption of German law instead of 
French law.2 These strongly convince that the cornerstone of the Code of 1925 in 
both the contents and structure was the BGB. The Thai draftsmen’s adherence to the 
German Code and their rare adoption of French provisions during the drafting 
process also confirm this conclusion. Why did the draftsmen adopt the Minpō of 
1898 as another principal model when they could have directly copied the English 
translation of German provisions? The answer is twofold. First, like many legal 
comparatists, Plod was misled by the mainstream belief that the Minpō was a 
                                                      
1 Phraya Manavarajasevi, บันทึกคําสัมภาษณพระยามานวราชเสว ี(Transcript of the Interviews with 
Phraya Manavarajasevi) (Thammasat University 1980) 4, 13. 
2 National Archive of Thailand, Office of the Council of State Doc No 9, ‘Note of the 
Department of Legislative Drafting on the Publication of the Draft-Codes’ in ‘Letter No 
75/131 from René Guyon to Chao Phraya Abhai Raja’ (7 March 1925). 
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simplified version of the BGB of 1900 in both content and structure3 and, second, he 
thought that the successful establishment of the Minpō resulted from the copying 
method. What did lead Plod into believing this? There are two answers to this 
question. First, the Japanese method of and success in making a civil code, 
according to Plod, was brought to his attention by John, first Viscount Simon, when 
he studied law in England.4 Second, Plod was misled by De Becker’s Annotated Civil 
Code of Japan of 1909. In copying Japanese provisions and understanding 
conceptions of Japanese civil law, Plod and the Thai draftsmen appear to have relied 
solely on De Becker’s two books, Annotated Civil Code of Japan as the source of 
English translation of Japanese provisions and The Principles and Practice of the Civil 
Code of Japan of 1921 as a source of commentary on the Minpō. The information in 
the Annotated Civil Code of Japan is misleading in two ways. First, De Becker added a 
list of sources following the English translation of each Japanese provision which 
apparently had a connection with the Japanese rule in question. His style of 
referencing led Plod to believe that the annotations were produced by the Japanese 
draftsmen.5 This misunderstanding, however, had a positive effect; it inspired the 
draftsmen of the Code of 1925 to adopt De Becker’s referencing method; they wrote 
down the model provisions which they copied in the English draft of each Thai 
provision. This is commonly known as ‘Plod’s List of References’.6 Second, the BGB 
of 1900 was the only foreign law to which De Becker referred in the second volume 
of his Annotated Civil Code of Japan, dealing with the Japanese Articles 399 to 724.7 It 
seems likely that this misleading information was the most important explanation 
for why Plod believed that the Minpō was a copy of the BGB. 
 This thesis has demonstrated that Plod was incorrect about the reception of 
German law in the drafting of the Minpō. Comparative lawyers should be reluctant 
to conclude that the Japanese simply copied the BGB of 1900 or any foreign code if 
they examine the drafting process of the Minpō thoroughly and take contextual 
factors of legal change in Japan at the time of codification into consideration. When 
comparing the nature of the discussion of the draftsmen of the Thai Code with those 
who worked on the Japanese Code, it is reasonable to think of the former as a 
                                                      
3 See ch 5, 1.2.3 ‘The tracing of De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan and examining 
Plod’s perception of the reception of German law in Japan’ p 159 above. 
4 See p 95 above. 
5 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 9, 23. 
6 See Phraya Manavarajasevi, อุทาหรณสําหรับประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยบรรพ 1-2 ฉบับกรมรางกฎหมาย 
และที่มาของกฎหมายในประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 1-5 (Department of Legislative Drafting’s 
Instances of Books I and II of the Civil and Commercial Code and Sources of the Provisions 
of Books I, II, II, IV, and V of the Civil and Commercial Code) (Bangkok University 1990). 
7 JE de Becker, Annotated Civil Code of Japan, vol 2 (Butterworth 1909) 6–285. 
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product of the copying method and the latter a product of comparative 
jurisprudence. While the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 discussed which English 
translation should be copied, the Japanese draftsmen had to explain to the 
examination committee what principle underpinned the draft of each provision. 
Furthermore, the Minpō of 1898 emerged from hostility between English-law-
oriented and French-law-oriented schools and its draft went through a 
parliamentary processes. This meant that the draftsmen had to forge a compromise, 
incorporate national customs and avoid blindly copying foreign law: the accusation 
of the last of these in part ended the Minpō of 1890.8 The anatomy of Article 414 of 
the Minpō illustrates that it was a mixture of foreign legal concepts with a 
predominance of French influence rather than a mere copy of any foreign text. In 
drafting Article 415 French and German legal concepts were mixed to the extent that 
it is not easy to determine whether this Japanese provision still maintains a French 
or German character.9  
 In this thesis it was also demonstrated that Plod uncritically relied on the 
information provided by De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan. The two drafts of 
the BGB of 1900 were not the only foreign legal material that the Japanese draftsmen 
consulted. Despite the fact that in examining the drafts of the Japanese Articles 414 
and 415, Hozumi provided the draft examiners with a long list of sources that he 
‘claimed’ to consult neither the draftsmen nor the examiners officially confirmed 
that they were ‘actually’ adopted.10 De Becker neither claimed that the references 
contained in his book were produced by the Japanese draftsmen nor explained 
clearly why such references were included and he drew attention to only one 
foreign statute. Any Japanese provision linked with BGB rules in his book must 
therefore be verified with the help of proper comparative and historical methods.  
 While it is certain that Plod misunderstood the reception of German law in 
Japan and the foreign influence over the drafting of the Minpō, there is no definite 
proof that his misunderstanding about the Japanese method was shared by the 
other members of the drafting committee. However, the fact that the Thai committee 
members’ adherence to the BGB and the Minpō indicates that they inclined towards 
Plod’s belief that both laws were closely related. Only on rare occasions, did the 
                                                      
8 Kenzo Takayanagi, ‘Occidental Legal Ideas in Japan: Their Reception and Influence’ (1930) 
3 Pacific Affairs 740, 745; Yoshiyuki Noda, Introduction to Japanese Law (Anthony H Angelo tr, 
University of Tokyo Press 1976) 47; Byron Marshall, ‘Professors and Politics: The Meiji 
Academic Elite’ (1977) 3 JJS 71, 83. 
9 See ch 5, 2.1 ‘An anatomy of Articles 414 and 415 of the Minpō of 1898’ 163. 
10 See pp 161-63 above. 
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Thai draftsmen adopt provisions of the Code civil.11 Had they known that the Minpō 
was influenced by both German and French law equally,12 they may have been 
reluctant to adopt the Japanese provisions. In 1933, Boonchoi, one of the Thai 
draftsmen, made a comparative study of the provisions of Book II and explained 
that each of them bears similarities to a variety of foreign rules,13 some of which 
were not mentioned in the list of sources of the drafts. This did not mean that 
Boonchoi knew the true nature of the reception of German law in Japan at the time 
of the drafting of the Code of 1925. Had he known this truth in 1925, he may have 
brought it to Chitr and Plod’s attention. In reality, during the drafting process, 
Boonchoi usually agreed with the other two Thai draftsmen. Even at the time of the 
publication of this commentary, it was not certain whether Boonchoi was already 
aware of the complexity of the reception of foreign private law in Japan. This is 
because his 1933 book only aimed at showing theoretical similarities between Thai 
and foreign provisions and did not engage with examining the origin of the Code of 
1925. All these facts point to the conclusion either that during the drafting of the 
Code of 1925 the Thai draftsmen shared Plod’s view that the Minpō was practically 
a copy of the BGB or that the very mixed nature of the Minpō was unknown to them. 
This is not surprising since the tracing of foreign influences in their civil code only 
began to generate interest among Japanese legal scholars from the 1960s.14 
Specific performance: an example  
The examination of the drafting of specific performance as the case study shows that 
there was an absence of theoretical explanation for the drafting of three essential 
rules of the Code of 1925 concerning specific performance, namely Articles 194, 213, 
and 215. Article 194 was copied from Chung Hui Wang’s English translation of s 241 
BGB (1900) verbatim. Articles 213 and 215, concerning the enforcement of 
performance and the right to damages in case of non-performance, were copied 
from De Becker’s English translation of Articles 414 and 415 of the Minpō. It is 
worth noting that in the Minpō there is no provision similar to s 241 BGB. The 
                                                      
11 See ch 3, 2.3 ‘An overview of the drafting process’ p 117 above. 
12 Kenjiro Ume’s Speech at French Civil Code Centenary Celebrations in 1904 at the Faculty 
of Law of the Imperial University of Tokyo quoted in Noda, Introduction to Japanese Law 52. 
13 Phraya Debvitoon Pahoolsarutabordi, คําอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 1-2 มาตรา 1 ถึง 240 
(Commentary on Articles 1 to 240 of Books I and II of the Civil and Commercial Code) (Bar 
Council of Thailand 1933). 
14  Taro Kogayu, ‘French Law Research in the Study of Civil Law in Japan’ in Zentarō 
Kitagawa and Karl Riesenhuber (eds), The Identity of German and Japanese Civil Law in 
Comparative Perspectives (De Gruyter Recht 2007) 92. 
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Japanese Article 414 is the principal provision dealing with compulsory 
performance or specific performance. By contrast, the BGB of 1900, does not contain 
a provision dealing with how to enforce performance like the Japanese Article 414. 
For German lawyers this issue falls within the scope of procedural law.15  
 The minutes of the drafting committee’s meetings show that Articles 194, 213, 
and 215 were drafted uncritically. In the drafting of Articles 194 and 215, there was 
not any discussion over their conceptual foundation or clear intellectual motive for 
copying s 241 BGB and Articles 415 of the Minpō respectively. The Japanese Article 
414 was borrowed for the making of Article 213 simply because its wording was 
similar to that of Articles 331 to 334 of the old Civil and Commercial Code of 1923 
(‘Code of 1923’).16 The Thai draftsmen needed a good definition of the term 
‘obligations’ and s 241 BGB appeared to suit their needs well. They, however, failed 
to take account of the underlying principle of this provision, ie how German 
lawyers understood it and how it connected to other relevant German provisions. 
The function of Article 194 may therefore be understood as narrowly as the letter of 
the law presents. Similarly, the reason for adopting The Japanese Article 414 in 
drafting Article 213 that its wording was similar to that of a number of provisions of 
the Code of 1923 does not suggest that this Thai rule of specific performance was 
scientifically made. The drafting of Article 215 is, however, unknown. There is no 
clue as to when and by whom this article was introduced. 
 The question remains as to why the draftsmen adopted these foreign rules so 
readily. There are a few explanations for this, but the most important one appears to 
be that they held the broad view that Japanese civil law was a modified version of 
German law17 and De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan was a trustworthy 
source of the Japanese provisions.18 For the Thai draftsmen, copying from the Minpō 
was not different from copying from the BGB. Plod viewed Japanese rules as 
digested German rules.19 The best illustration can be seen from the minutes of the 
meeting of the draftsmen on 27 August 1925. Relying on the second volume of the 
Annotated Civil Code of Japan, Plod was misled into believing that the Japanese 
                                                      
15 Florian Faust and Volker Wiese, ‘Specific Performance: A German Perspective’ in JM Smits 
and others (eds), Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives 
(Intersentia 2008) 50. 
16 National Archive of Thailand, Office of the Council of State Doc No 3(1) Books 5(1)(2), 
‘รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (The Minutes of the Meetings of the Committee of Legislation)’ 
(3 March - 26 October 1925). The Minutes of the Meetings of the Committee of Legislation 
are, hereinafter, referred as ‘Meeting Minutes’. 
17 Manavarajasevi, Interviews 4, 13, 23, 42. 
18 ibid 9. 
19 ibid 4, 42. 
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Article 414 was modelled on ss 249 and 251 BGB (1900). This is illustrated by his 
proposal to change a term in the texts of the original draft of Article 213 to include 
‘restitution in kind’ in accordance with ss 249 and 251 BGB. The other draftsmen 
readily approved his proposal without any doubt about whether the Japanese 
Article 414 was really founded on ss 249 and 251 BGB and how ‘restitution in kind’ 
was related to ‘compulsory performance’. 20 It is not surprising if the uncritically 
copying of foreign rules and misconceptions about their origin may have had some 
effects on later generations’ understanding of the rules adopted.   
Effects of the reception 
It was illustrated in Chapter 6 that the provisions of the Code of 1925 concerning 
non-performance and remedies for non-performance were mainly copied from the 
English translation of a number of provisions of the BGB and the Minpō. The reason 
why some were modelled on Japanese law while the others on German law is 
simple: the Thai draftsmen chose between these two legal systems mainly on 
linguistic grounds by opting for the provision which was written more clearly. 
Other than Articles 213 and 215 and some provisions concerning rescission, all of 
the provisions concerning non-performance were copied from the BGB of 1900. 
Having provisions dealing with causes of non-performance, namely impossibility of 
performance, delayed performance and imperfect performance, and remedies for 
non-performance, specific performance, damages and rescission,21 Thai law seems to 
follow the German system of non-performance. 
 Although their adherence to the BGB in drafting the provisions concerning 
non-performance seems to suggest that the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 intended 
to base the Thai system of non-performance on German law, their adoption of the 
copying method deprived them of the chance to discuss the theoretical basis of the 
relevant provisions. This has some significant effects on the way Thai scholars and 
lawyers have understood the concept of specific performance afterwards. While the 
Japanese choose to systematise and explain its rules of non-performance and 
remedies for non-performance mainly according with German law, the academic 
interpretation of the borrowed rules of the same area of law in Thailand is 
disoriented and reflects diversity of legal education backgrounds among the 
                                                      
20 ‘Meeting Minutes’ (27 August 1925) 3. 
21 See Table 6-3, pp 183-85 above. 
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interpreters as well as their occasional disregard of historical and comparative 
approaches to researching the relevant rules. 
 The existence of Articles 213 and 215 in the system of non-performance makes 
it difficult to identify the character of specific performance in Thai law because these 
two provisions are mainly French in nature while the other provisions of non-
performance were copied from German law. This complexity leads to some 
undesirable results.22 First, the concept of specific performance has been explained 
and understood more within the scope of procedural law than of substantive law. 
Despite the fact that Thai scholars usually link Article 194, a copy of s 241 BGB, with 
Article 213, a copy of the Japanese Article 414, they perceive specific performance as 
the enforcement of claims rather than ‘a right conferred by substantive law’, the 
common interpretation of the concept of specific performance in Germany.23 This is 
not surprising since the wording of Article 213 encourages interpreters to think that 
way and the model rule, Article 414, is similarly explained by Japanese scholars.24 
Furthermore, the phrase ‘when the nature of an obligation does not permit of 
compulsory performance’ always prompts interpreters to distinguish between 
obligations to do, not to do, and obligations to give to determine whether the 
creditor is entitled to the right to specific performance. The existence of Article 194, 
a copy of s 241 BGB, has not convinced Thai lawyers to adopt German 
jurisprudence to conceptualise specific performance fully perhaps because the 
German provision is perhaps too abstract. They mainly view Article 194 as the 
definition of the term ‘obligations’. This clearly illustrates that the borrowing of s 
241 BGB did not bring its original meaning from German law to the new 
environment.  
 Second, most Thai academics readily accepted that specific performance was 
the first and primary remedy for non-performance, but they also maintained that in 
cases of non-performance the creditor can choose between the right to specific 
performance and the right to compensation for damage. This is contradictory. 
Giving the creditor the right to choose without justification means that specific 
performance is no longer the first and primary remedy for non-performance. There 
                                                      
22 The complexity of the system of remedies for non-performance in Thai law is reflected in 
Prachoom Chomchai’s statement on a choice of remedies for non-performance that ‘[t]he 
uncertainty of the codified law is…such that one cannot be sure whether the foregoing 
depicts a genuine option or simply a scenario or sequence of proceedings to be observed’. 
Prachoom Chomchai, ‘Introduction’ in Prachoom Chomchai (ed), Development of Legal 
Systems in Asia: Experiences of Japan and Thailand (Thammasat University 1998) 80. 
23 Faust and Wiese, ‘Specific Performance’ 49. 
24 See ch 5, 2.2 ‘’Germanisation’ of the Japanese concept of non-performance and remedies 
for non-performance’ p 172 above. 
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has been an absence of theoretical explanations in Thai literature on how the 
primacy of specific performance can coexist with the creditor’s right to choose 
remedies freely in case of non-performance. Sophon Rattanakorn, an eminent expert 
on the Thai law of obligations, is the only writer who confirms that compensation 
for damage can be both an alternative remedy and a supplementary remedy of 
specific performance.25 However, Sophon, who insisted on the principle of the 
primacy of specific performance, did not clarify how the primacy of specific 
performance was still upheld where the creditor had the right to choose between 
remedies.  
 The problem of the Thai concept of specific performance is not the question of 
choosing the most appropriate foreign theory to explain the principle of the primacy 
of specific performance but the difficulty in justifying the principle with the theory. 
It is unclear whether this difficulty is the result of the copying method used by the 
draftsmen of the Code of 1925 or the result of the approach which the interpreters 
adopted to interpret the rules. Although both are plausible causes, the former is, in 
my opinion, more convincing due to its objectivity; the wordings of Articles 213 and 
215 seem to bar the interpreter from defending the principle of the primacy of 
specific performance logically. Specific performance cannot be the primary remedy 
for non-performance when the wording of Article 215 suggests that damages are 
always permitted where the debtor does not effect the performance.26 This universal 
availability of damages in case of non-performance is a result of the blind copying 
of De Becker’s English translation of the Japanese Article 415.  
 The principle of the primacy of specific performance does not necessarily 
mean that specific performance must always be chosen before the other remedies in 
case of non-performance. In German law, where the primacy of specific 
performance is ‘axiomatic’,27 there are exceptional situations where the creditor can 
claim damages instead of performance and German lawyers make it clear when 
performance and damages coexist. Despite this, specific performance is still 
                                                      
25  Sophon Rattanakorn, คําอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชยวาดวยหนี:้ บทเบ็ดเสร็จทั่วไป (Commentary on 
the Law of Obligations of the Civil and Commercial Code: General Provisions) (10th edn, 
Nitibannakarn 2010) 150. 
26 Code of 1925, art 215 ‘When the debtor does not perform the obligation in accordance with 
the true intent and purpose of the same, the creditor may claim compensation for any 
damage caused there by’. Office of the Council of State, Doc No 79, 
‘การตรวจแกรางประมวลกฎหมายแพงและพาณิชย บรรพ 1 และ บรรพ 2 (The Book of the Revised Drafts)’ (1925) 109. 
27 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, 
Clarendon Press 1998) 472. 
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regarded as the primary remedy for non-performance.28 By contrast, there is no 
systematic theoretical explanation of the principle of the primacy of performance 
and the availability of each remedy for non performance, ie when damages instead 
of performance and damages in addition to performance are available. The problem 
of this unclear relationship between contractual remedies in Thai law is well 
illustrated by the Supreme Court Decision No 2625/2551 BE (2008 CE) where the 
court rejected the plaintiff’s claim for damages instead of performance on the 
grounds that the performance was still possible despite the fact that the contract had 
been rescinded before the case was brought before it.29 
 The adoption of the Japanese Article 415 does not only create confusion over 
the relationship between specific performance and damages in the legal systems 
where specific performance is regarded as the primary remedy for non-performance, 
it also undermines the principle of fault. Either intentionally or accidentally the 
Japanese draftsmen did not incorporate the principle of fault into the text of Article 
415.30 Literally interpreted, this provision means that the debtor can be liable even if 
he is not responsible for his failure to perform the obligation. This gap was later 
filled by the Japanese court which held that, in case of delayed performance, the 
debtor’s fault was a prerequisite for his liability.31 The draftsmen of the Thai Code of 
1925 were unfortunately unaware of this problem and the Japanese judgement at 
the time of codification. The adoption of the  Article 415 proves to be one of the 
most detrimental effects of the reception of foreign laws of obligations in Thailand. 
This is because Article 215, a copy of the Japanese Article 415, is contrary to Articles 
205, a copy of s 285 BGB, which states that ‘the debtor is not in default so long as the 
performance is not effected in consequence of a circumstance for which he is not 
responsible’.32 The same question arises whether in Thai law the debtor is still liable 
for compensation for damage where he is not responsible for the cause of his failure 
to perform the obligation. In one of the most popular Thai texts on the law of 
obligations, originally written by Jeed Setthabutr but later edited by Daraporn 
Thirawat, Daraporn added her opinion to the original commentary on Article 205 
                                                      
28 See also Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, ‘The New Approach to Breach of Contract in German 
Law’ in Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 
(Hart Publishing 2005) 135-56. 
29 Supreme Court Decision No 2625/2551 BE. 
30 Akira Kamo, ‘Crystallization, Unification, or Differentiation? The Japanese Civil Code 
(Law of Obligations) Reform Commission and Basic Reform Policy (Draft Proposals)’ (2010) 
24 CJAL 171, 194. 
31 Judgement of the Supreme Tribunal, 22 November 1922, Minroku 27-1978 cited in Hiroshi 
Oda, Japanese Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 138. 
32 Chung Hui Wang, The German Civil Code: Translated and Annotated (Stevens and Sons 1907) 
65; ‘Book of the Revised Drafts’ 107. 
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that although in case of delayed performance, the debtor cannot be put into default 
because he has a legitimate excuse under Article 205, by virtue of Article 215, he is 
still responsible for damages he caused and the creditor has the right to claim 
compensation for damage.33 This interpretation clearly undermines the principle of 
fault and contradicts Article 205. 
 Article 215 can also be potentially problematic in case of delay if it is applied 
without the principle of fault. Since the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 copied 
Wang’s English translation of s 284 BGB almost verbatim to formulate Article 204,34 
Thai civil law received the principle of notice of default (Mahnung). Although s 326 
BGB (the principle of giving a period of grace (Nachfrist)) was not adopted Thai 
writers and courts interpret Article 204 to include Nachfrist. It is worth nothing that 
giving the creditor a second chance is also common in French law.35 If Article 215 is 
interpreted literally as Daraporn did, the debtor’s failure to perform his duty always 
gives rise to the creditor’s claim for damages no matter whether the debtor is 
answerable to such failure (Article 205) and without the debtor being given a notice 
of warning and an additional period of time to perfom (Article 204). This 
interpretation clearly nullifies the effect of Article 204 of the Code of 1925. 
 It is ironic that the Thai draftsmen who were critical of French law uncritically 
adopted two Japanese provisions which were largely based on French legal 
concepts to establish Articles 213 and 215. Their use of the copying method for 
drafting the Thai rules on specific performance has left a legacy of theoretical 
disorientation: while many leading Thai jurists have German law in mind, their 
interpretation points the way towards French law. The position of the current 
system of remedies for non-performance, especially specific performance, seems to 
be ambiguous and unfortunate. The time is ripe for Thai academics and lawyers to 
explore the possibilities of reforming not only the system of specific performance 
but also the entire system of the law of obligations in the Code of 1925 before it 
reaches its century in 2025. 
 
                                                      
33 Jeed Setthabutr, หลักกฎหมายแพงลักษณะหนี้ (The Principles of the Law of Obligations) (20th edn, 
Thammasat University Faculty of Law 2011) 75–76. To compare Daraporn's edition with her 
predecessor's see Jeed Setthabutr, หลักกฎหมายแพงลักษณะนิติกรรมและหนี้ (The Principles of the Law of 
Juristic Acts and Obligations) (Chitti Tingsabadh (ed), 4th edn, Thammasat University 
Faculty of Law 1983) 418–19. 
34 See Table 6 - 3, p 183 above. 
35 Code civil art 1139. See Marcel Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, vol 2:1 (Louisiana State Law 
Institute tr, St Paul 1959) 101; GH Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Account (Clarendon 1988) 132-33; Hugh Beale and others, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract 
Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010) 973. 
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2. WHAT DOES THE CASE STUDY TELL US?  
The research on the drafting of the rules concerning specific performance in 
Thailand provides insights not only into the development of the rules and the 
concept in question but the pattern of legal change of the entire Code of 1925. This 
case study thoroughly examined the general method which the draftsmen adopted 
in drafting Books I and II of the Code of 1925. However, the case study shows that 
some problems have resulted from the use of the copying method. Since almost all 
of the rules of the Code of 1925 were products of copying, one can reasonably 
assume that similar problems exist with other rules and concepts, especially the 
rules and concepts which were copied from the Minpō of 1898. 
Legal transplants and the development of Thai private law 
On the surface, the making of the Code of 1925 seems to be an excellent example of 
Alan Watson’s theory of legal transplants.36 It matches many of his observations on 
legal change and does so better even than the reception of foreign civil law in Japan, 
one of his typical examples. Watson suggested that successful legal borrowing does 
not require ‘a systematic knowledge of the law’37 and that ‘the transplanting of legal 
rules is socially easy…[they] move easily and are accepted into the system without 
too great difficulty’.38 This characterisation of legal change can be identified in the 
modernisation of Thai private law in 1925. While the Japanese took great interest 
when employing comparative methods in establishing their original code of law, the 
Thai draftsmen devoted their attention to copying the wording of foreign rules. 
Consequently, they neglected the historical and doctrinal foundations of the rules. 
The draftsmen of the Code of 1925 treated legal rules as if they were a substance 
which could be picked up and implanted very easily. It is clear that they understood 
the rules adopted mainly from their literal meaning and as a result some 
misconceptions occurred. It is hard to believe that a group of five draftsmen, three 
of whom were busy Thai officials who held top positions in judiciary and in 
government departments, spent only approximately seven months drafting the first 
                                                      
36 See Andrew Harding, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Transplatation in South East Asia: 
Making Sense of the ‘Nodic Din’’ in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds), Adapting Legal 
Cultures (Hart Publishing 2001) 213. 
37 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 LQR 79, 79. 
38 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, UGA Press 1993) 
95–96, 99. 
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two books of the Code of 1925. However, with the help of the copy-and-paste 
method, codification happened quickly.  
The relevance of internal and external factors 
The Code of 1925 was speedily made within seven months by a handful of people, 
namely five draftsmen, members of the High Revising Committee and the monarch. 
This appears to support Watson’s proposition that ‘legal development by 
transplanting derives from the expertise of the lawyers who know the foreign rule 
rather than from the common consciousness of society’.39 However, taking account 
of the social and political contexts of Thailand between the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, legal change during that period can be better understood. The 
country came under intense external pressure, colonisation threats and increasing 
abuse of consular jurisdictions. It concurrently faced an internal challenge, the 
realisation that its legal system was falling into decay. A reform of the justice system 
became a principal condition for the unfair treaties to be relaxed or abolished. Plod 
accepted that the government’s strong desire to end extraterritoriality was the 
reason why codification had to be accelerated.40 The question remains as to how 
long it would have taken the Siamese government to modernise its law without this 
external pressure. It is unconvincing that the Thai’s self consciousness about their 
own defective systems alone could be the driving force for legal change since that 
their realisation sprang up only after the arrival of expansionism in the nineteenth 
centuries. 
 The absence of ‘the common consciousness of society’ was apparent,41 and the 
modernisation of Thai private law was in the hands of a handful of professional 
elites and the ruling class. Watson may be right in suggesting that the practical 
pressure, ie economic, social and political pressure, must be also directed against the 
                                                      
39 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 CLJ 313, 315. See also Alan 
Watson, Society and Legal Change (2nd edn, TU Press 2001) 8; Alan Watson, Legal Origins and 
Legal Change (Hambledon Press 1991) 101–02. 
40 Phraya Manavarajasevi, ‘คํารําลึกของพระยามานวราชเสว ี(ปลอด วิเชียร ณ สงขลา) (Recollection of Phraya 
Manavarajasevi)’ in The Council of State of Thailand (ed), ครบรอบ 48 ป 2524 
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Thailand 1981) 5. 
41 Aubrey L Diamond opines that ‘[i]f the laws of one country can be adopted by another, it 
becomes difficult to argue that, for the adopting country at any rate, law arises from the 
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Change by Alan Watson’ (1980) 96 LQR 303, 306. 
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culture of lawmakers for law to be changed.42 This is because it is undeniable that 
legislators always have a role to play in a change of law. However, the experience of 
Thailand cannot be counted as definite proof that the lawmakers are always the 
decisive factor for legal change. One must look into an essential characteristic of 
Thai society to understand why legal change and legislation did not interest the 
ordinary Thai people at the time. As Sarasin Viraphol observed that paternalism 
formed the basis of traditional Thai society,43 the people were accustomed to being 
controlled by the ruler. Under absolutism, ordinary Thai people were not usually 
given a role to play in politics. They were prohibited from acquiring statutes since 
access to law was restricted to the ruler and his officials. It is not until 1862 that King 
Mongkut allowed the printing and circulation of the Three-Seal Code.44 These 
political and social conditions explained why legal change in Thailand was not a 
product of the common consciousness of society and why the Code of 1925 could be 
made easily by the will of the ruler. To understand why foreign private law was 
easily transplanted into the Thai legal system, one also needs to look at the system 
of Thai private law before modernisation. The Three-Seal Code shows that a 
contract constituted moral rather than legal obligations. The law did not clearly 
distinguish between civil and criminal disputes or between contracts and torts; they 
were all mixed. There was no evidence of commercial law.45 As Andrew Huxley 
puts it, where the monarch had a monopoly on trade, political rather than legal 
tools were needed.46 It is understandable that in the absence of a developed system 
of private law, superior foreign civil and commercial law was readily accepted and, 
of course, there were no issues of conflicts between traditional Thai private law and 
the foreign private rules received. This verifies the observations of some legal 
sociologists, notably Roger Cotterrell, who submits that a transplantation of 
instrumental laws, especially contract and commercial law, is relatively easy 
because of their ‘tie to economic interests rather than national customs or 
sentiments’.47 To conclude in Watson’s terms that legal change in Thailand in 1925 
was socially easy may be right, but this specific example does not necessarily prove 
                                                      
42 Watson, Legal Origins 101–02; Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law (Blackwell 1985) 118–19. 
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that Watson’s notion is universally true. Its validity can be questioned when it 
comes to legal change in democraticised Thai society. 
Legal irritants and success of the reception 
The making of the Code of 1925 may support Watson’s view that legal change does 
not derive from ‘the common consciousness of society’, but this thesis questions 
whether legal transplants, as Watson contended, are so easy to accomplish that a 
systematic knowledge of foreign law is not needed to implement them. If law can be 
borrowed without a systematic knowledge of it, do we really need lawyers to 
undertake legal reforms? If legal change can occur simply by copying legal ideas or 
legal texts, as illustrated by the making of the Code of 1925, one can argue that there 
is no need for lawyers at all; any one with a good command of the foreign language 
in which the law books of the borrowed system are published may be tasked with 
copying the foreign legal texts.48  
 Because Watson placed excessive emphasis on the survival of the received law 
but too little on how the received law has operated in its new environment, his legal 
transplantation model is easy and unproblematic. Studies of the reception of rules 
concerning specific performance in Thailand have, however, shown that a legal 
transplant means something more than a mere copying of legal ideas or texts and 
that it potentially causes theoretical misconception and disorientation. From a 
doctrinal perspective, the research findings challenge at least two postulates of 
Watson’s theory of legal transplants: first the recipient system does not require ‘a 
systematic knowledge of the law’49 and second the proposition that ‘[a] successful 
legal transplant – like that of a human organ – will grow in its new body, and 
become part of that body just as the rule or institution would have continued to 
develop in its parent system’.50 
 The hasty process of drafting the Code of 1925 shows that the draftsmen 
picked up the model rules and arranged the Thai provisions based on the outlines of 
the Japanese and German Civil Codes, which were deemed well-structured. Thus 
                                                      
48 Watson’s claim that a successful transplant does not require ‘a systematic knowledge of 
the law’ does not convince Eric Stein, who ‘find it somewhat difficult to conjure up an image 
of a law reformer on a tour d’horizon of foreign legal systems, plucking ideas from ‘black 
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49 Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ 79. 
50 Watson, Legal Transplants 27. 
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one may claim that by copying their structures the Thai code was automatically 
systematised. This may be broadly true. However, the drafting process neglected 
the systematic conceptual basis of the rules adopted since the draftsmen placed 
emphasis on the arrangements of the words rather than on their underlying 
principles. The rules in the BGB are not completely independent from each other. 
Several of them are systematically connected and represent the same concept. This 
was illustrated by the German principle of the primacy of specific performance 
where provisions concerning delayed performance, damages, and rescission 
confirmed that a debtor should be given a chance to perform his obligations before 
the creditor could seek other remedies. Moreover, one concept is not always 
independent from another. A systematic knowledge of the concept of law therefore 
helps with understanding how the relevant rules are theoretically linked under its 
purview.  
 If a concept is reflected in five separate provisions, an adoption of three out of 
the five provisions may result in the transfer of an incomplete concept. The 
incomplete German concepts of specific performance and non-performance which 
Thailand received from Germany and Japan have proven to be theoretically 
problematic in the understanding of the relevant rules. Thai lawyers did not 
understand the concept of specific performance in the same way as German and 
Japanese lawyers did despite a claim that the Thai system of performance follows 
German law.51 The meaning of the concept changed. It changed not when the law 
was put into effect but since the rules were adopted. Articles 414 and 415 of the 
Minpō were adopted to draft Articles 213 and 215 of the Code of 1925 respectively 
without any realisation that they were predominantly based on French law. In fact, 
Plod and most likely other Thai draftsmen naively believed they were of German 
origin.  
 In reality, the interpretations of Articles 213 and 215 have been more 
consistent with French than German Jurisprudence. It is not certain whether French 
jurisprudence has exerted considerable influence over this interpretation because of 
French characters apparently contained in the texts of Articles 213 and 215 or 
because of the interpreters who adhered to the French approach. This ambiguity 
resulted from lack of explanations in the Thai texts on the law of obligations about 
why French jurisprudence was adopted. However, considering the development of 
legal education in Thailand one may find the reason why the law of obligations in 
Thailand was mostly academically explained according to French law. From the 
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establishment of Thammasat University in 1934, French law rivalled English law in 
Thai legal education. It later became the predominant foreign legal system, 
especially in private law, in Thailand. It is natural that those familiar with French 
law picked up French doctrines to interpret the provisions of the Code of 1925. 
Coincidently, Articles 213 and 215 were of French heritage. 
 Taking account of Thailand’s experience in the borrowing of the specific 
performance rules, Pierre Legrand’s argument that the meaning of a rule is not 
entirely supplied by the rule itself but depends on the contexts of the place where it 
exists and the interpreter who applies it has some merit. However, Gunther Teubner 
may provide a clearer explanation for what has happened in Thailand. His theory of 
‘legal irritants’ has challenged Watson’s postulate that the received law will develop 
in the same way as it would have done in its parent system. The conclusion of this 
thesis favours the former for two reasons. First, from a doctrinal perspective, the 
law received is not the same as the one used as the model despite the fact that the 
later was copied word for word. The Thai draftsmen, the first group of interpreters, 
did not understand the model rules as they were understood in their parent system. 
When they transplanted the rules into the Thai legal system they gave them new 
meanings. Second, the received rules have not developed in the same way as their 
models. They have been understood and interpreted in various ways, some relying 
on the information provided by the draftsmen and others on their most familiar 
foreign approaches.  
 It is not easy to determine whether the reception of foreign private law in 
Thailand in 1925 has been successful. The meaning of ‘success’ and criteria for 
assessing it are themselves subjective and controversial. It is understandable that 
one might readily add the making of the Code of 1925 to Watson’s successful legal 
transplant list.52 If success of a reception is determined by the survival of the rules 
borrowed as Watson suggested,53 since the Thai code has been in use and most of its 
provisions have remained untouched by subsequent reforms since its promulgation 
in 1925, one can conclude that the reception of foreign private law has been 
successful. However, if success of the modernisation of Thai private law in 1925 is 
determined by the achievement of the goals set by the draftsmen to make a 
systematic and coherent code based on the BGB, the case study of specific 
                                                      
52 Andrew Harding submits that ‘law in South East Asia has evolved out of legal 
transplantation, which has, on the whole, been successful if judged by the criterion of 
whether the law has stuck or unstuck’ (Watson’s notion of successful transplants). Harding, 
‘Comparative Law and Legal Transplatation in South East Asia’ 213. 
53 See Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ 82–83; Watson, Legal Transplants 20; Alan 
Watson, Society and Legal Change 98. 
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performance suggests a negative answer. Although the problems of specific 
performance resulting from the method adopted in the making of the Code of 1925 
cannot be generalised, this case study should alarm Thai lawyers that there may be 
some similar problems elsewhere in the Code resulting from the same cause. 
The use of comparative law in Thailand 
From the process of receiving foreign private law to the process of interpreting the 
law received in Thailand, it has been discovered that there have always been 
problems with the use of comparative law.54 If there were major failures in the 
making of the Code of 1925, an absence of a proper use of comparative law must be 
one of them. Plod himself admitted that the Code of 1925 was made mostly by 
copying and the draftsmen’s claim that it was a product of comparative law was 
overstated.55 It was unfortunate that during the time of codification comparative law 
was only a fledgling legal science. It did not enjoy the international academic 
attention it does today. However, this does not excuse ignoring careful comparisons, 
which means not only a careful scrutiny of the underlying principles of the rules to 
be adopted and their functions but also means being aware of their historical 
development. This thesis affirms that legal history is indispensable for those who 
make use of comparative law for the sake of borrowing. It proves that the flaws in 
the borrowing of foreign rules were caused by uncritically copying and by being 
unaware of misleading information in secondary sources. The problems therefore 
resulted from an absence of a proper use of comparative and historical methods. 
Had the draftsmen of the Code of 1925 traced the origin of the Japanese rules 
adopted they would have discovered that some of them did not derive from the 
BGB. Had they had a systematic knowledge of German private law they would 
have found that there is a distinction between the German and French concepts of 
                                                      
54 Andrew Harding viewed the problem of the use of comparative law as a common 
problem in Southeast Asia. According to Harding, ‘[t]he fundamental conceptual problem 
confronting those working on law in South East Asia is that the conventions of comparative 
law are often inadequate to convey South East Asian legal reality; what comparative law 
therefore lacks…is a suitably flexible and sophisticated grammar of the discourse’. Harding, 
‘Comparative Law and Legal Transplatation in South East Asia’ 203. 
55 Manavarajasevi, ‘Recollection of Phraya Manavarajasevi’ 5. However, relying on Plod’s 
List of Resources, Naoyuki Isogawa was under the impression that ‘TCCC [Thai Civil and 
Commercial Code] can more accurately than JCC [Japanese Civil Code] be characterized as 
the genuine fruits of comparative jurisprudence’. Naoyuki Isogawa, ‘The Japanese Civil 
Code in the World Legal Systems: Toward a Comparative Study of the Asian Civil Law’ in 
Prachoom Chomchai (ed), Development of Legal Systems in Asia: Experiences of Japan and 
Thailand (Thammasat University 1998) 165. 
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specific performance. One can reasonably argue that the draftsmen could not 
always foresee the future theoretical and practical problems of the law they made 
and that interpretation varies depending on the interpreter’s conception about the 
rule. It can hardly be denied that the draftsmen’s sufficient knowledge of law would 
have prevented some potential problems which might arise from conflicting 
concepts. 
 Unfortunately, when tracing of the origin of the Code of 1925, Thai academic 
and researchers usually consult ‘Plod’s List of References’.56 As discovered in this 
thesis, this source is partially misleading especially concerning provisions of the 
Minpō because they were influenced by De Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan. 
While the Japanese have realised that some ‘Germanised’ Japanese provisions were 
not of German origin since the 1960s, in Thailand there has been a lack of research 
on the validity of ‘Plod’s List of Rereferences’. If one needs comparison as a tool for 
propounding his native legal concepts, one also needs to use legal history.57 
However, John W Cairns cautions that ‘[c]omparison may be useful in achieving 
better historical understanding but it can also hold dangers, depending on how it is 
used’.58 It is hard to understand how Thai academics could compare Thai private 
law with foreign private law without even knowing the true identity, position, and 
origin of their own law. With the help of a historical method, they will be able to 
discover the true origin and nature of it and may be able to determine which 
approach they will adopt to interpret the law. 
Reassessments of the Code of 1925 
This thesis has paved the way for a thorough reassessment of the Code of 1925. On a 
large scale, the law commission of Thailand and relevant organisations need to 
                                                      
56 See an example of a misunderstanding arising from reliance on Plod’s List of References in 
n 55 above. 
57 See Frederic William Maitland, ‘Why the History of English Law Is Not Written’ in HAL 
Fisher (ed), The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, vol 1 (CUP 1911) 488; Frederick 
Pollock, ‘The History of Comparative Jurisprudence’ (1903) 5 JSCL 74, 75; Harold Gutteridge, 
Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study & Research (CUP 
1946) 28–29; Watson, Legal Transplants 6; James Gordley, ‘Comparative Law and Legal 
History’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 772; David Johnston, ‘Roman Law, Comparative Law and Legal 
History’ (1999) 3 ZEuP 560, 561-64; William Ewald, ‘Legal History and Comparative Law’ 
(1999) 3 ZEuP 553, 558–559; Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law 8. 
58 For example, a comparative study of English and Scottish legal history, according to 
Cairns, is not always appropriate. John W Cairns, ‘National, Transnational and European 
Legal Histories: Problems and Paradigms. A Scottish Perspective’ [2012] 5 Clio@Themis 6 
<http://www.cliothemis.com/IMG/pdf/TP_Cairns.pdf> accessed 15 November 2012. 
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examine the drafting process of the Code and the effects of the copying method. 
There are several important issues about the making of the Code of 1925 and 
success of the reception, for example translation59 and economic effects of the 
reception, which cannot be thoroughly investigated in this thesis. This thesis, for 
example, raised a linguistic issue concerning the terms ‘compensation for damage’ 
and ‘pecuniary damages’ in Articles 213 and 215 which were slightly changed by 
the draftsmen when they were copied and were translated into Thai according with 
the alteration.60 The change of the terms and the translation have affected Thai 
lawyers’ understanding of the rules containing these two terms, especially in 
connection to delictual and contractual remedies. The issue of lack of a unified and 
sophisticated system of contractual remedies should also be considered seriously. 
The ambiguous relationship between specific performance and damages results in 
uncertainty as to the scope of these two remedies, ie when they are available and 
whether damages in lieu of performance and damages in addition to performance 
are distinguished. These concepts of contractual remedies should also be assessed 
from economic perspective, ie whether the current remedies are just and sufficient 
to the person who suffers loss. 
 The legal systems on which the Code of 1925 were based, namely the BGB, the 
Minpō and the French Code civil, have all been reformed or have attracted attempts 
to reform them, especially the system of remedies for non-performance. The 
Germans revised the BGB in 2002. The revision mainly concerned non-performance 
and remedies for non-performance. Specific performance was strengthened while 
other remedies, namely damages and rescission, were systematised. The German 
system of non-performance has changed from a system based on types of 
performance which revolved around impossibility of performance to a system 
based on remedies for non-performance.61 The Japanese detected some problems of 
the rules of the Minpō, especially the law of obligations, which arose from the 
adoption of various foreign laws and the concepts which were ‘Germanised’.62 In 
2009 the Japanese government responded to academic requests for a revision and 
                                                      
59 In Japan, the problem of translation which arised from the reception of foreign law was 
discussed extensively. See eg Ichiro Kitamura, ‘Problems of the Translation of Law in Japan’ 
(1993) 23 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 143. 
60 See p 205 above. 
61 Reinhard Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives (OUP 2005) 39–40; Andreas Heldrich and Gebhard Rehm, ‘Modernisation of the 
German Law of Obligations: Harmonisation of Civil Law and Common Law in the Recent 
Reform of the German Civil Code’ in Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick (eds), Comparative 
Remedies for Breach of Contract (Hart Publishing 2005) 130. 
62 See ch 5, 2.2 ‘Germanisation of the Japanese concept of non-performance and remedies for 
non-performance’ p 172 above. 
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the Japanese Ministry of Justice set up a commission to consider a reform on the 
Code in relation to the law of obligations.63 Although the work of the commission is 
still in progress, this movement shows the Japanese realisation of the defects 
resulting from the reception of foreign law. Since many provisions of the Thai law of 
obligations were copied from Japanese rules, the Japanese reform project may 
provide useful lessons for the Thai to learn. A French academic project on a 
proposal for reform of the law of obligations64 might also be a resource for learning. 
The unclear French position of specific performance, a legacy of the adoption of two 
conflicting concepts of performance, namely those of Pothier and Domat, has 
polarised academic views on the primacy of specific performance.65 The proposal 
offers a reinterpretation of current Article 1142 of the Code civil and proposes a new 
provision, proposed Article 1154, to replace it. This proposed provision reinterprets 
Article 1142 to strengthen the principle of the primacy of specific performance.66 
 On a small scale, the Thai writers on the law of obligations need to examine 
whether any of their conceptions were based on misleading information from De 
Becker’s Annotated Civil Code of Japan. Any misunderstandings should be corrected. 
To expound on the Code of 1925 they must pay more attention to the historical 
development of individual rules to avoid being misled by secondary sources, such 
as that of De Becker. This can be achieved only with the help of proper comparative 
and historical methods. 
                                                      
63 Kamo, ‘Crystallization’ 173–74. See also the web page of the Japanese Ministry of Justice’s 
Reform of Civil Code <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/ccr/CCR_00002.html> assessed 
22 February 2013. 
64 See John Cartwright, Stefan Vogenauer, and Simon Whittaker (eds), Reforming the French 
Law of Obligations  : Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations 
et de la prescription (Hart Publishing 2009). 
65 See pp 130-33 above. See also Yves-Marie Laithier, ‘Comparative Reflections on the French 
Law of Remedies for Breach of Contract’ in Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick (eds), 
Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (Hart Publishing 2005) 103–22. 
66 Art 1154: ‘If possible an obligation to do is to be performed in kind. 
             Its performance may be ordered by a court either on pain of a monetary penalty orof 
some other means of constraint, unless the subject-matter of the obligation has a clearly 
personal character. 
             In no case may performance be obtained by recourse to any coercion which 
compromises a debtor’s personal liberty or dignity. 
             In the absence of performance in kind, an obligation to do gives rise to damages’ in 
John Cartwright and Simon Whittaker (tr), ‘Proposals for Reform of the Law of Obligations 
and the Law of Prescription’ 111 
<http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/Proposals%20for%20Reform%20of%20the%20Law
%20of%20Obligations%20and%20the%20Law.pdf > accessed 22 February 2013. 
See also Yves-Marie Laithier, ‘The Enforcement of Contractual Obligations: A French 
Perspective’ in John Cartwright and others (eds), Reforming the French Law of Obligations  : 
Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription 
(Hart Publishing 2009) 127. 
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 If they are to reform the Code of 1925, Thai lawyers and lawmakers need to 
learn from the lessons of history. They may take Bentham’s following note of 
caution into account to avoid the same mistakes: 
 
The productions of one country are, in course of time, transplanted to 
another: and the course of cultivation, may, in consequence, be changed; 
but if any change is in consequence required in the laws, it arises from the 
blindness or indolence of the legislator of former times.67
                                                      
67 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’ in 
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